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Dam(n) Displacement: Compensation,
Resettlement, and Indigeneity
Stephen R. Munzert
Hydroelectric dams produce electricity, provide flood control, and
improve agricultural irrigation. But the building and operation of these
dams frequently involve forced displacement of local communities. Dis-
placement often has an outsized impact on indigenous persons, who are
disproportionately poor, repressed, and politically marginalized. One can
limit these adverse effects in various ways: (1) taking seriously the ethics of
dam-induced development, (2) rooting out corruption, (3) paying compen-
sation at or near the beginning of dam projects, (4) using land-for-land
exchanges, (5) disbursing resettlement funds as needed until displaced per-
sons are firmly established in their new locations, and (6) having entities
that loan money to foreign governments for power dams insist that a per-
centage of the loan be sequestered to cover compensation and resettlement
costs.
This sextet of sensible measures must, however, be applied to highly
different countries and indigenous persons. This application will be
unsuccessful unless these measures fit the local situations on the ground.
This Article shows how one can succeed in two quite different countries-
China and Guatemala-in which past efforts have proved inadequate.
Maya Achi displaced by the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala are an "indige-
nous people" under any traditional definition. Ethnic minorities displaced
by dams in China are not traditional indigenous peoples because historical
narratives of outsider conquest and colonization do not apply to them.
They are, however, indigenous ethnic minorities. The Han Chinese super-
majority dominates, represses, and discriminates against them. China
ought to treat them in basically the same way that other countries ought to
treat their indigenous peoples.
Introduction ..................................................... 824
I. Development and Indigeneity ............................. 831
A. Developm ent .......................................... 831
B. Indigeneity ........................................... 833
f Distinguished Research Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. Through their
research and extended conversations with me, five persons contributed greatly to this
Article: Michael Dutton, Chong Luo, Jeremy Peretz, Sarah Rahimi, and Malena Wilson.
To them all I am endlessly grateful. My thanks go also to Tendayi Achiume, Gabriel
Juirez, Kenneth Kennedy, Sung Hui Kim, Benjamin Nyblade, Linda O'Connor, Liberty
M. Sacker, Sydney Truong, and Alex L. Wang. I appreciate the material support of the
Academic Senate and the Dean's Fund at UCLA. Any errors, shortcomings, and
opinions are wholly my responsibility.
51 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 823 (2019)
Cornell International Law Journal
II. Dam Building in China: Problems of Resettlement and
C om pensation ............................................
A. Resettlement, Compensation, and the Law .............
B. The Three Gorges Dam Project in Hubei Province ......
C. Dam Projects in Yunnan Province .....................
D . Attem pted Reform s ....................................
E. China's Challenges ....................................
1. Problems of Law, Regulation, Policy, and
Com pensation .....................................
2. Problems of Dam Performance and Corruption ......
F. Addressing China's Challenges ........................
1. Law, Regulation, Policy, and Compensation Methods
2. Solutions Relating to Dam Performance and
C orruption ........................................
G. Displacement, Resilience, and the Ethics of Dam-
B uild in g ..............................................
III. The Chixoy Dam and the Fate of Maya Achi in
G u atem ala ...............................................
A . H istorical Context .....................................
B. Maya Achi Then and Now .............................
1. Rabinal and Its Surroundings .......................
2. Pacux: A Resettlement Village ......................
3. The Village of Rio Negro ............................
C . M igration Patterns ....................................
1. Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala City ...............
a. La Term inal ...................................
b . La Brigada ....................................
2. Maquiladora Workers throughout Guatemala .........
3. Palm Oil Plantations in Sayaxche ...................
D. Congress, the Executive Branch, and the World Bank...
1. How the World Bank Works ........................
2. The Law-on-the-Books ..............................
3. The Law-on-the-Ground ............................
a. Congress and the Executive Branch ............
b. The Executive Branch and the World Bank .....
c. Human Rights, Politics, and Corruption in
G uatem ala ....................................
E. Ethics of Development ................................
C on clu sion ......................................................
840
841
846
849
854
856
856
857
858
858
860
863
865
866
870
870
875
877
879
879
879
880
881
884
885
885
887
888
888
890
892
894
895
Introduction
Building power dams is one way in which many countries seek to
improve the lives of their inhabitants by developing infrastructure that
exploits natural resources. Benefits of these dams include better flood and
irrigation control in the vicinity of the dam and downriver as well as more
electricity for cities, small towns, and rural areas. However, these dams
also have some adverse effects. Construction disrupts the normal life of
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valley dwellers. Once dam reservoirs fill, persons who previously lived in
upstream neighboring valleys can no longer do so in areas that are under
water. As a result, dam projects frequently displace some valley dwellers
and cause them harm.
Building power dams may dislodge both indigenous and nonindige-
nous populations. The term "indigenous peoples" lacks a definition that is
both precise and generally accepted. Elsewhere Kal Raustiala and I defined
an "indigenous people" as "a transtemporal cultural group whose members
have lived in a subregion of a country or countries prior to conquest or
colonization, who are a small minority of and to some extent isolated from
the main populations of that country or countries, and who have distinc-
tive social, linguistic, and political features."' That definition worked well
for the purposes of our paper on intellectual property rights in traditional
knowledge.
We and Martinez Cobo 2 both defined indigenous peoples in relation
to, or as a condition of, a historical narrative of outsider invasion, con-
quest, or colonization. However, there are difficulties in applying this nar-
rative to countries without a history of European invasion, conquest, or
colonization. The Chinese government, for example, has refused to apply
the term "indigenous peoples" to various ethnic minorities who, along with
the dominant ethnic majority (Han Chinese), make up China's popula-
tion.3 Part I shows that while what China calls "ethnic minorities" are not
indigenous peoples as that term is usually understood, its ethnic minori-
ties, which are indigenous to China, should have the same protections as
indigenous peoples in other parts of the globe.4
For the moment, I use the term "indigenous groups" to encompass
both "indigenous peoples" and "indigenous ethnic minorities." This Arti-
cle concentrates chiefly on indigenous groups in China's Hubei and Yun-
nan provinces and Guatemala's Rabinal municipality. Usually, indigenous
1. Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual Property
Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDozo ARTS & ENT. L.J. 37, 49 n.25 (2009) [herein-
after Munzer & Raustiala]. Raustiala and I were well aware that some international doc-
uments and other authors define the term differently, or leave it undefined. See id.
2. "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a histori-
cal continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their terri-
tories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on
those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society
and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ances-
tral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as
peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal
system." ASIA PACIFIC FORUM OF NAT'L HUMAN RIGHTS INST. & OFFICE OF THE U.N. HIGH
COMM'R FOR HuMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGE-
NOUS PEOPLES: A M~AN'uAL FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS 6 (2013) (quoting
Jos6 Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Popula-
tions, E/CN/4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, para. 379) [hereinafter INDIGENOUS PEOPLES MAN-
UAL] (emphasis omitted).
3. See Benedict Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples" in International Law: A Constructive
Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 AM J. INT'L L. 414, 417-18 (1998) [hereinafter
Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples"] (discussing China's refusal).
4. See infra text accompanying notes 50-99.
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groups consist of the poorest individuals in a nation state. These individu-
als are often politically marginalized as well. As a result, it is all too easy
for the wealthy, the well-connected, and even middle class persons-who
are not likely to be indigenous-to ignore the negative effects building
dams in river valleys exert upon dispossessed indigenous groups. My argu-
ment does not rest on the assumption that, some populations should have
special protections or rights simply because they are indigenous. Instead,
the argument is that, as a practical matter, countries often have a moral and
political duty to protect heightened procedural rights for indigenous
groups, and occasionally countries should grant slightly different substan-
tive rights to indigenous groups-for instance, in regard to resettlement
options. 5 This argument is consistent with the position that poor persons
who are not indigenous have, or should have, largely the same rights and
protections as members of indigenous groups.
I focus on indigenous groups in China and Guatemala for four rea-
sons. First, it would take more than one book to deal with indigenous
groups everywhere, because their characteristics and situations vary so
widely. It is more realistic to say something in satisfying detail about two
countries with indigenous groups. Second, China is a fine example of a
partly developed, but still partly developing nation that in recent decades
has built many hydroelectric dams. 6 China is distinctive in that it has a
sometimes-shifting economic system that combines its communist past
and present with some capitalist features, 7 and places significant restric-
tions on land-use rights.8 Its economic development no longer depends on
aid from foreign countries. The United States has little leverage on how
China treats its ethnic minorities. Third, Guatemala is a developing coun-
try that has many Maya groups as indigenous peoples. Guatemala has one
main hydroelectric dam-the Chixoy Dam-which was built between
1977-1983.9 The construction of that dam took a heavy toll on one indig-
enous group in particular-namely, the Maya Achi people 10 who suffered
5. Philosophically, this assumption rests in part on what can be called a threat-
protection view of moral and political rights. This view attaches importance to the fact
that some right-holders are often in a poor position to assert and protect their own
rights. Children, for example, occupy this position in regard to some of their rights.
Legal examples include a child's right to have a voice through a trustee in custody cases
and a right in neglect hearings against the parents. See generally Joel Feinberg, The
Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, PARENTAL AUTHOR-
ITY, AND STATE POWER 126 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette eds., 1980). To forestall
misunderstanding, I am not infantilizing indigenous persons or viewing them as help-
less victims but just pointing out that subordination, oppression, and linguistic
marginalization can inhibit their ability to insist on their moral, political, and legal
rights.
6. See infra text accompanying note 93.
7. See infra text accompanying note 118.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 104-46.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 273-75, 294-315.
10. Maya Achi are indigenous to Alta and Baja Verapaz and number about 75,000 to
85,000 persons, of whom about 1,500 live or lived in the Rio Negro valley. Jaroslava
Colajacomo, The Chixoy Dam: The Maya Achi' Genocide. The Story of Forced Resettlement
1 (World Comm'n on Dams, Working Paper, 1999) [hereinafter Colajacomo]. The
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killings, torture, and other forms of violence. 1 ' Displaced from the Rio
Negro valley in Rabinal, they relocated mostly to other parts of Guatemala,
but received almost no compensation or resettlement aid from the govern-
ment. 12 The United States has some leverage on the Guatemalan govern-
ment, whether through the U.S. Treasury Department or entities such as
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund ("IMF"), or the Inter-
American Development Bank ("IADB"). Fourth, though China and Guate-
mala differ in many ways, they have at least three things in common: eco-
nomic inequality, corruption, and inadequate provision for displaced
indigenous groups. 1 3
It is not possible to address all questions about the pairing of China
and Guatemala. Some might ask, for example, why not investigate China-
India or Guatemala-Honduras? No doubt China-India could generate an
interesting discussion. But because India claims it has no indigenous peo-
ples in the colonial contact sense, it would not further my project to bring
the indigenous peoples literature into contact with the literature on Chi-
nese ethnic minorities. Comparing Guatemala and Honduras could also
prove fruitful. In Honduras, the El Caj6n Dam produces hydroelectric
power despite challenges, 14 and the murder of a Honduran environmental-
ist who opposed the Agua Zarca dam project on the Gualcarque River,
viewed as sacred by Lenca indigenous people, led international investors to
withdraw funding.15 However, dam-related violence is a small part of the
story of dam construction in Honduras whereas it is at the center of the
narrative, and extensive literature, concerning the Chixoy Dam in Guate-
mala. Moreover, a Guatemala-Honduras comparison would foreclose the
opportunity to discuss both the treatment of indigenous peoples in Central
America and the treatment of indigenous ethnic minorities in China. In
any case, it is no part of my argument that pairing China and Guatemala
generates, hands-down, the most fruitful comparison of dam displacement
and indigeneity.
This Article shows how better provision for indigenous groups can be
both politically and economically realistic and how it can improve the lives
native language of Maya Achi is Achi. Gary F. Simons & Charles D. Fenmig, Achi, in
ETHNOLOGUE: LANGUAGES OF THE WORLD (21st ed., SIL International, 2018), https://
www.ethnologue.com/language/acr/21 (click on "acr" identifier).
11. See infra text accompanying notes 303-13.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 298-302, 314, 323-30, 564-94.
13. "China is no monolith. While residents of Shanghai and Beijing are almost as
well off as those in Switzerland by some income measures, parts of the country live more
like they were in Guatemala." China's Got a $43,000 Wealth Gap Problem, BLOOMBERG
News (May 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-20/china-s-
wealth-gap-teslas-for-the-rich-footpaths-for-the-poor. "Guizhou and Yunnan provinces in
the south and Gansu in the north each had per capita GDP income below $10,000 last
year, ranking them among Ukraine, El Salvador and Guatemala." Id. On corruption, see
infra Sections III.E.2 and ILI.F.2 (China) and Section W.D.3.c (Guatemala).
14. See Christoph Lehmann, Of Dams and Hurricanes: Lessons and Recommendations
from El Cajon, 21 MOUNTAIN REs. & DEV. 10, 13 (2001).
15. Nina Lakhani, Backers of Honduran Dam Opposed by Murdered Activist Withdraw
Funding, GUARDIAN (June 4, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/04/
honduras-dam-activist-berta-caceres [https://perma.cc/3L44-DLC8].
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of indigenous persons. Better provision requires money that is wisely
spent. There are at least two ways to get the money. One is to generate the
economic rent by exploiting natural resources, such as the topography of a
valley and the existence of flowing water.16 A second is to carve out, say,
ten percent of a loan made by the World Bank to a foreign government or
closely-related entity that will build the dam. The carve-out can partly off-
set negative impacts on indigenous groups. The World Bank Operations
Manual requires that the Bank respect the interests of indigenous persons
when disbursing funds to a foreign government or closely-related entity. 17
The United States helps fund the World Bank, but Congress has no direct
authority over it.' 8 By statute, however, the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury
must protect the interests, and above all the human rights, of indigenous
persons. 19 Whatever the source of funds, it is important to get the money
upfront when possible. If an indigenous group and a foreign government
or lender do not come to ready agreement on what the group needs, an
impartial body can process the claims of the group and its members,
because all members may not be equally affected.
20
A government solution to problems created by dam projects might
seem absurdly simple. First, adhere to an ethics of development that pro-
tects indigenous groups from unnecessary or unjustified dam projects.
Second, root out corruption that diverts money intended for these projects
into the pockets of politicians, government officials, and business people.
Third, disburse compensation as soon as a taking of private or communal
16. Michael M. Cernea, Compensation and Benefit Sharing: Why Resettlement Policies
and Practices Must Be Reformed, 1 WATER SCI. & ENGINEERING 89, 95 (2008) [hereinafter
Cernea, Resettlement]. Cernea defines "economic rent" as "a surplus (or windfall) over
and above the value of the invested capital, materials, labor costs, and other factors of
production employed to exploit natural resources." Id. at 95. For other ambitious schol-
arship on hydroelectric dams, see Amy McNally et al., Hydropower and Sustainability:
Resilience and Vulnerability in China's Powersheds, 90 J. ENV'T MGMT. S286 (2009) (using
the spatial abstraction of a power shed to analyze resilience and vulnerability); Thi Dieu
Nguyen, The State versus Indigenous Peoples: The Impact of Hydraulic Projects on the Indig-
enous Peoples of Asia, 7J. WORLD HIST. 101 (1996) (using historical analysis with specific
reference to the role of the World Bank).
17. WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK OPERATIONS MANUAL (2015), available at http://sitere
sources.worldbank.org/EXTOPMANUAL/Resources/EntireOMExternalUpdatedJulyl-
2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/KKB4-SMTQ]. The World Bank ("the Bank") has to
"screen[ ]" to see if an indigenous people has an attachment to the project area." Id.
4.10, c15 6, 8. If it does, the borrowing nation has to make a social assessment and
create an Indigenous Peoples Plan ("IPP"), respond to any negative social outcomes with
a detailed plan for mitigation, compensation, and resettlement if needed, and ensure
that the indigenous people receive "culturally appropriate" benefits from the project. Id.
at 11 6, 9-12, 15, 16. For details, see id. at Annexes A and B.
18. Kristina Daugirdas, Congress Underestimated: The Case of the World Bank, 107 Am
J. Nr'L L. 517, 520 (2013) [hereinafter Daugirdas, World Bank].
19. The main statutes are the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the
International Financial Institutions Act of 1977, as amended, both codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C. Key provisions include 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 262d, 262o-4, 2151(a)(1),
2151n, 2169, 2271(b).
20. A generic name for such a body is "claims resolution facility," of which there are
many varieties. Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities,
57 STAN. L. REV. 1361-62 (2005).
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property occurs, including the value of ongoing businesses and livelihoods
wiped out by the taking. Fourth, set up some land-for-land exchanges as
in-kind compensation. Fifth, disburse resettlement funds as needed until
displaced persons are firmly established in their new locations. Sixth,
have entities that loan money to countries seeking funds for power dams
impose an obligation on recipient governments to sequester part of the
loan amount to cover compensation and resettlement costs, and create an
independent auditing process to make sure the sequestered money is actu-
ally going toward compensation and resettlement.
Some will claim that the problem of improving the conditions of indig-
enous groups who frequently bear the negative impacts of new power dams
cannot possibly be that simple. There is some truth to this claim. Coun-
tries sometimes ignore the ethics of development. 2 1 Although the eco-
nomic-rent point is sound, often the rent does not materialize until the dam
project is complete or nearly so. Indigenous groups often lack title-i.e.,
legal recognition of robust property rights-to the land on which they live
and work.2 2 Thus, even if a law requires compensation for private prop-
erty taken for a dam project, there may be little legal recourse for indige-
nous groups if they have no legally recognized private property, or perhaps
have no property interest at all, in the land on which they live and work.
Moreover, many societies today show scant regard for indigenous groups. 23
All too often, indigenous groups all over the world tend to be viewed as
obstacles to economic development rather than individuals whose lives are
as valuable as the lives of other persons in society.24 In worst-case scena-
rios, national governments, their armies, or private militias sometimes
murder and terrorize indigenous persons to get them to leave river valleys
where dams will be built.25 Lastly, even if a country's statutes seem to
create a sensible law-on-the-books, it is the law-on-the-ground that counts.
These matters receive intensive discussion later in this Article.
The foregoing difficulties are challenging but not intractable. Corrup-
tion also merits serious attention. This Article offers some general discus-
sion of dams, land use, economic development, migration, and indigenous
groups. It briefly discusses the ethics of dam-induced development 26 and
grapples with particular developing countries, the extent of their need for
hydroelectric power, and the affected indigenous groups and their cultures.
21. See infra Part II.G (China) and Part III.D (Guatemala).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 118, 113-20 (China). Guatemalan recogni-
tion of Maya Achi land rights has been spotty, even when Maya Achi seem to have had
legal titles; see infra text accompanying notes 303-04.
23. See Indigenous Peoples, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, https://www.amnesty.org/en/
what-we-do/indigenous-peoples [https://perma.cc/APC4-G3QR] (last visited Jan. 23,
2019).
24. See U.N. DEP'T OF ECON. & SocIAL AFF., STATE OF THE WORLD'S INDIGENOUS PEO-
PLEs 87-88, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/328 (Jan. 10, 2010), available at https://www.un.org/
esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIPweb.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4SP-
YPYK.
25. See infra text accompanying notes, 303-07, 309-13 (Guatemala).
26. See infra Part II.G (China) and Part III.E (Guatemala).
829
Cornell International Law Journal
Two contrasting examples inform the discussion at a concrete level.
The first is dam building and operation in contemporary China. China has
a good deal of law on how to treat those displaced by dam projects.2 7 But
frequently, the law-on-the-books and the law-on-the-ground differ.28 The
laws and regulations that guide local authorities often need improvement
in practice. Furthermore, the compensation offered and the pertinent
resettlement policies are far from perfect, and corruption is a constant
problem. 2 9 China nevertheless gets more things right in dealing with
indigenous peoples than many other countries.
The second example is dam building and operation in Guatemala, and
specifically the construction of the Chixoy Dam in the Rio Negro Valley.
Corruption haunted Guatemala generally, and legal recourse for the indige-
nous Maya Achi who lived in the area was almost nonexistent. 30 Worse,
local militias tortured, raped, and murdered individuals, burned homes
and businesses, and generally terrorized the Maya Achi population.
3 1
Compensation was decades late and many dollars short.32 Resettlement
opportunities were dismal.3 3 Only after decades of struggle did Maya Achi
ever receive any financial recompense, and even then the dollar amount
provided was paltry in relation to the harm done.3 4 As Part III will show,
the politics of Guatemala have recently, though fitfully, begun to change,
and the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury can and should play a more effective
role in securing a carve-out of World Bank and IADB loans that the United
States funds, in whole or in part, for many recipients of U.S. foreign aid.
Guatemala can learn something from China, and vice versa.
35
This Article tackles many issues. In an effort to avoid reader fatigue, I
do not consider: (1) whether indigenous groups should have a legal immu-
nity against being displaced; (2) whether they should have a legal right to
block the taking or regulation of their property, be it individually or collec-
tively held, despite the overall desirability of a power dam; (3) whether
their rights should be the same in developing and developed countries; (4)
how to appraise tradeoffs, if a country needs more electric power, between
building a hydroelectric dam and burning coal to generate electricity; and
(5) whether and, if so, how race is related to indigeneity or ethnicity. I do
consider, however, whether compensation and resettlement related to dam
projects can ever entirely offset the harms these projects impose on indige-
27. See infra Part H.A.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 146 (discussing the unavailability of certifi-
cates memorializing land-use contracts in China), 520-65 (discussing the law-on-the-
books and the law-on-the-ground regarding World Bank operations in Guatemala).
29. By "corruption" I mean generally an abuse of trust for personal, familial, or polit-
ical gain. For more on this understanding, see infra Part II.F.2.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 303-04 (discussing the assembly of a "book"
of land titles by two Maya Achi, who "disappeared" along with their "book" on the way to
Guatemala City).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 307, 309-13.
32. See infra text accompanying note 314.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100.
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nous groups. 36 To set the inquiry in context, I shall at once discuss issues
of development and indigenous groups.
1. Development and Indigeneity
In discussions of international development, scholars often overlook
indigeneity and often do not consider international development in rela-
tion to issues of indigeneity. This part remarks on development and
indigeneity, mentions connections between them, and sets the stage for the
subsequent treatment of dam building in China (Part II) and Guatemala
(Part III).
A. Development
The Introduction opened with a somewhat optimistic statement that
power dams are a way for countries to benefit inhabitants by improving
infrastructure and harnessing natural resources. 3 7 Here, I offer some
nuance to the benefits and drawbacks of the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF"), 3 8 and related institutions such as the Asian Devel-
opment Bank ("ADB") and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
("AIIB").
Even if the mission of these institutions is benevolent, one might ques-
tion whether their programs have uniformly benign effects on the coun-
tries to which loans are made. Should one of these institutions decide to
loan money to a country for a power dam, it understandably might seek
some changes in how that country operates. In case the country has a
reputation for corruption, the lender might insist that the country reduce
corruption before approving the loan and that monitoring during the dam
project be a condition of receiving loan installments. If a country has a
record of inefficiency and lacks experience with large infrastructure
projects, the lender might require terms that decrease the risk of default
and increase the probability of success. After all, a lender will have less
funds available for future loans to this or other countries if default occurs.
Some economists and political theorists criticize certain Structural
Adjustment Agreements ("SAAs") between lenders and recipient coun-
tries.3 9 The terms of SAAs vary but often require recipient countries to
commit to:
making the private sector the primary engine of [a country's] economic
growth, maintaining a low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the
size of its state bureaucracy, maintaining as close to a balanced budget as
possible,... eliminating and lowering tariffs, removing restrictions on for-
eign investment, . . .increasing exports, privatizing state-owned industries
36. See infra Part II.G (China) and Part III.E (Guatemala).
37. See supra text accompanying note 1.
38. Together the World Bank Group and the IMF are known as the International
Financial Institutions ("IFIs"). M. RODWAN ABou-HaRB & DAVID CINGRANELLI, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT 3 (2007) [hereinafter ABouHAR- & CINGRANELLI].
For extended discussion of the World Bank and Guatemala, see infra Part III.D.
39. ABoUHARB & CINGRANELLI, supra 38, at 11.
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and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency convertible
[to dollars or other stable currencies], [and] ... deregulating its economy to
promote as much domestic competition as possible .... 40
Terms like these illustrate how SAAs often serve a neoliberal agenda
by promoting open markets, private industry, and deregulation. 4 1 Contro-
versially, such terms also rely on a positive assessment of the role of global-
ization in economic and social development.
4 2
Clearly, empirical evidence is necessary to assess claims about the
harms SAAs arguably inflict. Rodwan Abouharb and David Cingranelli
provide evidence that SAAs are often a hardship for the poor and increase
civil conflict, undermine the rights of workers, and interfere with human
rights. 4 3 They argue that, in fact, respecting human rights fosters eco-
nomic development.4 4 Unlike some scholars, 4 5 Abouharb and Cingranelli
do not criticize the World Bank and the IMF on the grounds that SAAs
disrupt democratic institutions and destabilize civil liberties. 4 6 Instead
they claim that "[dieveloping countries are likely to have a higher rate of
economic growth if they have democratic political institutions and if their
citizens have protections of their civil liberties."' 4 7 It is, however, worth
investigating whether countries that dispense development aid not only
seek to gain political influence in recipient countries but also see the
harms of dam-induced displacement and corruption as predictable or just
as the way the world works.
No consensus exists on the best way to promote economic and social
development. Matt Andrews, for example, argues that reforms signaling
better "short-term" performance are "often unrealistic" and that what he
calls institutional reform through "problem-driven iterative adaptation" is
40. THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LExus AND THE OLIVE TREE 103 (2000).
41. See ABouHaRB & CINGRANELLI, supra note 38, at 67-68, 75-77, 191-95 (discuss-
ing neo-liberal economics and the effects of SAAs). A new issue on the horizon con-
cerns the rise of Chinese financing and outbound investment, which have a different
view of development from the IFIs and are less likely to attach conditions to financing.
See, e.g., Bushra Bataineh, Michael Bennon & Francis Fukuyama, Beijing's Building
Boom, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May 21, 2018), https:/www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/
2018-05-21/beijings-building-boom (stating that "[t]he Chinese tend to overvalue the
beneficial economic spillover effects of infrastructure projects, while undervaluing the
potential harms, whether economic, social, or environmental").
42. Compare JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DIscONTENTS (2002) (discuss-
ing the failures of globalization), with MARTIN WOLF, WHY GLOBALIZATION WORKS (2004)
(touting the benefits of globalization).
43. ABouiHARB & CINGRANELLI, supra note 38, at 144, 168-69, 201. Another term for
SAAs is Structural Adjustment Programs ("SAPs"). Id. at 4.
44. Id. at 29. SAMUEL MoYN, NOT ENOUGH: HUMAN RIGHTS IN AN UNEQUAL WORLD
(2018) is, of course, correct to argue that protecting human rights does not always
reduce social and economic inequalities. However, a human rights agenda coming from
the political center has a better chance of reducing inequalities than the political left
agenda of human rights that Moyn criticizes.
45. See ABouHARB & CINGRANELLI, supra note 38, at 203 (citing AMARTYA SEN, DEVEL-
OPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999)).
46. See ABOUHARB & CINGRANELLI, supra note, at 38.
47. Id. Chinese lenders affiliated with the ADB and the AIIB are unlikely to have the
same view. See supra note 41.
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preferable. 4 8 A less sanguine example resides in neo-Marxist theories that
claim that developing countries suffer from chronic underdevelopment, as
capitalism and the institutions that promote capitalism change form over
time.4 9
An extensive exploration of economic investment is outside the scope
of this Article. But development and indigeneity are not isolated topics.
Rather, each can affect the other. Thus, an awareness of the power of inter-
national investment institutions and policies and the need for accountabil-
ity in development dealings are crucial to the evaluation of dam building
and its effects on indigenous lives, lands, and affairs. For instance, devel-
opment SAAs that insist on discontinuing government aid programs could
have a negative impact on indigenous groups who benefit from these pro-
grams. The perils of economic development play a role in my evaluation of
the dams constructed in China and Guatemala.
B. Indigeneity
Is there a principled way to acknowledge that China has no "indige-
nous peoples" as generally understood but nevertheless has "indigenous
ethnic minorities" who are entitled to basically the same protections that
ought to be given to indigenous peoples in most other areas in the globe?50
I argue that such a way exists. Indigeneity is an abstract noun that encom-
passes both indigenous peoples and indigenous ethnic minorities.
Let us start at the beginning. The adjective "indigenous" comes from
the Latin word indigena, meaning "native."'' 1 This word brings in the idea
of being native to a place or territory. The phrase "indigenous peoples" has
a legal dimension as a result of the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples5 2 and the efforts of scholars to clarify it. 5 3
48. MATr ANDREWS, THE LIMITS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN DEVELOPMENT: CHANGING
RULES FOR REALISTIC SOLUTIONS xi-xii (2013).
49. For articulation and discussion of such theories, see B. N. GHOSH, DEPENDENCY
THEORY REVISITED 16-17 (2001); MANNING MARABLE, How CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED
BLACK AMERICA: PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY 24-26 (2015); WAL-
TER RODNEY, How EUROPE UNDERDEVELOPED AFRICA 10, 14, 95 (1972).
50. I say "most other areas" because some other Asian countries, such as Japan,
frequently claim that they have no indigenous peoples either. See, e.g., Kingsbury,
"Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3, at 429-30 (discussing Japan's position on Ainu).
51. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNA-
BRIDGED 1151 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., 2002), s.v., "indigenous." In tum, the word
"native" applied to persons sometimes means "to inhabit a territorial area at the time of
its discovery or its becoming familiar to a foreigner." Id. at 1505, s.v., "native," sense
12a. "Native" sometimes means "inherent" or "inborn," id., s.v., "native," sense 1, or
when applied to plants, it means "living or growing naturally in a given region," id. sense
6c.
52. See generally G.A. Res. 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007) (offering no definition of the phrase). See also Arti-
cle 1(1)(b) of the Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent
Countries (ILO No. 169), June 27, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1382, 1384-85 (1989) (glossing
"peoples ... who are regarded as indigenous"). Because the meanings of "indigenous
peoples" are so varied and porous, manifold problem cases arise. (1) Should Bedouin
Arabs in Israel count as indigenous peoples? For discussion, see Seth J. Frantzman et
al., Contested Indigeneity: The Development of an Indigenous Discourse on the Bedouin of
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The embedded word "peoples" indicates that more than a family or a clan
is at stake. Yet the size and nature of a sociocultural group large enough to
count as a "people" is left indefinite. The newer word "population," as used
for example in population genetics, might add a patina of scientific
inquiry, but it is not yet a common word in the present context.
We are indebted to Benedict Kingsbury for a landmark article on the
definition of "indigenous peoples."54 He wisely rejects efforts to give a
"precise definition" which he calls "positivist"5 5 by, say, specifying singly
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for applying the phrase "indige-
nous peoples." Instead, he proposes a "constructivist" definition. 56 The
definition, which is flexible and tentative, has "essential requirements" and
"relevant indicia." 5 7 Here is his list of each:
Essential Requirements
Self-identification as a distinct ethnic group
Historical experience of, or contingent vulnerability to, severe dis-
ruption, dislocation or exploitation
Long connection with the region
The wish to retain a distinct identity
Relevant Indicia
(1) Strong Indicia
Nondominance in the national (or regional) society (ordinarily
required)
* Close cultural affinity with a particular area of land or territories
(ordinarily required)
Historical continuity (especially by descent) with prior occupants of
land in the region
(2) Other Relevant Indicia
Socioeconomic and sociocultural differences from the ambient
population
Distinct objective characteristics such as language, race, and mate-
rial or spiritual culture
the Negev, Israel, 17 ISRAEL STUD. 78, 78-79 (2012). (2) What do we say about groups
that move from place to place in the national parks of various countries? For discussion,
see Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Peoples and Protected Areas: Rights, Principles and
Practice, 7 NoMADIc PEOPLES 33, 33-35 (2003). (3) Are Maasai and other groups in
Africa indigenous peoples? For discussion, see Dorothy L. Hodgson, Becoming Indige-
nous in Africa, 52 AFRICAN STUD. REV. 1 (2009). (4) Can Japan decline in good faith to
say that Ainu are indigenous peoples? See Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3,
at 429-30 (raising the issue). (5) Can India-with its caste system, dalits, and adivasi-
claim in good faith "that the concept of 'indigenous peoples' does not apply within its
borders"? See id. at 433 (caste); Dipesh Chakrabarty, Politics Unlimited: The Global
Adivasi and Debates About the Political, in INDIGENEITY IN INDIA 235, 240-41 (Bengt G.
Karlsson & Tanka B. Subba eds., 2006) (dalits and adivasi).
53. See supra text accompanying notes 2-3.
54. See generally Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3.
55. Id. at 414 and passim. See Kingsbury associates positivism with analytic philos-
ophy but does not tie it to any particular thinker. Id.
56. Id. at 415 and passim.
57. Id. at 455 (emphasis omitted).
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Regarded as indigenous by the ambient population or treated as
such in legal and administrative arrangements
5 8
How does Kingsbury's constructivist definition stack up against
China's position? China signed the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples. 59 But China maintains that it has no "indigenous peo-
ples," only "ethnic minorities" (shioshtiminzt, J,*KV).6 ° And yet, it
might seem that these ethnic minorities could count as indigenous peoples
under Kingsbury's constructivist definition, for it nowhere requires that
indigenous peoples have a history of invasion, conquest, or colonization. 6 1
If that is a correct understanding of Kingsbury's definition, this under-
standing nevertheless sidesteps China's position because it does not grap-
ple with China's underlying reasoning on this matter. The Chinese
government reasons that the term "indigenous peoples" applies only to
peoples who were harmed by European colonialism, and that the minority
nationalities and ethnicities that make up part of China's population have
historically had little or no contact with European colonizers. 62 In 1995,
well prior to signing the Declaration, China stated:
As in the majority of Asian countries, the various nationalities in China have
all lived for aeons on Chinese territory. Although there is no indigenous
peoples' question in China, the Chinese government and people have every
sympathy with indigenous peoples' historical woes and present plight....
[T~he draft declaration must clearly define what indigenous peoples are, in
order to guarantee that the special rights it establishes are accurately
targeted at genuine communities of indigenous people and are not distorted,
arbitrarily extended or muddled.63
Suppose that, under the Martinez Cobo definition 64 and "positivist"
definitions which require a history of colonial invasion or conquest, Chi-
nese ethnic minorities do not count as indigenous peoples. Suppose also
that the Chinese government would have a sound argument against count-
ing them as indigenous peoples under Kingsbury's "constructivist" defini-
tion. However, it is a spark of sound sense to say that they are indigenous
ethnic minorities. After all, in the passage quoted above, China insists that
these ethnic minorities or minority nationalities "have all lived for aeons on
58. Id. (italics, bullet points, and enumeration in original).
59. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 52.
60. The Chinese term is also translated as "minority nationalities." For the linguistic
background and its historical context, see Ma Rong, A New Perspective in Guiding Ethnic
Relations in the 21st Century: "De-Politicization" of Ethnicity in China, 2 PRocEDIA Soc. &
BEHAV. Sci. 6831 (2010). Although China's population may include more than fifty-five
ethnic minorities, only fifty-five are officially recognized. HUANG CHI-PING, THE INDIGE-
NOUS WORLD 2015 241 (2015). As of November 13, 2018, the population of China was
1,418,386,516-not counting Taiwan, Hong Kong, or Macau. China Population 2018,
http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/china-population/ [https://perma.cc/
G5TT-TK5W] (last visited Feb. 27, 2019).
61. See Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3, at 455.
62. See Comm'n Hum. Rts., Consideration of a Draft United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/WG.15/2 (Oct. 10, 1995).
63. Id.
64. See INDIGENOUS PEOPLES MANUAL, supra note 2, at 6.
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Chinese territory." 65 The abstract noun "indigeneity" thus embraces both
indigenous peoples and Chinese indigenous ethnic minorities. As indi-
cated in Part I, non-indigenous individuals, such as poor Ladinos in Guate-
mala and poor Han farmers in China, can also suffer from dam-induced
development and should be treated accordingly. My examination here,
however, focuses on indigenous persons.
The foregoing argument splits apart three things that Kingsbury
neglects to disentangle. First, his constructivist position on indigenous
peoples may well be superior to positivist positions, even if it leads to the
conclusion that China has no indigenous peoples. Second, the ethnic
minorities in China qualify as indigenous because they have lived on Chi-
nese territory for many hundreds of years, and in some cases, for two mil-
lenniums. It would be a mistake to accept China's apparent position that
its ethnic minorities are not indigenous. These minorities are indigenous
regardless of what the Chinese government proclaims. Third, whether
indigenous ethnic minorities in China are the functional equivalents of
indigenous peoples depends on how the Han majority has treated them
and continues to treat them.
Let us build on the third point. Functional equivalence, let us sup-
pose, requires that Chinese ethnic minorities meet Kingsbury's Essential
Requirements and Strong Indicia. 66 Of his Essential Requirements, "histor-
ical experience" of "severe disruption, dislocation or exploitation" seems
especially important.67 The Strong Indicia of "nondominance in the
national" society and "close cultural affinity with a particular area of land
or territories" also seem important.68 It is appropriate to defer until Part
III to explain how these and other requirements and indicia are met in
particular cases. For the moment, it helps to see how various indigenous
ethnic minorities have suffered at the hands of Han Chinese, who make up
about 91.64% of the overall population.69 The ethnic minorities which fig-
ure prominently in Part II are Tujia, Miao, Lisu, and Tibetan ethnicities
along with Bai, Nu, Pumi, and Dulong. 70
At least three good reasons exist to say that indigenous ethnic minori-
ties in China are the functional equivalent of indigenous peoples in coun-
tries adversely affected by European colonialism. First, the Han have
dominated China's political and cultural elite for the last century. Ever
since the Qing dynasty, led by Manchus, collapsed in 1912, "China's top
leaders have been Han, while the Han have also been overrepresented
65. See supra text accompanying note 63.
66. See supra text accompanying note 58.
67. Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3, at 453.
68. Id. at 455.
69. The fifty-five ethnic minorities make up the balance of the population of about
8.36%. For a list of all fifty-six ethnic groups, including statistics and accessible back-
ground information, see RONGXING Guo, CHINA ETHNIC STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 2016 ix-x
(2017). Zhuang make up the largest ethnic minority with about 16,178,811 people.
Zhuang Ethnic Minority, CHINA TRAVEL (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.chinatravel.com/
facts/zhuang-ethnic-minority.htm [https://perma.cc/E3PJ-R4FX].
70. See infra text accompanying notes 161, 176, 178, 187, 191-92.
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amongst the political, economic and social elites." 71 Current Chinese gov-
ernment policy on ethnic minorities goes back to the rise of the Commu-
nity Party of China ("CCP"), which declared that ethnicity was "fixed at
birth."' 72 Curiously, "the dominant majority Han nationality . . . groups
together a wide array of culturally diverse populations." 73 Pragmatically,
the eventual fifty-five ethnic minorities included some groups-including
"the Miao, Yi, Tibetans, Mongols and Hui"-that received "special treat-
ment . . . for their support" during the Long March of 1934-1935 and
World War 11.74
Second, Han often dominate other recognized and unrecognized eth-
nic minorities in ways that parallel relationships between settler groups
and indigenous peoples in countries like Guatemala. 75 Xiaogang Wu and
Xi Song write about the ethnicity-based social order in China that results in
an increasingly poor relationship between Han and Uighur ethnic
groups. 76 In Xinjiang, since 2014, the government has sent Uighurs to
"transformation camps" for weeks or months to curb Uighur culture and
weaken the practice of Islam. 77 Han also dominate unofficial ethnic
minorities, such as the Mosuo and Chuanqing, in part by refusing to recog-
nize them. Under the Martinez Cobo Study, 78 for example, self-identifica-
71. Reza Hasmath & Andrew W. MacDonald, Beyond Special Privileges: The Discre-
tionary Treatment of Ethnic Minorities in China's Welfare System, 47 J. Soc. POL'Y. 295,
295 (2018) [hereinafter Hasmath & MacDonald].
72. Id. at 296. On the role of the Soviet Union in the emergence of the CCP's policy
on ethnic minorities, see XIAoyuAN Liu, RECAST ALL UNDER HEAVEN: REVOLUTION, WAR,
DLI-OMACY, AND FRONTIER CHINA IN THE 20TH CENTURY 109-32 (2010); Yash Ghai, Auton-
omy Regimes in China: Coping with Ethnic and Economic Diversity, in AUTONOMY AND
ETHNICiTY: NEGOTIATING COMPETING CLAIMS IN MULTI-ETHNIC STATES 77 (Yash Ghai ed.,
2000); Rong Ma, Reflections on the Debate on China's Ethnic Policy: My Reform Proposals
and Their Critics, 15 AsIAN ETHNICITY 237, 238 (2014) ("the 'nationality theory' of the
Communist Party of China (CPC) since 1921 and the PRC's theory and practice of
minority policies since 1949 have followed Soviet theory and model, with the exception
of establishing regional autonomy instead of federalism for minority regions"). Cf.
James Leibold, Ethnic Policy in China: Is Reform Inevitable?, 68 POL'Y STUD. 1, 5 (2013)("the CPC did 'sinicize' some important aspects of Marxist-Leninist theory on the
national question").
73. Hasmath & MacDonald, supra note 71, at 296. See also Michael Dillon, Majori-
ties and Minorities in China: An Introduction, 39 ETHIC & RACIAL STUD. 2079, 2082,
2085 (2016) (describing linguistic differences among those designated as Han and the
origins of using "Han" to "denote an ethnic group").
74. Hasmath & MacDonald, supra note 71, at 297. See also Barry Sautman, Prefer-
ential Policies for Ethnic Minorities in China: The Case of Xinjiang, 4 NATIONALISM & ETH-
NIC POL'Y. 86 (1998) (discussing a range of preferential policies for some non-Han ethnic
groups).
75. Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peoples," supra note 3, at 424.
76. See generally Xiaogang Wu & Xi Song, Ethnic Stratification amid China's Eco-
nomic Transition: Evidence from Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, 44 Soc. Sci. REs.
158 (2014).
77. Chris Buckley, The Leaders Who Unleashed China's Mass Detention of Muslims,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2018, at Al. Some Chinese academics, it appears, persuaded the
government that giving ethnic groups greater autonomy "had contributed to the breakup
of the Soviet Union by encouraging ethnic separatism" and that it would behoove China
"[t]o avoid similar troubles." Id.
78. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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tion is a common feature of indigenous peoples. 79 Also under Kingsbury's
constructivist definition, "self-identification as a distinct ethnic group"80 is
an Essential Requirement of being an indigenous people. Without ade-
quate justification, Chinese policy on ethnic minorities disallows self-iden-
tification from figuring as even one feature or partial criterion of ethnic
minority, minority nationality, or indigeneity.8 1
Third, Gray Tuttle argues that the Chinese government is guilty not
only of repressing ethnic minorities but also of embracing racism.
82
Because Tuttle does not define "race," "racism," or "racial," it is hard to
evaluate his specific claim of racism. Yet, his discussion of Beijing's treat-
ment of Tibetans supports his claim of ethnic repression. What the Chi-
nese state media occasionally refers "euphemistically" to "Han
Chauvinism" qualifies as ethnic repression.8 3 Examples include "deep and
broad hostility and discrimination toward Tibetans and other non-Han
Chinese citizens;"8 4 treating Tibetans "as second-class citizens" and
"depriv[ing them] of basic opportunities, rights, and legal protections that
Han Chinese enjoy;"8 5 "ethnic profiling" of Tibetans by "[s]ecurity and law
enforcement personnel" in the form of "extra attention and questioning;"
8 6
museums "distort[ing] Tibet's past" by "depicting it as a 'hell on earth' and
portraying Tibetans as a savage, backward people in need of civilizing."
87
Tuttle notes-"Beijing spun this recognition [of ethnic minorities] as a sign
of China's respect for minorities. In reality, it was merely a step in codify-
ing inequality."88
The foregoing arguments make a strong case for saying that China has
indigenous ethnic minorities, and that they are similarly situated to indige-
nous peoples in countries adversely affected by European colonialism. In
the context of building and operating power dams, the foregoing argu-
ments also warrant giving pride of. place to the treatment of minority
79. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES MANUAL, supra note 2, at 6 ("consider themselves distinct
from other sectors" of society).
80. See supra text accompanying note 58.
81. "[T]he Mosuo and Chuanqing peoples self-identify as ethnic minorities but are
not recognized as such." John E. Petrovic & Roxanne M. Mitchell, Comparative Reflec-
tions on Philosophies of Indigenous Education Around the World, in INDIGENOUS PHILOSO-
PHIES OF EDUCAFION AROUND THE WORLD 249, 250 Uohn E. Petrovic & Roxanne M.
Mitchell eds., 2018). Mosuo, who usually refer to themselves as Na, live in the Tibetan
foothills. See Eileen Rose Walsh, From Nia to Nf'er Guo: Negotiating Desire in the Land of
the Mosuo, 31 MODERN CHINA 448, 449-51 (2005) (reporting that since the 1990s,
Mosuo have embraced tourism and sexualized their culture in response to tourists'
desires).
82. Gray Tuttle, China's Race Problem: How Beijing Represses Minorities, 94 FOREIGN
AFF. 39, 39 (2015).
83. Id. at 44.
84. Id. at 39.
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 43.
88. Id. at 42. 1 recognize that Tibetan and Xinjian Uighur repression is driven partly
by Chinese efforts to gain control of the hinterlands populated by these groups, and
involves intentional destruction of religion and local culture. Even so, dam-induced dis-
placement is scarcely incidental in its impact on indigenous ethnic minorities in China.
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groups by the dominant group or groups. Hence, the Chinese government
ought to treat its indigenous ethnic minorities in basically the same way
that countries with indigenous peoples ought to treat those peoples.
There are, moreover, concrete benefits from discussing China and
Guatemala together. China can learn from Guatemala's treatment of Maya
Achi people in building the Chixoy Dam. The inadequate record-keeping
and porous enforcement of Guatemala's system of private and communal
ownership did little to safeguard Maya Achi from exploitation by the gov-
ernment. 89 The absence of a hukou system in Guatemala gave Maya Achi,
other indigenous groups, and the government the prospect of more flexibil-
ity for employment and habitation elsewhere, even if in the recent past
Guatemala has squandered this opportunity. 90 Extreme violence by
paramilitary groups and others in Guatemala decimated Maya Achi, vio-
lated human rights, heightened inequality, and inflicted severe trauma.9 1
Corruption in government, the military, and business enterprises lowered
the socioeconomic welfare of citizens, dragged down GDP, and created bad
publicity internationally. 92 This short list is only a start.
By the same token, Guatemala can learn from China's treatment of
ethnic minorities in building the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei Province and
ongoing dam projects in Yunnan Province. China's system of property,
with almost no protection for private and communal property interests in
land, reduced incentives for efficient use and failed to shelter indigenous
ethnic minorities from exploitation by the government and corrupt busi-
nesspersons, politicians, and officials. 93 All the same, the detailed rules in
Chinese property law gave indigenous groups a fairly determinate, if not
always welcome, sense of what they could expect from the government in
the way of compensation. 9 4 A hukou system, or anything like it, would be a
bad fit for Guatemala because it unduly restricts movement to areas with
better employment opportunities; such a system would also impose bureau-
cratic costs on the government.9 5 Use of even moderate state force in evict-
ing and resettling indigenous groups would create civil unrest, foster
collective protests, increase economic inequality, and have a negative
impact on the mental health of ethnic minorities. 96 The lesson about cor-
89. See infra text accompanying notes 303-04.
90. A huhou system, officially called huji, is a household registration system in China
and a few other East Asian countries. See FEt-LING WANG, ORGANIZING THROUGH DIVISION
AND EXCLUSION: CHINA'S HUKOU SYSTEM (2005). Dating from the early 1950s in China,
this complicated registration system is key to who can live where and who has access to
educational and social benefits in a particular location. See, e.g., Kam Wing Chan, The
Chinese Hukou System at 50, 50 EuRAsIAN GEOGRAPHY & ECON. 197, 197-98 (2009)
[hereinafter Chan, Hukou] (discussing the ramifications of this system for industrializa-
tion and urbanization in China). See infra text accompanying notes 304-13.
91. See infra text accompanying notes 303-13.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 556-83.
93. See infra text accompanying notes 97-141, 222-23, 225, 237-57.
94. See infra text accompanying notes 104-42.
95. See Chan, Hukou, supra note 90, at 196-97.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. See also infra text accompanying
notes 144-58.
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ruption is in many ways the same for Guatemala as it is for China.9 7 This
list, too, is only a start.
A related way of seeing benefits in the pairing of China and Guatemala
is to focus on the best and worst practices of each country's approach to
power dams. China's best practices are an elaborate system of property
and administrative laws that apply to the building and operation of dams.
This system applies as well to the compensation and resettlement of
migrants, through which China at least acknowledges a duty to compen-
sate and resettle, even if the expenditures are inadequate. 98 China's worst
practices are rampant corruption and the hukou system. Guatemala's best
practices include its entering, in 1999, into a peace pact that set up an
international commission to rein in corruption. 99 Its worst practices in the
recent past include extreme violence against Maya Achi and prolonged
efforts to avoid paying anything more than token compensation to those
wronged.10 0
II. Dam Building in China: Problems of Resettlement and
Compensation
Chinese legal materials and the secondary literature usually refer to
persons displaced by dam construction and operation as "migrants,"1 0'
and I shall use that word in this part. Some migrants are Han Chinese, and
some are indigenous ethnic minorities. I focus mainly on the latter. I first
explain the Chinese laws and regulations that govern migrant compensa-
tion and resettlement. Next, I examine the outcome of migrant resettle-
ment during the construction of the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei Province.
Then I look at the effects of similar dam projects in Yunnan Province, and
at the possible effects of proposed dam projects on the Nu River in the
northwestern part of Yunnan Province, with special emphasis on the
effects of resettlement on the ethnic minority populations there. Finally, I
scrutinize several proposed strategies for improving compensation and
resettlement, and point out problems and potential solutions, specific to
97. See infra text accompanying notes 577-85. As Susan Rose-Ackerman makes
clear, corruption is an economic, cultural, and political problem in many countries. But
she considers reform achievable. See generally SUSAN ROsE-AcKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND
GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999) [hereinafter ROsE-ACKERMAN].
98. See Pu Wang et. al., Compensation Policy for Displacement Caused by Dam Con-
struction in China: An Institutional Analysis, 48 GEOFORUM 1, 5-7 (2013).
99. This international-national arrangement, known as the International Commis-
sion Against Impunity in Guatemala ("CICIG"), receives support from the United States,
which also reflects a welcome change in U.S. policy toward Guatemala. See Eric A,
Witte, Why the U.S. Should Aid Guatemala's Anti-Corruption Push, AMERIcAS Q. (Mar. 1,
2018), http://americasquarterly.org/content/how-us-can-aid-guatemalas-anti-corrup-
tion-push [https://perma.cc/G5AP-Z8H9] [hereinafter Witte, Guatemala] (reaffirmation
by Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the U.N., on Feb. 28, 2018).
100. See supra text accompanying notes 303-14.
101. See infra text accompanying note 105.
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Chinese policies and practices.' 0 2
A. Resettlement, Compensation, and the Law
The legal materials governing property in China include, in descend-
ing level of authority, the Property Law of the P.R.C. ("Property Law"), 10 3
the Land Administration Law of the P.R.C. ("Land Administration
Law"), 10 4 and the Regulation on Land Requisition Compensation and
Resettlement of Migrants for Large and Medium Water Conservation and
Power Construction Projects ("Regulation on Land Requisition").10 5 The
Property Law makes no distinction between the real and personal property
rights of ethnic minorities and those of Han Chinese. 10 6
Article 47 of the Land Administration Law provides for land expropri-
ation and compensation. 10 7 This provision does not mention ethnic
minorities or migrants but does discuss expropriation, compensation, and
resettlement.10 8 In the case of expropriated agricultural (cultivated) land,
the amount offered covers (1) land compensation, (2) resettlement fees,
and (3) an award for standing structures and green crops. 10 9 Land com-
pensation ranges from six to ten times the average output value over the
three preceding years. 110 The resettlement fee for each "agricultural per-
son" is four to six times the average output value."' The sum of (1) and
(2), which might be called the base compensation, ranges from ten to six-
teen times the average output value. 1 2 Article 47 recognizes that even the
102. The aid of Chong Luo has been invaluable in understanding population move-
ments and hydroelectric dams in China. I owe much to her research, Chinese language
skills, and knowledge of contemporary China.
103. Zhonghud R~nmin G6ngh~gu6 Wfiquan Fd ( [Property
Law of the People's Republic of China] (Order of the President of the P.R.C. (no. 62))
(promulgated by the Tenth Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007),
available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?id=6642&lib-law&SearchKey
word=property%201aw&SearchCKeyword [https://perma.cc/8GCF-4U3G] [hereinafter
Property Law] (in Chinese with English translation).
104. See Zh6nghud Renmin G6nghegu6 Tddi Gu~nli Fd (
[Land Administration Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), available
at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383939.htm [https:/
/perma.cc/3KVQ-NQN8] [hereinafter Land Administration Law].
105. See DAzh6ngxing Shuili Shuidiin G6ngchengJiAnsh Zhengdi Bfichdng hi Yimin
Anzhi Tidoli (-k E : MA h. ; il) [Regulation on Land
Requisition Compensation and Resettlement of Migrants for Large and Medium Water
Conservation and Power Construction Projects] (promulgated by the St. Council, July 7,
2006, effective Sept. 1, 2006), available at http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?Lib
=law&ld=5462&keyword= [https://perma.cc/LBT5-WYHT] [hereinafter Regulation on
Land Requisition].
106. Cf. Property Law, supra note 103, art. 51 (implying that "cultural relics" (wenwu,
A4) belong to the state).
107. See Land Administration Law, supra note 104, art. 47.
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See id.
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upper end of this range might be insufficient. 1 3 However, it makes clear
that the base compensation may not exceed thirty times the average output
value, save perhaps in special circumstances. 114 This provision does not
specify how to determine the value of structures and green crops but refers
instead to the main points of Chinese compensation and resettlement
policy. 115
Article 51, however, deals with the particular case of dam projects:
"The rate of compensation for expropriation of land to build large[-] or
medium-sized water conservancy or hydroelectric projects and the mea-
sures for resettling relocated people shall be prescribed separately by the
State Council."1 16
To U.S. readers, Articles 47 and 51 might seem peculiar in both the
arithmetical calculations and the separate treatment of dam projects and
water conservancy from other public works. In the United States, the Tak-
ings Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to "private property," and "just
compensation" is, by case law, virtually always put at fair market value.
117
But as explained shortly, under China's Property Law, there is a "socialist
market economic order," "public ownership" plays "a dominant role,"118
and private property interests in land are severely circumscribed. Moreo-
ver, the relation between Articles 47 and 51 might seem peculiar to U.S.
readers in another way: it is unclear whether Article 51 intentionally sets
up the possibility that compensation under that Article can be lower than
compensation under Article 47.
An official explanation of Article 51 gives five reasons for the different
arrangements for dam and water conservancy projects compared to other
public works. 1 19 First, these projects are quite large. Second, the land req-
uisitioned for these projects is more geographically concentrated than, say,
for railways and highways, and the migrants are also more geographically
concentrated. Third, dam reservoirs are generally in outlying areas used
for agriculture, and the displaced migrants typically are resettled in non-
agricultural areas. Fourth, the living conditions and living standards of
migrants displaced by dam and water conservancy projects are usually
lower than those of migrants displaced for other public works, and farmers
in particular may experience long-term difficulties unless they are well set-
tled. Fifth, compensation funds for these projects are often insufficient,
which in practice means that compensation given to migrants is initially
113. See id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. Id. art. 51.
117. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S.
506, 506-11 (1979) (using fair market value as the metric for just compensation).
118. Property Law, supra note 103, arts. 1, 3. "Public ownership" in Article 3
includes both collective ownership and state ownership. Id. art. 3.
119. See Zh6nghua R~nmin G6ngh~gu6 Tfidi Gufnli FA Shiyi (dX~Jk. *li.
13~fi'- ) [Explanation of The Law of Land Administration of the People's Republic of
China], available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/flsyywd/xingzheng/2000-11/25/con
tent_8294.htm [https://perma.cc/W7T7-QVMP] (last visited Nov. 22, 2017).
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low; giving migrants longer-term support-once these projects are complete
and generate profits-can remedy this situation. 1 20 The last reason is the
most important and the most vulnerable to criticism, for the government
should compensate migrants fully at the beginning of their displacement.
The Regulation on Land Requisition follows the general outline of the
Land Administration Law but recapitulates the unclarity between Articles
47 and 5 1.121 Articles 20 to 25 of the Regulation address land compensa-
tion for large- and medium-sized power dam and water conservancy
projects. 12 2 Under Article 22 of this Regulation, the sum of "the land com-
pensation and resettlement subsidies shall be 16 times of the average
annual output of the cultivated land"' 2 3 in the preceding three years. A
factor of sixteen is more generous than the lower end of the base compensa-
tion-namely, a factor of ten under Article 47 of the Land Administration
Law. 124 But it is less generous than the maximum available for base com-
pensation-namely, a factor of thirty under Article 47.125
All the same, the Regulation on Land Requisition is far more detailed
on the resettlement of migrants than is the Land Administration Law.
Migrants need not be members of an ethnic minority. 1 2 6 Yet the state fre-
quently chooses to build new dams in areas of China in which members of
120. Id. Here is an English translation of the official explanation (translation cour-
tesy of Chong Luo):
"The standards for land compensation and method of resettlement for land req-
uisitioned for building large and medium-sized water conservancy projects and
hydroelectric power projects shall be determined separately by the State Council
because compared with other projects, large and medium-sized water conser-
vancy projects and hydroelectric power projects have some special features:
First, the areas of requisitioned land for large[-] and medium-sized water con-
servancy projects and hydroelectric power projects are large and usually occupy
tens of thousands of mu [one mu = 0.1647 acres] of agricultural land.
Second, unlike the railway and highway projects which involve many towns
and villages, the requisitioned land for water conservancy projects and hydroe-
lectric power projects is comparatively concentrated, and therefore the migrants
are comparatively concentrated.
Third, the locations of reservoirs are usually outlying. These places lack req-
uisitioned lands for resettling the migrants by changing their jobs from agricul-
tural to non-agricultural. The only method that can be used to resettle the
migrants is comprehensive agricultural and non-agricultural development,
including agricultural, foresting, fishing, sheepherding, assorted small indus-
tries, and starting township enterprises.
Fourth, because the economic and natural conditions [in reservoir areas] are
comparatively worse and people's living standard is comparatively lower, there
will be long-term difficulties for farmers if they are not well settled.
Fifth, the investments in the water conservancy projects and hydroelectric
power projects are insufficient, so only low-standard resettlement compensation
can be given to migrants. Migrants can get additional support and compensa-
tion after the water conservancy projects and hydroelectric power projects are
finished and earn profits."
121. See Regulation on Land Requisition, supra note 105, art. 1.
122. See id. arts. 20-25.
123. Id.'art. 22.
124. Land Administration Law, supra note 104, art. 47.
125. Id.
126. See generally Regulation on Land Requisition, supra note 105, art. 11.
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Cornell International Law Journal
ethnic minorities are present in significant numbers, and Article 11 of the
Regulation on Land Requisition refers to "minority ethnic groups."12 7
Chinese regulatory provisions reflect care in thinking about the socio-
economic impact of power dams in ways that many countries do not. For
example, Article 3 of the Regulation on Land Requisition says that the state
"shall make the migrants' living level [i.e., standard of living] reach or
exceed their former one by combining the early stage compensations and
subsidies with follow-up support."' 2 8 Article 5 makes the state and its
lower political subdivisions, including the "local people's governments at
the county level or above," responsible for handling migrant resettlement
related to power dam projects.' 2 9 A "project legal person"-basically, the
legal entity in charge of the project-has to prepare a detailed plan for reset-
tling those who will be displaced. 130 The plan is a condition of approval,
and must be publicly announced and approved by the "province, autono-
mous region or municipality."'13 1 Some provisions, however, seem to
hedge on the protections for migrants, and no recourse exists for persons
who do not want to move. 132
A resettlement plan under the Regulation on Land Requisition must
consider the value of all submerged land including standing structures,
127. Id.
128. Id. art. 3.
129. Id. art. 5.
130. Id. arts. 6-19.
131. Id. arts. 6, 22.
132. For instance, Article 15 requires that the project legal person or project adminis-
trative department "widely listen to the opinions of migrants and residents of the
migrant resettlement areas," but has to hold a hearing only "[wihere necessary." Article
38 provides that, once a resettlement plan is approved but is later seen to require "adjust-
ment or modification," only the "local people's government" or other "original approval
organ" may change the plan. Id. arts. 15, 38. However, Article 38 does not explicitly
give migrants a voice in adjusting or modifying a resettlement plan. Migrants could
complain to the provincial or central government, or go to court, but in either case their
prospects for changing the resettlement plan are uncertain.
Within the last ten years, government expropriation of land has sometimes sparked
mass protests and violent confrontations. See Zhu Keliang & Roy Prosterman, Land
Reform Efforts in China, CmNA Bus. REv. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.chinabusinessre
view.com/land-reform-efforts-in-china/ [https://perma.cc/9AG6-BZ78] (stating that
"Chinese officials estimate that approximately 2 million rural residents lose their land
each year" and that in late 2011 there was a "highly-publicized mass protest against local
authorities' land expropriations in Wukan, Guangdong").
As for the absence of recourse, China is not much different from the United States.
The U.S. legal system does not generally allow landowners to refuse to sell if the govern-
ment has a land use plan that is for a "public use" under U.S. CONST. amend. V, and
landowners are generally limited to "just compensation" (understood as fair market
value) under that amendment. See STEPHEN R. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 442-48
(1990). Dam building in Appalachia under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act, 48 Stat.
58 (May 18, 1933), was upheld in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 322-23 (1936).
Controversially, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005), upheld the use
of eminent domain to transfer land from one private owner to another because the trans-
fer was part of a comprehensive redevelopment plan, and thus for a public use. The Kelo
decision elicited howls of protest.
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green crops, 1 3 3 forests, and vegetation. 134 Article 11 states that the plan
must take into account the "load capacity . . . and environment" of the
submerged areas when deciding where to resettle migrants, and that "[t]he
preparation of a migrant resettlement plan shall respect the production and
living forms, habits and customs of the minority ethnic groups."'13 Article
11 is important to these groups, and much depends on how the plan will
support their economic and cultural welfare.
As to the mechanism of compensation, the local government must pay
initial compensation and any subsequent support directly to each
migrant. 13 6 This provision is, however, subject to an exception if the local
government believes that the money would be better spent on projects to
"strengthen the communication, energy, water conservation, environmen-
tal protection, telecommunication, culture, education, health, radio, televi-
sion, and other infrastructure construction so as to support the
development of the migrant resettlement areas."' 3 7 This exception might
enable local governments to divert funds intended for the resettlement and
compensation of displaced migrants to uses that provide public goods, in
the economic sense, for non-migrants. It is one thing if local governments
rarely invoke this exception. But it is quite another if they regularly deprive
displaced migrants of the benefits due to them in order to enrich non-
migrants who are unaffected by the projects that necessitate such compen-
sation in the first place.
Migrants can also be shortchanged by the property rules applicable in
rural China. There, migrants receive compensation based on the average
annual output of their land over a three-year period because Chinese farm-
ers do not own the land they use and have only a contract right to use
"their" land for a fixed period of time. 138 Farmers do not have title to the
land in which they work.139 Under Chinese law on real property interests,
there is no equivalent to the common law's fee simple absolute. Unlimited
duration of individual property in land does not exist in China. Local col-
lectives own all farmland, and farmers bargain with collectives for a con-
tract right to use a plot of land. 40 Payment for a land-use contract is made
133. "Green crops" are crops already planted on the land that will not be ready for
harvest by the date of resettlement. The compensation value of green crops is calculated
based on the fair market value of crops of that kind in the local area. Junhua Chen,
Urban Development and Migrant Housing in Contemporary China, in URBAN CHINA IN THE
NEw ERA: MARKET REFORMS, CURRENT STATE, AND THE ROAD FORWARD 52-53 (Zhiming
Cheng et. al. eds., 2014).
134. See Regulation on Land Requisition, supra note 105, art. 16.
135. Id. art. 11.
136. Id. art. 32.
137. Id. arts. 40-41. See also Philip H. Brown & Kevin Xu, Hydropower Development
and Resettlement on China's Nu River, 19J. CONTEMP. CHINA 777, 796-97 (2010) [herein-
after Brown & Xu] (containing a table of other relevant legal provisions).
138. See Brown & Xu, supra note 137, at 796.
139. See Jonas Alsen, An Introduction to Chinese Property Law, 20 MD. J. INT'L L. 1,
57-58 (1996) [hereinafter Als~n].
140. If a lease is a contract, it does not follow that all contracts are leases. To say that
Chinese farmers have a contract right to use land is not necessarily to say that they have
a "lease" in one or more of the many senses in which that word is used in Anglo-Ameri-
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with a percentage of the land's yield.' 4 1
Collectives' land-use contracts transfer a limited property interest in
the land to farmers. Collectives may grant land-use rights only for a period
of up to thirty years. 14 2 Land-use contracts are transferable by the holder
solely as a result of death and inheritance or by authorized sale, and in
either case only for the period remaining on the contract. 14 3 Further,
farmers may use the land solely for agriculture, and they may not sell their
contract to any party for any other use. 144 By law, rural collectives must
provide farmers with a certificate memorializing their land-use contract.
145
In fact, however, only one in ten farmers receives such a certificate, which
limits farmers' incentives to invest in their property and their ability to
legally defend such limited property rights they have. 14 6 It takes little
imagination to see that the absence of a written contract or certificate
might dissuade farmers from seeking legal protection of their contracts.
B. The Three Gorges Dam Project in Hubei Province
A specific example illuminates many of the problems with dam dis-
placement in China. The legal provisions just sketched, or close cousins of
them, applied to the construction of the Three Gorges Dam (1994-2009),
which is China's, and the world's, largest hydropower project to date. 147
Construction of the dam and its reservoir displaced over 1.13 million peo-
ple in China's Hubei Province. 14 8 The reservoir inundated an estimated
"20 counties or municipal districts, 227 townships... 680 villages... and
23,800 [hectares] of farmland."' 4 9
An analysis halfway through the project concluded that resettlement
had not gone well. 150 Officials resettled some migrants from fertile river
bottoms to "steep, infertile slopes.'' 1 They also resettled some younger
can landlord-tenant law. See Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural
Property System Exacerbates China's Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. AstLA L. 451, 461
(2006).
141. Id.
142. See Alsan, supra note 139, at 58.
143. See Property Law, supra note 103, art. 128.
144. In contrast, urban property holders can sometimes use their land for commer-
cial or industrial purposes as well, which can add value to the land. See James, supra
note 140, at 480.
145. See id. at 451, 471.
146. See id. However, the Ministry of Agriculture has stated that it plans to register all
landholdings and issue corresponding registration certificates within five years from
March 1, 2015. See Bfid6ngch~n Dingji Zhinxing Tiaoli ( [Interim
Regulation on Real Estate Registration] (promulgated by the State Council, Nov. 24,
2014, effective Mar. 1, 2015), CLI.2.240136(EN) (China).
147. The dams were completed in 2006 and fully operational by 2012. See Pu Wang
et. al., supra note 98, at 6.
148. See id.
149. Brooke Wilmsen et. al., Involuntary Rural Resettlement: Resources, Strategies, and
Outcomes at the Three Gorges Dam, China, 20J. ENv'T & DEv. 355, 358 (2011).
150. See Li Heming et al., Reservoir Resettlement in China: Past Experience and the
Three Gorges Dam, 167 GEOGRAPHICALJ. 195, 20-09 (2001).
151. Id. at 203.
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migrants to cities and provided them with jobs in factories, but migrants
"found that they often soon lost their new urban jobs, though they did
experience an improvement in infrastructure and social services."'1 52 Pre-
mier Zhu Rongji took some of the officials to task "for corruption and mis-
use of relocation funding," but "[m]ore importantly, he was dissatisfied
with the quality of relocation programmes." 153 Zhu envisioned a new pol-
icy of placing migrants in locations with adequate jobs and resources to
help them resettle comfortably, but this policy had the perverse effect of
resettling many migrants even farther away from their communities of ori-
gin, to locations where many found it hard to rebuild livelihoods, lamented
the loss of social networks, and considered the new environment unfamil-
iar and unsatisfactory. 154 Migrants from rural areas in particular faced
discrimination in their new communities. 155
After the dam's completion, news reports indicated that migrants
forced to resettle did not receive adequate compensation. 156 A govern-
ment-led audit of the Three Gorges Dam project bore out reports that
revealed that over 2 billion1 57 Yuan ($44.9 million USD) out of the 85 bil-
lion Yuan ($13.6 billion USD) resettlement fund had been mismanaged or
fraudulently misappropriated. 1 58 A study of two villages forced to resettle
because of the Three Gorges Dam project showed that, although some vil-
lagers' monthly incomes saw an increase immediately after resettlement,
there was a decline over the longer term in income and financial stability
owing to inadequate land grants, increased housing expenses, and unem-
ployment. 159 Moreover, a survey of over 1,000 migrants following resettle-
152. Id.
153. Id. at 204.
154. Id. at 205-06.
155. See id. at 208-09.
156. See Luo Wangshu & Tan Yingzi, Senior Chonqing Official Investigated for Graft
Allegations, CHINA DAILY (May 5, 2014), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2014-05/
05/content_17483454.htm [https://perma.cc/C8VH-272P]; AssoCIATED PRESs, Chinese
Displaced by the Three Gorges Dam Protest, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2009), https://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-china-three-gorges-protest-030409-2009mar4-
story.html [https://perma.cc/TCD7-ETN5]; China to Increase Supervision, Audits of the
Three Gorges Project, BBC INr'L REP. (Asia) 1, 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2005); Martin Fackler, China
Speeds Up Resettlements, MIDLAND DAILY NEws (Jan. 19, 2002), https://www.ourmidland.
com/news/article/China-Speeds-Up-Resettlements-7081426.php [https://perma.cc/
M9DW-XXKW]; Cox Washington Bureau, China dams up dissent of Three Gorges Project,
PROBE INT'L (July 28, 2008), https://joumal.probeinternational.org/2008/07/29/china-
dams-dissent-three-gorges-project-l/ [https://perma.cc/T5GD-L3AY]; Ching-Ching Ni,
China's Uprooted Peasants Find Life in "City" Is Awash in Difficulty, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 23,
2000), http://articles.latimes.com/2000/sep/23/news/mn-25332 [https://perma.cc/
6N5U-643N].
157. Here and throughout "billion" means "1,000,000,000," i.e., American billion
rather than British billion.
158. See Audit Results of the Draft Financial Final Accounts for Fulfillment of the Three
Gorges Project, Nat'l Audit Office of the P.R.C., No. 23 of 2013 (General Serial No. 165),
Section B, http://www.audit.gov.cn/en/n746/n752/n769/c66744/content.html [https:/
/perma.cc/9W9K-4ZFV] (last visited June 23, 2017).
159. Wilmsen et al., supra note 149, at 370-71. For more information on the negative
effects of the Three Gorges Dam resettlement, see Juan Xi & Sean-Shong Hwang, Reloca-
tion Stress, Coping, and Sense of Control Among Resettlers Resulting from China's Three
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ment showed an overall increase in symptoms of depression across all age
groups.16 0 These tangible and intangible negative effects of the Three
Gorges Dam project were accentuated by the associated destruction of cul-
tural heritage, such as archeological and historic sites, which affected Tujia
and Miao ethnic minorities in particular.'
6 1
Gorges Dam Project, 104 Soc. INDICATORS RES. 507, 508-09 (2011) (citing a series of
articles on the negative effects on migrants of the Three Gorges Dam).
Resistance to dam projects based on not-in-my-backyard ("NIMBY") reactions by eth-
nic minorities and Han residents is understandable and not necessarily selfish. Some
two hundred miles from the Three Gorges project, construction of the Gangkouwan Res-
ervoir project in Anhui Province elicited local resistance. See W.S. Lin et al., Impacts of
Large Construction Projects on Residents' Living Status in China: A Reservoir Project Case,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 21ST INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON ADVANCEMENT OF CONSTRUC-
TION MANAGEMENT AND REAL ESTATE 879 (K.W. Chau et al. eds., 2018) (analyzing NIMBY
events and negative and positive impacts of the project).
160. See Juan Xi, Sean-Shong Hwang & Patricia Drentea, Experiencing a Forced Reloca-
tion at Different Life Stages: The Effects of China's Three Gorges Project-Induced Relocation
on Depression, 3 Soc'Y & MENTAL HEALTH 59, 68-69 (2012). The literature on migrants'
mental health problems in China is sparser than that on similar problems in Guatemala.
See infra text accompanying notes 350-352.
161. See, e.g., Paola Dematt&, After the Flood: Cultural Heritage and Cultural Politics in
Chongqing Municipality and the Three Gorges Areas, China, 9 FUTURE ANTERIOR 46, 54-57
(2012) (describing the adverse effects on cultural heritage). Today, Tujia number about
8 million persons. Tujia Nationality, CHINA TRAVEL GUIDE, https://www.travelchina
guide.com/intro/nationality/tujia/ [https://perma.cc/LMQ2-WVJHP] (last visited Nov.
13, 2018) [hereinafter Tujia Nationality]. By 910 C.E., "Tujia emerged from their legen-
dary origins and became a recognized people of the western Hunan region." 2 BARBARA
J. WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND OCEANIA 825 (2009) [hereinafter
WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA]. Tujia live at higher elevations, up to 5,000 feet; they hunt, fish,
and grow crops. Id. In the last 100 years they have relied less on their native languages
and often speak Mandarin. Id. "Tujia today practice a syncretic religion with aspects
from Taoism, ancestor worship, shamanism, and animism." Id. They have distinctive
crafts and clothes, are proud of the scenic beauty of their area and the folklore and art
reflected in the Nuo Drama. Tujia Nationality, supra note 161. Tujia, like Miao, have
houses in which livestock are on the lower floor and bedrooms are on the upper floor.
Id.
Miao (Hmong) number almost 9 million people. Miao Nationality, https://www
.travelchinaguide.com/intro/nationality/miao/ [https://perma.cc/9RW2-Z8UN[ (last
visited Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Miao Nationality]. Norma Diamond, writing nearly a
quarter of a century ago, found the Miao to be a disparate group in southwestern China,
including Hubei Province. Norma Diamond, Defining the Miao: Ming, Qing, and Contem-
porary Views, in CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS ON CHINA'S ETHNIC FRONTIERS 92, 92-99 (Stevan
Harrell ed., 1995). Miao may go back to the third century B.C.E. and historically
resisted assimilation and control by Han Chinese, who saw them as "barbarians." Id. at
99-100, 104, 106, 110. Nonetheless, Han sometimes also saw Miao as having a colorful
culture and liberal sexual practices. Id. at 100-04, 106-12. In the 1980s, Miao seem to
have had rather less access to education than Han. Id. at 113. Diamond observes that
"the Miao are the poorest of any of the ethnic groups" and that Han regard them as
"backward and ignorant." Id. at 116. 1 WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 161, at 286-89,
prefers the name Hmong over Miao, and remarks on their conjectural origins and their
suffering under Mao Zedong's Great Leap Forward. She adds, "The traditional Hmong
religious beliefs all generally concern spirits and other powerful forces that are associ-
ated with specific natural features: groves of trees, caves, mountains, large stones, and
the like." Id. at 289. West is not alone in calling Miao "Hmong." Some confusion,
disagreement, or contextual differences lurk in who is or uses "Hmong" versus "Miao;"
"Miao" seems more encompassing and has greater use in China whereas "Hmong,"
which in Chinese contexts covers a subset of Miao, is a more common term in Southeast
Vol. 51
2019 Dam(n) Displacement
C. Dam Projects in Yunnan Province
The early years of this century provide another specific example of
dam-induced problems. In this period, the Chinese government sought to
build thirteen dams along the upper reaches of the Nu River. 16 2 The Nu
(also called the Nujiang River), which is a tributary of the Mekong River,
flows from southeastern Tibet Autonomous Province into the northwest
corner of Yunnan Province. 16 3 China has already completed several dams
on the lower stretches of the Mekong in southern Yunnan, where the peo-
ple forced to resettle have experienced difficulties similar to those faced by
the Three Gorges migrants. 1 6 4 However, the negative effects of resettle-
ment have been exacerbated by the higher ethnic minority population, the
lack of adequate infrastructure (e.g., passable roads, irrigation, and electri-
cal grid), and the rugged terrain in Yunnan Province. 16 5 For example, in
western China, low slopes suitable for rice paddy fields are the most desir-
able agricultural land, but these are in short supply because of the steep
terrain. 16 6 Construction of the Manwan Dam on the Mekong River in
southern Yunnan Province in 1996 exacerbated the existing shortage of
low-sloping land, as the average ratio of paddy-field to dry-land holdings
per farmer fell from 6:4 to 4:6, which led to an overall loss in agricultural
production and income for those who lived near the river. 1 6 7
One news source alleged that resource mismanagement and corrup-
tion significantly affected dam building in Yunnan Province: The hydro-
power company that constructed the Manwan Dam requisitioned a large
parcel of land in the village of Xiaohe for temporary use during construc-
tion.16 8 The company then failed to return the land to the village after
construction and ceased paying for its use. 16 9 Similar misfortune struck a
village of 4,000 people who were displaced in 2000 by construction of the
Asian contexts and in the West. Nicholas Tapp, Cultural Accommodations in Southwest
China: The 'Han Miao' and Problems in the Ethnography of the Hmong, 61 AsL&N FOLKORE
STUD. 78-81 (2002). A recent travel guide reports that Miao "believe that everything in
nature has a spirit," attach much importance to ancestors, and make distinctive jewelry,
handicrafts, and traditional clothes. Miao Nationality, supra note 161.
162. See Brown & Xu, supra note 137, at 777.
163. See id. at 778. In China, the Mekong is often called the Salween River. Id. See
also Tom Phillips,Joy as China Shelves Plans to Dam "Angry River," THE GuARDLAN (Dec.
2, 2016), https:www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/02/joy-as-china-shelves-plans-
to-dam-angry-river [https://perma.cc/NV2V-HPSQ] [hereinafter Phillips, "Angry River"].
In Thailand, the Nu is called the Salween River and in parts of Myanmar the Thanlwin
River. See id.
164. See generally Brendan A. Galipeau, Mark lngman & Bryan Tilt, Dam-Induced Dis-
placement and Agricultural Livelihoods in China's Mekong Basin, 41 HUM. EcOLOGY 437
(2013).
165. See Bryan Tilt, Yvonne Braun & Darning He, Social Impacts of Large Dam Projects:
A Comparison of International Case Studies and Implications for Best Practice, 30 J. ENVTL.
MGMT. 5254, 5254 (2008).
166. See id.
167. Id. Inadequate and ill-maintained irrigation exacerbated this problem. See id.
168. See Meng Si, Life in the Shadow of the Mekong Dams, in CHINADIALOGUE 31, 31
(2013).
169. Id.
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Dachaoshan Dam on the Mekong, downriver from the Manwan Dam.
170
The government installed irrigation in the area to which the village was
resettled. 17 1 However, the government spent only a fraction of the money
it claimed to have allotted for the irrigation project and stopped pumping
water altogether when the area was struck by drought. 17 2 Moreover, the
local government did not pay the migrants all the resettlement money they
were due. 173
For socioeconomic reasons, the areas around the proposed dams on
the Nu River may be more vulnerable to such negative effects than were
areas around the Three Gorges Dam in Hubei Province. 17 4 Heightened
awareness of this vulnerability combined with other factors may affect
plans for future dams.1 75 On December 2, 2016, "China's State Energy
Administration published a policy roadmap for the next five years that con-
tained no mention of building any [new] hydroelectric dams on the
Nu."'176 The roadmap is indirect evidence that new dams are on pause. It
is not the equivalent of a cancellation notice, in part because the govern-
ment does not like to acknowledge that it has bowed to public pressure.
Although some pronounce that China has "shelve[d] plans to dam" 177 the
Nu, it is premature to draw this conclusion. There are reasons besides pub-
lic pressure to put new dams on hold: environmental degradation, seismic
activity in the southwestern China, and a slowing economy. 178 If in the
future these reasons seem less weighty, China could put new power dams
back on the table. It therefore makes sense to consider previously pro-
posed new dams and their likely effects.
Nujiang Prefecture, where eight of the previously proposed 13 dams
on the Nu River would be built, has a higher poverty rate than the areas
affected by the Three Gorge Dam, and the vast majority of the Nujiang
population consists of ethnic minorities. 17 9 Twenty-two of China's 55 offi-
cially recognized ethnicities are represented in Nujiang Prefecture, includ-
ing Lisu, Bai, Nu, Pumi, and Dulong. Over half of the people in Nujiang
Prefecture are of Lisu ethnicity and ethnic minorities account for over 92%
of the total population. All four counties in Nujiang Prefecture are still
designated as "national key poverty counties" and Nujiang Prefecture
remains one of the poorest ethnic minority autonomous prefectures in
170. See Meng Si, The Fate of People Displaced by the Mekong Dams, in CHINADIALOGUE,
25, 25 (2013).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Philip H. Brown, Darrin Magee & Yilin Xu, Socioeconomic Vulnerability in
China's Hydropower Development Programs, 19 CHINA ECON. REv. 614, 623 (2008).
175. Phillips, "Angry River," supra note 163.
176. Id.
177. This pronouncement is the interpretation of Phillips, "Angry River," supra note
163.
178. See id. (listing these reasons).
179. Id. at 624.
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China. 180
The eight previously proposed dams in Nujiang Prefecture would dis-
place over 36,000 persons who belong to ethnic minorities. 181 These
populations are vulnerable to mistreatment and economic hardship as a
result of resettlement because of their distinctive cultural practices and the
fact that many do not speak Mandarin, the official government lan-
guage. 182 Without the ability to communicate effectively with government
officials, these ethnic minorities face hurdles to participation in commu-
nity meetings and regional dialogues about dam projects.' 8 3 Furthermore,
even if the affected minority populations overcome the language barrier,
there is no clear or direct way for those affected to appeal to the local gov-
ernment, and appealing to federal courts is expensive, difficult, and often
ineffective. 184
180. Brown & Xu, supra note 137, at 779-80. Bai seem to have emerged in the third
century B.C.E. from an earlier Kunming community, and live mainly in the Dali Bai
Autonomous Prefecture in western Yunnan Province. 1 WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note
161, at 78, 80. "Most Bai people are subsistence farmers and herders." Id. at 79. Cul-
turally, Bai are known for quarrying marble, song and dance festivals, and a syncretic
religion marked by village gods, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Id. at 79-80.
Information on Nu dates from the eighth century C.E., and they live chiefly in rugged
parts of Yunnan Province. 2 WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 161, at 602. Over the
centuries, Nu came under the influence and sometimes subjugation of Naxi, Bai, and
Tibetans, until they became citizens of China in 1949. Id. Nu society was patrilineal
and patrilocal; farming was the main occupation. Id.at 602-03. "Nu religion recog-
nized a wide variety of nature spirits, including the sun, moon, various animals, moun-
tains, rivers .... as well as their dead ancestors." Id. at 603.
Pumi "live in northwestern Yunnan Province as well as in Sichuan Province." Id. at
674. Like Nu, Pumi are socially patrilineal and patrilocal, but, interestingly, they often
marry cross-cousins. Id. They practiced swidden agriculture until the 1950s, and also
raised farm animals. Id. The Pumi indigenous religion ascribed "power [to] both nature
and ancestral spirits," though now "Pumi are nominally Buddhists." Id.
Dulong (also known as Derung, Drung, T'rung, and other names) are a tiny ethnic
minority who live along "the Dulong River valley in northwestern Yunnan Province." 1
WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 161, at 186. They hark back to at least the Tang
dynasty in the seventh century C.E. Id. Often Dulong were at the mercy of other
groups, such as Bai, Dai, Lisu, or Naxi. Id. at 186-87. Many Dulong are farmers, and
they marry outside their own patrilineal clans. Id. at 187. Most Dulong are animists,
and "[u]ntil 50 years ago [Dulong] women were known for traditional facial tattooing."
Id. at 187. Dulong speak a Tibeto-Burman language, which they see "as closely bound
up with their ethnic identity," and which is on the verge "of endangerment." Ross Perlin,
Language Attitudes of the T'rung, 32 LINGUISTICS OF THE TIBETO-BURMAN AREA 91, 92, 108
(2009).
181. Desiree D. Tullos et. al., Biophysical, Socioeconomic, and Geopolitical Vulnerabili-
ties to Hydropower Development on the Nu River, China, 18 ECOLOGY & SOC'Y 16, 19
(table 2) (2013) [hereinafter Tullos et al.]. The table presents a conservative estimate.
Id. at 18.
182. See id. at 17, 24.
183. Id. Although the Chinese government officially supports the use of minority
languages, officials often speak only Mandarin. Also, while Mandarin is taught in Chi-
nese primary and secondary schools, minority populations have high dropout rates,
especially in isolated rural areas like Nujiang Prefecture. See Yuxiang Wang & JoAnn
Phillion, Minority Language Policy and Practice in China: The Need for Multicultural Edu-
cation, 11 INT'L J. MULTICULTURAL EDUC. 1, 4, 6 (2009).
184. SeeJames, supra note 140, at 478, 483 (remarking that appeals are often ineffec-
tive owing to Chinese courts' "lack [of] meaningful independence").
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It is likely that most of the 36,000 persons to be displaced by the eight
possible dams in Nujiang Prefecture will be members of the Lisu ethnic
minority. 18 5 Barbara West identifies Lisu as "a highland people of Yunnan
Province, '"186 and observes that "[flor the most part Lisu communities
established themselves in the high elevations of their new [i.e., nineteenth-
century] homes, between 4,265 and 9,845 feet." 18 7 Lisu villagers tradition-
ally practiced swidden (slash-and-bum) agriculture, which China abol-
ished "in favor of the irrigated fields and wet-rice agriculture of the
Han."18 8
Lisu identity is partly a function of village residence and "membership
in a patrilineal clan group or zo."'18 9 Because each clan group "has its own
set of ancestral and other important beliefs, religious rituals and
beliefs, ' 190 it is difficult to pick out a unifying thread among them. Some
suggest that Lisu religious practice honors special relationships cultivated
between Lisu persons and all components of their surroundings.
19 1
Paul Durrenberger, writing about Lisu in Thailand thirty years ago,
opines that important parts of Lisu religious practice include the recogni-
tion of social relationships between living Lisu and their departed ances-
tors, who are honored with earthen burials (which are often prohibited in
densely populated areas of China). 19 2 For Lisu, he says, each village's bur-
ial ground is protected by spirits who guard the graves of the newly
deceased until their souls are able to detach from their bodies. 193 Rivers
also figure strongly in Lisu religious practices. Some of the most powerful
ritual events in Lisu persons' lives, he points out, take place near ceremo-
nial bridges erected over moving water. 19 4 The loss of access to rivers and
to ancestral burial grounds could have negative psychosocial effects on
Lisu persons. If their sense of identity rests partly on being in harmony
with their surroundings, then moving them away from these surroundings
could destabilize their sense of identity.
1 95
Recent work on Lisu by Michele Zack remarks on their independence,
185. See Tullos et al., supra note 181, at 23.
186. 1 WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 161, at 466.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 466-67.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See The Lisu Ethnic Minority, http://www.china.org.cn/e-groups/shaoshu/shao-
2-1isu.htm [https://perma.cc/3QJV-VQCZ] (last visited Nov. 13, 2018).
192. See E. Paul Durrenberger, Lisu Religion 21, 28, 30 (1989) (Ctr. for Se. Asian
Stud., N. Ill. Univ., Occasional Paper No. 13, 1989) (discussing Lisu in northern Thai-
land but also how religious practices are similar among all Lisu groups). Mathew Dess-
ner, Burial Now Illegal in Chinese Province, T~AKDEATH (June 3, 2014), http://www.talk
death.com/burial-now-illegal-chinese-province/ [https://perma.cc/MRR7-EA7B].
193. Id. at 28.
194. See id. at 25.
195. See Huang Ji et al., An Ethnobotanical Study of Medicinal Plants Used by the Lisu
People in Nujiang, Northwest Yunnan, China, 58 ECON. BOTANY S253, S254, S256 (2004).
Lisu medicine uses some fifty-two medicinal plants, and increasing exploitation and
deforestation threaten some of these plants. Id.
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industriousness, and adjustment to contemporary China. 196 Zack's book
is less scholarly but more journalistic than Durrenberger's, and it offers
separate discussions of Lisu in Thailand, Burma/Myanmar, and China
along with excellent photographs. 197 She reports that a large power dam
across the Nu River has "been planned since the 1980s," but there "have
been resistance and delays in starting such projects."'198
Another group affected by dam displacement are Tibetans living in
Yunnan Province. Tibet is familiar to many people across the globe
because of its political plight, the Dalai Lama, and Tibet's distinctive, if
syncretic, form of Buddhism. 199 Tibet may have existed as a separate
country as long ago as the first century B.C.E.200 Invaded by the British in
1904 and by the Chinese in 1910, Tibet eventually succumbed to the Chi-
nese army in the 1950s and 1960s. 20 1 "[M]any Tibetans themselves
believe they came from India, . . . [though] many contemporary historians
and anthropologists believe that Tibetans have the same origins as most
other Chinese populations and speakers of Sino-Tibetan languages. '20 2
Tibetans have often been nomadic herders who rely on their livestock and
high-altitude varieties of barley, potatoes, and other crops for food.203
Buddhism remains an important part of Tibetan culture,20 4 even if the Chi-
nese government tries to repress monasteries and convents. Tibetan mar-
riage practices include "simple monogamy," "fraternal and father-son
polyandry," "sororal polygyny," and "mother-daughter polygyny. ' 20 5 Mon-
asteries and convents remain an option for those who do not marry.20 6
Ethnic minorities, like Tibetans or Lisu, who live in western regions of
China are not prosperous. Hydropower in these regions is a large part of a
key national development strategy: the "Great Western Opening" (xibei
dAkaifa). 20 7 Within the lower Mekong Basin in Yunnan, the central govern-
ment has planned a cascade of seven dams, four of which have been com-
pleted.208 The Tibetan village of Geze is located in the upper cascade of the
Lancang River, in Deqin County in northwestern Yunnan Province. Just
downstream from the village is the projected site of the Gushui Dam. Once
built, it will inundate Geze, displacing its inhabitants and interfering with
196. See MICHELE ZACK, THE Lisu: FAR FROM THE RULER (2017) [hereinafter ZACK].
197. Id. at 187-302.
198. Id. at 278 (discussing "a personal communication from Piaporn Deetes of the
NGO International Rivers (Berkeley, CA) on July 13, 2017").
199. See 2 WEST, ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 161, at 804-09 (discussing the origins,
history, and culture of Tibet).
200. Id. at 804-05.
201. Id. at 805, 808.
202. Id. at 804.
203. Id. at 808.
204. Id. at 808-09.
205. Id. at 808.
206. Id. at 809.
207. Brendan A. Galipeau, Socio-Ecological Vulnerability in a Tibetan Village on the
Mekong River, China, 34 HIMALAYA 38, 39 (2014).
208. Darrin Magee, The Dragon Upstream: China's Role in Lancang-Mekong Develop-
ment, in POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY WATERSHED: THE CASE OF THE
LOWER MEKONG BASIN 171, 187 (Joakim Oejendal et al. eds., 2012).
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their livelihoods.20 9 Geze villagers rely on agricultural products and local
natural resources-especially grapes and caterpillar fungus-for household
income. 2 10
It is unlikely that villagers will be resettled in a nearby location where
it would be possible for them to retain their geographic and cultural heri-
tage, such as ancestral lands and local natural resources. All too often,
communities have to move to regions with a different topography and make
substantial economic and lifestyle changes. Alterations in cropping pat-
terns and socio-ecological relationships, losses of cultural identities and
ecological knowledge, and a shift away from traditional agricultural
income strategies to less secure forms of wage labor are common occur-
rences elsewhere in China and will likely replicate in Geze when the
Gushui Dam is built.211
An especially aggravating problem for Tibetans in Geze and through-
out Yunnan Province is the frequent lack of government payment for land
requisition. This failure to pay generally strips displaced migrants of a via-
ble means to develop new livelihoods, while also inhibiting their ability to
maintain significant links to their cultural pasts. Although "the Ministry of
Land and Resources recognized at least 168,000 cases of illegal land deals
in 2003, the actual number of cases violating rights of [displaced farmers]
could significantly exceed it."2 12
D. Attempted Reforms
China's model for resettlement and compensation is more thorough
and effective than that of many other countries, but this model and the
laws undergirding it have not achieved their full potential.213 This section
seeks to identify problems facing China and to advance some possible
solutions.
Scholars have made suggestions for improving China's resettlement
and compensation practices, and I begin by surveying some of these pro-
posals. In a perceptive article, Michael Cernea suggests some strategies for
209. Galipeau, supra note 207, at 39.
210. Id. at 42. The relevant fungus is Ophiocordyceps sinensis, which Tibetans and
some other ethnic minorities use medicinally. Jiyue Chen et al., Ethnomycological Use of
Chinese Caterpillar Fungus, Ophiocordyceps sinensis (Berk.) G. H. Sung et al. (Ascomy-
cetes) in Northern Yunnan Province, SW China, 12 IrN'L J. MEDICINAL MUSHROOMS 427,
427 (2010).
211. Like Lisu persons' deep connections to their surroundings discussed in supra
text accompanying notes 182-91, ethnic Tibetan villagers of Geze "not only have a
highly place-based economy, but also a place-based culture and cultural practices [in]
which things like caterpillar fungus are indeed a part of in addition to being market
commodities; these things are part of their village identity. Villagers continually
describe how fortunate they are to live in a region with a mountain that is rich with
resources, not just for markets, but also for their daily life needs and spiritual beliefs,
which others have also commented on the importance of with regards to the landscape
of the upper Mekong. ... " Galipeau, supra note 207, at 48.
212. Elena Barabantseva, Development as Exclusion: Ethnic Minorities in China's West-
ern Development Project 8 (British Inter-University China Centre Working Paper Series
No. 7, 2007).
213. See Cernea, Resettlement, supra note 16, at 111.
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improving resettlement and compensation practices. 214 He stresses that
mere compensation for the value of requisitioned land is inadequate, and
that strong resettlement support and continued assistance are crucial to
the long-term security of resettled communities. 215 Cernea proposes that
resettlement costs be calculated ex ante and extracted from the economic
rents generated by dam projects.216 A familiar governmental position is
that the government cannot disburse any economic rents to migrants until
a project is completed or nearly so. This position is untenable because
China has the financial resources to compensate migrants before a project
is complete. 217 Cemea also proposes that hydropower companies enable
migrants to share in the peripheral benefits of projects, such as subsidized
electricity and water, and employment opportunities related to the con-
struction and operation of dams.218
Shi Guoqing offers some additional suggestions. Shi recommends
that China improve its resettlement and compensation plans through third-
party monitoring (project supervision and auditing) and by focusing on
improved infrastructure. 219 Shi suggests further that hydropower compa-
nies and local governments increase funding for infrastructure (e.g., irriga-
tion, roads, and bridges) in order to ensure the financial security of the
resettled persons. 220 Shi also proposes that resettlement planners craft
detailed policies and procedures to mitigate the loss of significant cultural
knowledge and practices. 221
While Cernea and Shi offer suggestions for change, some scholars
praise the progress China has made in the recent past. Such scholars point
out that China's resettlement and compensation policies have been getting
better since the 1980s and will likely continue to improve.222 They empha-
size that compensation rates have increased along with public awareness
and concern over the life prospects of resettled persons. 223 Moreover, a
public outcry in China over the socioeconomic and ecological impact of
the Nu River dams led to a salutary delay in these projects, which intimates
that government officials might take more care now that public awareness
214. See id.
215. Id. at 117.
216. Id. at 95.
217. Id.
218. Id.at 105.
219. See Shi Guoqing, China's Experiences: Involuntary Resettlement in Hydropower
Development, Slide 31-32, 41, http://antioquiapresente.org/sitio/sites/default/files/
Profesor-Shi.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LTK-68XY] [hereinafter Shi, China's Experiences]
(last visited Nov. 13, 2018). Shi is the director of the National Research Center for Reset-
tlement and Social Development Institute, and the Dean of the Public Administration
School of Hohai University. See generally Shi Guoqing et al., Post-Resettlement Support:
Policy Aimed at Poverty Alleviation and Sustainable Development, in ADVANCES IN WATER
RESOURCES & HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING 1446-55 (Changkuan Zhang & Hongwu Tang
eds., 2009).
220. See Shi, China's Experiences, supra note 219, slide 34.
221. See id. at slide 41.
222. See, e.g., Pu Wang et al., supra note 98, at 6.
223. See id. at 7-8.
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and concern have risen.224 Nevertheless, though Chinese officials may
disclose more information than they used to,225 migrants might not know
how to access or evaluate it.
The proposals and strategies just reviewed could lead to better resettle-
ment and compensation policies in many parts of the world. However,
China faces some salient challenges to implementing change, as we shall
see immediately.
E. China's Challenges
1. Problems of Law, Regulation, Policy, and Compensation
First, Chinese rural property law complicates the calculation of ade-
quate compensation. Collective ownership of land is a vestige of China's
total commitment to agrarian socialism during the Great Leap Forward.
226
Because of the nature of collective ownership, current resettlement funding
can compensate individual farmers only for lost agricultural production
for a limited time, even if the government is requisitioning their land for
more profitable commercial uses. This systemic undervaluation of land
may help China meet its ambitious hydropower goals. But it disincen-
tivizes land development and agricultural improvements by farmers hold-
ing limited land-use contracts. With some justification, many in China
believe it is necessary to urbanize and advance to a modern economy, yet
funneling displaced farmers into cities often leaves them leading precari-
ous lives. 227 Hu Shuli notes that, unless both rural and urban land trade in
something closer to a free market, rural "residents are cut off from sharing
the gains of rising land prices," and that "restricting the trade of such a key
factor of production leads only to inefficiencies" '228 and, I would add,
increased socioeconomic inequality.
Second, the manner of resettlement has led to problems, especially
with resettling displaced migrants on land that is inferior to the land they
lost. Government support for irrigation and electricity has been spotty.
Moreover, many resettlement communities offer housing that is both
undersized and overpriced. 229 China could mitigate these problems by
sharing water and power resources produced by dams, but it would be even
224. See id. at 8. See also Cernea, Resettlement, supra note 16, at 97-98 (also mention-
ing lack of political will as a factor).
225. See, e.g., Arthur Mol et al., Information Disclosure in Environmental Risk Manage-
ment: Developments in China, 3 J. CuRRENr CHINESE AFF. 163, 164 (2011).
226. See Vince Wong, Land Policy Reform in China: Dealing with Forced Expropriation
and the Dual Land Tenure System 11-13 (Faculty of Law, Univ. of Hong Kong, Occasional
Paper No. 25, 2014) (discussing the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution as
part of a larger history of land policy in China from 1911 to 2014), available at http://
www.law.hku.hk/ccpl/pub/OP%20No%2025%2Vince%20Wong.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BY77-5NAQ]. For an earlier discussion, see Alsen, supra note 139, at 57.
227. See Hu Shuli, Without Land Reform, China Cannot Meet Its Policy Goal of
Urbanisation, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (May 30, 2013), http://www.scmp.com/com-
ment/insight-opinion/article/ 1249134/without-land-reform-china-cannot-meet-its-pol-
icy-goal [https://perma.cc/NAT7-AJUZ].
228. Id.
229. Brown & Xu, supra note 137, at 791-92.
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better to have sound housing design and construction for the benefit of
resettled persons.
Standing over these problems of migration, urban and rural regula-
tions, and social and spatial stratification is the hukou system. Though this
system appeals to China's preference for centralized government, it receives
frequent criticism as a major obstacle to just and sensible development. 230
Over the years, workers have migrated to Beijing, but under China's "house-
hold registration" (hukou) system, city officials periodically evict them en
masse with little in the way of due process. 23 1
2. Problems of Dam Performance and Corruption
First, Chinese dams are running below capacity: a 2015 report
revealed that China is producing less than half the electricity it could be
producing.23 2 Proper engineering needed for reliable hydroelectric dams
has been common industry knowledge for decades, and yet engineering
problems bedevil Chinese dams. These problems undercut the ability of
hydropower companies to provide long-term resettlement support. Evi-
dence exists that corruption of business persons in the bidding and pro-
curement process encourages the use of inferior construction materials,
which are a common cause of dam underperformance. 23 3
Second, a core problem with China's resettlement programs is the cor-
ruption of government officials.2 34 One survey of persons forced to reset-
tle in China found that "in only twenty two percent of all land takings were
farmers actually consulted about their compensation, and nearly two
thirds of those surveyed responded that the amount of compensation
promised was inadequate. ' 235 One should worry about officials as adept
230. See Chan, Hukou, supra note 90, at 197, 198, 202, 206, 216 (criticizing the sys-
tem's rigidity and complexity, the suffering caused by the system, and the division
between urban and rural and between agricultural and nonagricultural status and loca-
tion which now poses "a major obstacle" to China).
231. See, e.g., Benjamin Haas, China: "Ruthless" Campaign to Evict Beijing's Migrant
Workers Condemned, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 26, 2017), https://theguardian.com/world/
2017/nov/27/china-ruthless-camp aign-to-evict-beijings-migrant-workers-condemned
(reporting that an open letter to China's leadership called the evictions "a serious tram-
pling of human rights").
232. See David Stanway, RPT-Dam Waste: Planning Chaos Drains China's Hydro Ambi-
tions, REUTERS NEws (June 7, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/china-renewables-
hydropower/dam-waste-planning-chaos-drains-chinas-hydro-ambitions-idUSL3NOYB
3UB20150607 [https://perma.cc/MYD6-P6MQ] ("If China fully exploited hydropower,
total annual output should be around 2.2 trillion kWh, compared to about 1 trillion
kWh now.").
233. See X.L. Ding, The Quasi-Criminalization of a Business Sector in China: Decon-
structing the Construction-Sector Syndrome, 35 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 177, 183 (2001)
(connecting, in the case of the Three Gorges Dam project, (1) government-construction
company corruption and (2) "substandard materials and shoddy workmanship" in a
bridge collapse related to the project).
234. This Article concentrates on dam-related corruption in China, but for a sound, if
now slightly older, monograph on corruption generally in China see MELANIE MANION,
CORRUPTION BY DESIGN: BUILDING CLEAN GOVERNMENT IN MAINLAND CHINA AND HONG
KONG (2004).
235. James, supra note 140, at 482.
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at skimming money as magicians are at pulling rabbits out of hats. Shi's
proposed supervision measures might improve the situation. However,
China has a single-party system, and the state exercises its power through
the Communist Party without much effective outside supervision. That is
one reason why China's famously opaque political processes create consid-
erable difficulty in limiting corruption by way of independent supervision,
though the new Supervision Commission, founded in March 2018, may
prove helpful.236
F. Addressing China's Challenges
1. Law, Regulation, Policy, and Compensation Methods
From these problems, I move to solutions that could improve China's
handling of its dam projects. First and foremost, China would do well to
revise its land policies. These policies are complicated; their revision will
be no less complicated. A good place to start would be to increase the
compensation for agricultural land, which at present remains, with qualifi-
cations, at ten to sixteen times its average annual output. It would be desir-
able to have something that is closer to a market price for land. Given
China's legal structure, it is a high hurdle to develop even a proxy for mar-
ket price. One can, however, key off current practices regarding the price
of buildings on urban land. Expropriated buildings in urban areas are val-
ued at prices by which the government calculates. No such practice cur-
rently exists for agricultural land. Developing such a practice would put
farmers in a position more closely resembling the economic situation of
persons who occupy houses in urban areas, though urban dwellers may
also find their compensation inadequate.
Second, allied with a reconfiguring of rural land values would be a
policy that uses multiple methods of compensation. Examples of these
methods are employment for displaced migrants, shareholding coopera-
tives, assurance of social security, and an interest in the retained land of
236. China's Central Discipline Inspection Commission-an internal organization
whose lack of autonomy hinders investigations of fraud and corruption-audits China's
governmental entities and the Communist Party. See generally Xuezhi Guo, Controlling
Corruption in the Party: China's Central Discipline Inspection Commission, 219 CHINA Q.
597 (2014); Jamie P. Horsley, Toward a More Open China, in THE RIGHT TO KNow: TaANS-
PARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD 54-91 (Ann Florini ed., 2007); Susan Shirk, What China's
Lack of Transparency Means for U.S. Policy, CHINA FILE (May 28, 2015), http://
www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/two-way-street/what-chinas-lack-transparency-
means-us-policy [https://perma.cc/6X7C-PW9E]. On the national Supervision Com-
mission, see China Aims to Set up State Anti-Corruption Unit Next Year, CHINA DAILY (Oct.
29, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-congress-corruption/china-aims-
to-set-up-anti-corruption-unit-next-year-idUSKBN 1CYODT [https://perma.cc/T28L-
UMV4] (discussing the new commission that will expand President Xi Jinping's anti-
corruption efforts); see also Jaime P Horsley, Op-ed, What's so controversial about China's
new anti-corruption body, BROOKINGS (May 30, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/opin
ions/whats-so-controversial-about-chinas-new-anti-corruption-body/ [https://perma.cc/
HDS4-73V9].
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rural collectives. 23 7 The aim of these and other methods is to make sure
that migrants are no worse off than if they had not been displaced at all.
Otherwise, China can expect resistance to dam projects by indigenous eth-
nic minorities. 23 8
Third, China should consider land-for-land exchanges, particularly
where unoccupied or sparsely occupied land exists that is a good substi-
tute for the requisitioned land. Admittedly, establishing equivalence will
be a challenge. How good a substitute unoccupied or sparsely occupied
land is turns on many factors: propinquity, topography, climate, similarity
of biodiversity, and so on. India's Sardar Sarovar Project ("SSP") illustrates
some of the issues besetting land-for-land exchanges. 23 9 The SSP was for a
large dam that would make water available for drought-prone areas.2 40 A
tribunal "explicitly provided for allotment of agricultural land to a land-
holding family (minimum 2 hectares) in lieu land lost" by "tribal peo-
ple."24 1 For complicated reasons, the arrangement fell apart,24 2 but a
taller version of the dam was inaugurated on September 17, 2017.243
Fourth, resettlement planning should recognize the strong cultural
links that some indigenous ethnic minorities have to their physical sur-
roundings. For instance, Lisu and Tibetans have distinctive cultural rela-
tionships to their native locations. 24 4 Project planners should tailor
housing designs to migrants' budgets and cultural preferences, or allow
migrants to plan and construct their own communities and housing with
resettlement funds. Because the Regulation on Land Requisition already
requires that resettlement planners consult with migrants before they are
resettled, improved monitoring and enforcement of those requirements
would be beneficial.
Fifth, it makes sense to limit the scope of land requisition by narrow-
ing what counts as the "public interest" in particular projects. Article 42 of
237. See Zhu Qian, Land Acquisition Compensation in Post-Reform China: Evolution,
Structure and Challenges in Hangzhou, 46 LAND USE POL'Y 250, 255 (table 1) (2015).
238. See, e.g., Green Watershed, EQUATOR INITIATIVE (May 28, 2017), https://
www.equatorinitiative.org/2017/05/28/green-watershed/ [https://perma.cc/VHV6-
S4AJ] (describing resistance to the Lashihai dam project in 1998 after inadequate com-
pensation for members of the Yi ethnic minority).
239. For excellent studies of this project, see TOwARD SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT:
STRUGGLING OVER INDIA's NARMADA RIVER (William W. Fisher ed., 1995) [hereinafter
NARMADA RIVER].
240. Anil Patel, What Do the Narmada Valley Tribals Want?, in NARMADA RIVER, supra
note 239, at 179.
241. Id. at 179-80.
242. See id. at 179-200; William W. Fisher, Development and Resistance in the
Narmada Valley, in NARMADA RIVER, supra note 239, at 3; Kingsbury, "Indigenous Peo-
ples," supra note 3, at 444.
243. "Engineering Miracle, " Says PM Narendra Modi: I O-Point Guide to Sardar Sarovar
Dam, NDTV [INDIA], https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/sardar-sarovar-dam-project-10-
things-to-know-1751285 [https://perma.cc/5QPA-RR8T] (reporting also that according
to some claims "40,000 families ... would be displaced" when the reservoir is filled to
capacity) (last updated Sept. 17, 2017).
244. Lisu culture, for example, attaches importance to ancestral burial grounds and
ceremonies performed over moving water. Tibetan culture, for example, prizes access to
Buddhist monasteries and convents. See supra text accompanying notes 186-200.
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the Property Law states: "To meet the needs of the public interest, collec-
tively-owned lands, premises owned by entities and individuals or other
real properties may be expropriated in accordance with the power[,]
scope[,] and procedures provided by laws."'24 5 Most infrastructure projects
fall within a broad understanding of the public interest. For years, the Chi-
nese government decided which projects would go forward and pro-
nounced that they were in the public interest. 24 6 But in 2011, the State
Council announced a new Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on
State-Owned Land and Compensation. 24 7  Statutorily, roads, dams,
national defense, health, education, and housing for low-income persons
all qualify as being in the public interest.2 48 But commercial development,
such as the building of shopping malls, is a closer question. Anyway, this
expropriation regulation applies only to buildings on state-owned land.
China needs a parallel regulation for projects built on agricultural land.
Sixth, the Chinese government could increase resettlement funding
and encourage greater investment in agriculture by extending the duration
of land-use contracts for resettled migrants. Migrants who are allowed a
longer contract period would be motivated to improve their land and agri-
cultural practices because the resulting value added would provide an
enduring, inheritable benefit. This benefit would, over time, allow owners
and their children to increase production and build family assets. China
might object that such a benefit goes too far. Even if one accepts this objec-
tion, longer-term contracts and the extension of existing contracts, coupled
with greater investment in irrigation and other infrastructure, could
improve the outlook and productivity of resettled migrants with little
change to the nature of Chinese property law.
2. Solutions Relating to Dam Performance and Corruption
First, the problems of land undervaluation and dam underper-
formance raise serious questions as to how authorities are to adequately
compensate migrants. One solution would be to require hydropower com-
panies to purchase migrants' land at prices comparable to its commercial
market value. This requirement would make the process of land valuation
easier and increase initial compensation payments to migrants. Moreover,
greater upfront costs would force hydropower companies to decrease reli-
ance on an inflated pool of anticipated economic rents. Since China's
245. Property Law, supra note 103, art. 42. I use "the public interest" as a more com-
mon English expression than "public interests" as employed in the above translation.
The relevant Chinese expression (g6nggongliyi, &_ J ) does not mark a difference
between singular and plural, which must be inferred from the context.
246. See Wong, supra note, 226, at 63.
247. Gu6you TfidishAng FIngw Zh~ngsh6u yd Biichang Tidoli (±-i-) Ai
& 4-*,a, N) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on State-owned Land and
Compensation] (promulgated by the State Council of the P.R.C., Jan. 21, 2011, Order
No. 590, effective Jan. 21, 2011), Lawinfochina, http://www.lawinfochina.com/dis
play.aspx?id=8580&lib=law&SearchKeyword=Regulation%20on%20the%2OEx%20pro
priation%20of%20Buildings&SearchCKeyword [https://perma.cc/6HY2-TQ78].
248. See id. art 8.
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dams are operating under capacity almost across the board, hydropower
companies may focus on raising production by improving infrastructure if
funding a dam upfront becomes more expensive. That would be better
than displacing more people to build additional inferior dams.
Second, though it is important to recognize that the roots of corrupt
practices run deep, despairing over it is unhelpful.2 4 9 Corruption, as
understood generally in this Article, is an abuse of trust for personal, famil-
ial, or political gain. 250 And by way of elaboration, trust is assured reliance
based on moral, social, and legal rules.2 5 ' Many scholars employ the
Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index ("CPI") to mea-
sure corruption. 25 2 But strictly speaking, the CPI measures perceptions of
corruption rather than corruption itself. Wholly accurate measurements
of corruption are elusive, 25 3 for corrupt individuals typically do their own
dirty work to avoid detection.
Corruption creates systemic harm. 25 4 It does so by increasing ine-
quality, which in turn may engender even greater corruption.25 5 As
Jiangnan Zhu points out in his study of corruption in China, corruption
permeates institutions and increases economic inequality.25 6 Zhu picks
249. See MANION, supra note 234, at 1-26, 200-08 (arguing confidently and realisti-
cally for anti-corruption efforts in China).
250. See supra note 29.
251. Other scholars think of corruption in similar although not identical ways. See,
e.g., MANION, supra note 234, at 5 (proffering that in government, corruption is "abuse of
public office for private gain") (emphasis omitted); DENNIS F. THOMPSON, EnIcs IN CON-
GRESS: FROM INDIVIDUAL TO INSTITUTIONAL CORRUPTION 29 (1995) (stating that corruption
in government involves "a gain by a public official, service to a private citizen, and an
improper connection between the gain and the service"); Sung Hui Kim, The Last Temp-
tation of Congress: Legislator Insider Trading and the Fiduciary Norm Against Corruption,
98 CORNELL L. REv. 845, 897 (2013) (arguing that "under most modem definitions,
corruption involves an abuse of trust ..."); Chilik Yu, Measuring Public Perceptions of
Corruption in Asia, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION IN ASIA 224, 224-25 (Ting
Gong & Ian Scott eds., 2017) (arguing that corruption is "the abuse of entrusted power
for private gain" following what Yu considers the "working definition of corruption"
used by Transparency International) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION]. Some
scholars offer further distinctions under a general understanding of corruption. See,
e.g., Benjamin Nyblade & Steven R. Reed, Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition
and Corruption in Japan, 1947-1993, 52 AMJ. POL. ScI. 926, 926 (2008) ("distinguishing
between two types of corruption by politicians: illegal acts for material gain (looting)
and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating)") (emphasis omitted).
252. Yu, supra note 251, at 224-25. For China's ranking under the CPI, see TRANS-
PARENCY INT'L, CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEx 2016 (2017), available at https://issuu.
com/transparencyinternational/docs/2016_cpireport-en?e=2496456/43483458
[https://perma.cc/Q444-4YHKI.
253. Yu, supra note 251, at 224-25; see also Paul M. Heywood & Jonathan Rose,
"Close But no Cigar": The Measurement of Corruption, 34 J. PUB. POL'Y 507, 507 (2014)
(opining that so far no one gets a cigar for the best measurement of corruption).
254. Cf. MANION, supra note 234, at 12 (noting that "the illegality of corrupt transac-
tions produces costs that are higher than those associated with legal market activity").
255. Jong-sung You, Corruption and Inequality in Asia, in HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION,
supra note 251, at 97. "The reciprocal causality may create a vicious cycle of high cor-
ruption and high inequality." Id. (citations omitted).
256. Jiangnan Zhu, Corruption Networks in China: An Institutional Analysis, in HArn-
BOOK OF CORRUPTION, supra note 251, at 27.
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out a trio of institutional factors that foster a network of corruption: "1)
power concentration in a geographically and functionally fragmented
authoritarian regime; 2) business-government collusion in a transitional
economy; and 3) the prevalence of informal politics, particularly factional-
ism and family members' involvement in public affairs."
25 7
Corruption also has a negative impact on individuals because it is "a
lived experience for real people."'2 58 As Michael Johnston puts it, corrup-
tion "affect[s] [real persons'] wellbeing, their values and choices, their
political voice (or lack of it), their relationships with other citizens as well
as with officials and their future chances in life."
25 9
The issue now becomes what China can do about it. A handful of
steps will be generally helpful. First, establish an anti-corruption agency
that is independent of both the Chinese government and the Chinese Com-
munist Party.2 60 Second, collectively protest corruption. Protests of this
sort by Chinese citizens can be risky but are increasing as China grows
more transparent. 26 1 Third, build institutions so as to prevent, or at least
lessen, corruption-this step has seen success in Singapore and Hong
Kong.26 2 Fourth, use both carrots and sticks-reward those who are incor-
ruptible, hold down corruption by others, and punish those who engage in
corrupt practices. Fifth, adjust constitutional and other legal rules so that
they convincingly signal a determined interest in clean government to both
the corrupt official and the ordinary citizen.2 63 Sixth, transform the char-
acter of individuals. 26 4 The idea here is to instill values and norms that
prompt individuals to act in ways that are morally good.
2 65
257. Id. at 39. Zhu cites the case of Zhou Yongkang as an example of the impact of
these factors on corruption in China. Id. at 35-39.
258. Michael Johnston, Thinking About Corruption as Though People Mattered, in
HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION, supra note 251, at 165 (emphasis omitted).
259. Id.
260. See MANION, supra note 234, at 201-03 (indicating that more than one anti-cor-
ruption agency may be needed); RosE-AcKERm AN, supra note 97, at 159-62 (pointing out
that such agencies have been notably effective in Hong Kong and Singapore).
261. See Andrew Wedeman, Corruption and Collective Protest in China, in HANDBOOK
OF CORRUPTION, supra note 251, at 179-181 (discussing the association between corrup-
tion and unrest) [hereinafter Wedeman]. Wedeman points out ordinary citizens are
more likely to see and protest minor (low-level) corruption than major (high-level) cor-
ruption because the latter "takes place behind closed doors and in discrete places." Id.
at 192. Protesting high-level corruption has higher risks and costs than protesting low-
level corruption. Id.
262. Jin-Wook Choi, Corruption Prevention: Successful Cases, in HANDBOOK OF CORUP-
nON, supra note 251, at 262, 265-74.
263. See MANON, supra note 234, at 205-08.
264. Robert Gregory conceives of this suggestion as integrity-based but other virtues,
values, and norms are also available, and he draws attention to Confucian values. See
Robert Gregory, Rule-Based and Integrity-Based Anti-Corruption Approaches in Asia, in
HANDBOOK OF CORRUPTION, supra note 251, at 277, 287. He wisely stresses that a combi-
nation of rule-based and integrity-based approaches may work well. Id. at 277, 282-83,
288.
265. Work on virtue ethics in analytic moral philosophy may provide helpful bedrock
for such an idea. See generally ROBERT MFmuiHEW ADAms, A THEORY OF VIRTUE (2006);
CHRISTINE SWANTON, VIRTUE ET-ics: A PLuRALISTIc VIEW (2003). P. F. Strawson, Social
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In addition to reforms in land and compensation policies, ongoing
monitoring is necessary to root out corruption and create trust between the
government and migrants. Increasing supervision is likely to require either
better internal auditing or better third-party or international auditing, or
both. Battalions of auditors and accountants might, however, prove of little
use unless the government has the political will to protect migrants.
In 2012, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party and
General Secretary Xi Jinping began to take government corruption seri-
ously through the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
("CCDI"). 266 The CCDI has pursued high-level officials and minor civil
servants alike, though the former gets the most international press.267
However, the fairness of these investigations has come under question.268
It remains unclear how effective this new push will be in the case of cor-
rupt dam-building practices. If the push is effective, it would facilitate bet-
ter provision of compensation and resettlement for displaced migrants.
G. Displacement, Resilience, and the Ethics of Dam-Building
Suppose that China were to implement every mutually compatible sug-
gestion for compensation and resettlement discussed thus far. Would that
make migrants whole in the sense of entirely offsetting the harms imposed
on indigenous ethnic minorities by dam building? It would not, at least for
most individual indigenous ethnic minorities or proper subsets of these
individuals such as families, clans, or communities. Although some indi-
viduals might prefer their post-compensation and post-resettlement lives to
the lives they had before displacement, many individuals and proper sub-
sets of them will not. As Michael Cernea writes, the "potential risks intrin-
sic to [development-induced] displacement" are "landlessness,"
"joblessness," "homelessness," "marginalization," "food insecurity,"
"increased morbidity and mortality," "loss of access to common property,"
and "social disarticulation." 269 Furthermore, one has to take into account
the costs-like disruption, stress, and trauma-of moving from migrants'
earlier lives to their post-compensation and post-resettlement lives.
Granted that some migrants may experience personal growth in the pro-
Morality and Individual Ideal, 36 PHIL. 1, 1-2 (1961), is a seminal paper on ideals. On
character, see CHRISTIAN B. MILLER, CHARACTER AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY (2014).
266. Xuezhi Guo, Controlling Corruption in the Communist Party: China's Central Dis-
cipline Inspection Commission, 219 CHINA Q. 597, 613 (2014). It is not encouraging that
Wedeman finds evidence that China under Xi Jinping had an increase in high-level cor-
ruption in the period 2012-2015. Wedeman, supra note 263, at 179.
267. E.g., Chris Buckley, China's Antigraft Push Snares an Ex-General, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 2014, at A6.
268. See, e.g., Andrew Jacobs & Chris Buckley, Presumed Guilty in China's War on
Corruption, Targets Suffer Abuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 20, 2014, at Al.
269. Michael M. Cernea, Why Economic Analysis Is Essential to Resettlement: A Sociolo-
gist's View, in THE ECONOMICS OF INVOLUNTARY RESETTLEMENT: QUESTIONS AND CHAL-
LENGES 17-18 (Michael M. Cernea ed., 1999) [hereinafter Cernea, Economic Analysis]
(citations and large and small capital letters omitted).
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cess of moving from the former to the latter,270 transition costs neverthe-
less exist in moving from one to the other.
2 7 1
The last forty years have seen many studies of responses to the stresses
resulting from dam displacement, economic migration, violence, and
related causes. The positive vocabularies employed in these studies vary:
resilience, grit, flexibility, coping, hardiness, positive emotions/psychol-
ogy, post-traumatic growth, and more. 2 72 These words overlap across
authors, and a given word may have somewhat different meanings for dif-
ferent authors. Perhaps the most common of these words in the psycholo-
gist's lexicon is "resilience," which usually means a person's capacity or
ability to adapt to adversity or trauma.2 73 It requires no imagination to see
that the development and possession of resilience in this sense are highly
advantageous to migrants displaced by dam projects.
Let us now turn specifically to dam-induced displacement, resilience,
and the ethics of development. We know that displacement creates serious
potential risks and that often these risks materialize. When they material-
ize, migrants frequently bear many costs of the resulting harms. They also
bear many transition costs of leaving a deeply rooted cultural and geo-
graphic community for a new and unfamiliar one. Resilience may lower
the costs of transition, but developing resilience requires the support and
270. See, e.g., Roni Berger & Tzipi Weiss, Posttraumatic Growth in Latina Immigrants,
4 J. IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE STUD. 55, 55 (2006) [hereinafter Berger & Weiss] (finding "a
moderate level of stress and a high level of PTG [post-traumatic growth] but no associa-
tion between stress and growth variables"); Jane Shakespeare-Finch & Janine Lurie-Beck,
A Meta-Analytic Clarification of the Relationship between Posttraumatic Growth and Symp-
toms of Posttraumatic Distress Disorder, 28J. ANXIETY DISORDERS 223, 233 (2014) (finding
linear and curvilinear relations between PTSD and PTG).
271. See David Eades, Resilience and Refugees: From Individualised Trauma to Post Trau-
matic Growth, 16 M/C J. MEDIA & CULTURE (2013) (suggesting that as refugees move
from their original social and geographical setting to a new setting, they lose "their
social network and cultural roots, resulting in a sense of homelessness between two
worlds" that is "outside normal time and place, a passage between past and future")
(citations omitted).
272. See, e.g., ANGELA DUCKwORTH, GmT: THE POWER OF PASSION AND PERSEVERANCE
(2016) ("grit"); Berger & Weiss, supra note 270 ("post-traumatic growth"); Eades, supra
note 271 ("resilience"); Barbara L. Fredrickson et al., What Good Are Positive Emotions in
Crises? A Prospective Study of Resilience and Emotions Following the Terrorist Attacks on the
United States on September 11th, 2001, 84 J. PERSONAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 365 (2003)
("positive emotions"); Todd B. Kashdan & Jonathan Rottenberg, Psychological Flexibility
as a Fundamental Aspect of Health, 30 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 865 (2010) ("flexibility");
Salvatore R. Maddi et al., Hardiness: An Operationalization of Existential Courage, 44 J.
HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 279 (2004) ("hardiness"); Martin E. P. Seligman & Mihaly
Csikzentmihalyi, Positive Psychology: An Introduction, 55 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 5 (2000)
("positive psychology"); Maria Theodoratou et al., Refugees' Coping Strategies, 4 J.
PSYCHOL. & CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 227 (2015) ("coping"). I leave to one side grand theo-
ries of successful human responses to stress, such as salutogenesis (the generation of a
sense of coherence and, more broadly, an orientation toward health). See generally
AARON ANTONOVSKY, HEALTH, STRESS AND COPING (1979); THE HANDBOOK OF
SALUTOGENESIS (Maurice B. Mittelmark et al. eds., 2017).
273. Malgorzata Pcilto, The Concept of Resilience in OSH Management: A Review of
Appraches, 22 INT'L J. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & ERGONOMICS 291, 291-94 (2016) (dis-
cussing the word "resilience" and the concept of resilience in different fields). For defi-
nitions of "resilience" in psychology, see id. at 292-93.
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resources that are frequently unavailable to ethnic minorities. In short,
indigenous ethnic minorities, as compared to other migrants, are some-
times more vulnerable and are less likely to be in positions that foster their
resilience.
If this conclusion is correct, then it is a start on an argument that
China has a moral and political obligation to take special steps to protect
its indigenous ethnic minorities when it is considering whether to build a
new hydroelectric dam. 2 7 4 First, is another dam necessary or at least
highly desirable all things considered? If not, that is a good but not deci-
sive reason why the government should not build it. Second, even if
another dam is necessary or highly desirable, should it be built in a partic-
ular area even though it will harm an indigenous ethnic minority? If not,
that is, again, a good but not decisive reason why the government should
investigate other locations to see whether they offer a better site. Third, if
no better site can be found, that is a good but not decisive reason why the
government should take all reasonable measures to minimize the resulting
harm and assorted costs that an indigenous ethnic minority will suffer. 2 75
Ill. The Chixoy Dam and the Fate of Maya Achi in Guatemala 2 76
In the period 1977-1983, the Chixoy Dam in the Rio Negro valley of
Guatemala was constructed amid widespread violence in the country and
against vehement opposition from the local population. 2 77 Some years ago
I discussed this case briefly with some of the sources available through
20 10.278 Now I use a much richer and up-to-date set of sources to examine
the Chixoy Dam controversy with specific reference to the compensation
and resettlement of Maya Achi villagers whose communal life was upended
by the building of the dam. This part discusses construction of the dam
and traces the relevant history of the region as well the effects dam con-
struction had on indigenous Maya Achi. I begin by sketching Guatemalan
history as it pertains to colonialism, land, and indigeneity in Rabinal Prov-
274. Brad Evans & Julian Reid make a stronger and broader point: "When policy-
makers engage in the discourse of resilience, they do so in terms which aim explicitly at
preventing humans from conceiving of danger as a phenomenon from which they might
seek freedom and even, in contrast, as that to which they must now expose themselves."
BRAD EVANS & JULIAN REID, RESILIENT LIFE: THE ART OF LIVING DANGEROUSLY 57 (2014).
275. This three-pronged suggestion is milder than the approach of Evans and Reid,
who offer a trenchant attack on current political uses of resilience. Id. at 202-03 ("Lib-
eral regimes are putting so much effort into imagining the necessity and possibility of
the resilient subject, equipped only ever to adapt to a world outside its control, because
in reality the real world is a human one, replete with politics, creativity, action, imagina-
tion and transformative potential.").
276. In this part, I owe much to the Spanish language skills and exemplary research
assistance of Michael Dutton. Jeremy Peretz and Sarah Rahimi contributed additional
research.
277. See Stephen R. Munzer, Corrective Justice and Intellectual Property Rights in Tradi-
tional Knowledge, in NEW FRONTIERS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 58,
67-68 (Annabelle Lever ed., 2012) [hereinafter Munzer, Corrective Justice]; Barbara
Deutsch Lynch, The Chixoy Dam and the Achi Maya: Violence, Ignorance, and the Politics
of Blame 5, 7-8 (Mario Einaudi Ctr. for Int'l Stud., Working Paper No. 10-06, 2006).
278. Munzer, Corrective Justice, supra note 277, at 58, 67-69.
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ince, where the Rio Negro is located. Next, I examine how the building of
the dam adversely affected indigenous Maya Achi in the Rio Negro valley.
Then I turn to the dam-related migration of many Maya Achi to other areas
of Guatemala. Finally, I discuss how the World Bank, the U.S. Congress,
and corruption in Guatemala have contributed to inadequate compensa-
tion and resettlement options for displaced Maya Achi.
A. Historical Context
In 1524, Spain invaded and colonized the territory now known as
Guatemala. 2 79 From 1560 to 1821, it existed as the Captaincy General of
Guatemala, and from 1823 until 1840, it was part of the Federal Republic
of Central America along with what is now El Salvador, Honduras, Nicara-
gua, and Costa Rica.2 80 Since 1847, Guatemala has been an independent
country with its borders as known today. 2 8 1 Authoritarian rulers in those
early years catered to the aristocracy and foreign business interests.
28 2
Jorge Ubico, who came to power in 1931 after a military coup, was such a
ruler.2 83 Even in the first few years of Ubico's rule, indigenous persons
were often enslaved, but a vagrancy law passed in 1934 made workers,
especially indigenous workers, liable to forced labor on plantations.
28 4
Ubico encouraged foreign investment, crushed labor unions, and favored
cash crops rather than sustainable food production for Guatemalans.
2 85
One scholar reports that at this time "[mlost of the country's holdings were
owned by U.S. business interests, particularly the United Fruit Company
(UFCO)," which later became Chiquita Banana Brands International. 28
6
The period 1944-1954 saw the Guatemalan Revolution: the progres-
sive Juan Arvalo succeeded the rightist Ubico in 1944, and in 1951, the
even more left-wingJacobo Arbenz GuzmAn followed. 28 7 Ar&valo's policies
included a labor code favorable to workers, a social security system, regula-
tion of foreign enterprises, and the encouragement of indigenous groups to
organize in campesino leagues to advocate for their interests. 28 8 Arbenz
also supported agrarian reform, which consisted of the expropriation of
279. Guatemala Profile- Timeline, BBC NEws (May 31, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-latin-america-19636725 [https://perma.cc/9MWX-PDADI [hereinafter Gua-
temala Profile]; Central America, BRITANNICA ACADEMIC (Aug. 8, 2018).
280. Capitan General, ENCYCLOPAEDiA BRITANNICA (Mar. 22, 2007); Guatemala Profile,
supra note 279; United Provinces of Central America, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 11,
2011); Guatemala, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct. 31, 2018).
281. Guatemala, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA supra note 280; Central America, supra
note 280.
282. Guatemala, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA supra note 280.
283. Id.; Jorge Ubico, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 6, 2018).
284. Guatemala, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA supra note 280; Jorge Ubico, supra note
283.
285. Laura Moye, The United States Intervention in Guatemala, 73 INT'L SOC. SCL REv.
44, 44 (1998) [hereinafter Moye].
286. Id.; Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, Big Fruit, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2008), https://
www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/books/review/Kurtz-Phelan-t.html [https://perma.cc/
9J22-KPRM].
287. Guatemala, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA supra note 280.
288. Guatemala Profile, supra note 279.
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plantations owned by UFCO or white Guatemalans, and the redistribution
of unused and fallow land from wealthy Guatemalans to indigenous Maya
groups.
2 8 9
Arbenz's policy change hit large landowners and foreign businesses
hard. UFCO had let vast amounts of land lie fallow for future use, and it
lost a third of its land under the Arbenz government. 290 UFCO also had a
monopoly on imports to and exports from the country, as it controlled the
railway, port, and fleet used for transporting goods.2 9 1 To gain control of
the Guatemalan economy, Arbenz ordered the construction of highways
and a new port.2 9 2 However, the C.I.A. began destabilizing the Guatema-
lan government, 29 3 and in 1953, President Eisenhower ordered the C.I.A.
to overthrow Arbenz. 29 4 After the 1954 coup d'etat that unseated Arbenz,
Carlos Castillo Armas-a U.S.-backed military leader in the coup-gained
power and began undoing his predecessor's policies: "He extirpated com-
munist influence, quashed agrarian reform, and broke labour and peasant
unions with considerable violence .... ,,295 The coup led to further mili-
tary governments and eventually a fierce civil war in the period from 1962
to 1996.296
It was in this strife-torn historical context that the Guatemalan govern-
ment decided, in 1975, to build hydroelectric dams as a way to avoid the
high costs of buying oil.2 9 7 Consorcio Lami, a government-hired consult-
ing firm, planned four dams, one of which would become the Chixoy Dam
across the Rio Negro. 29 8 The estimated cost of the Chixoy Dam alone was
$270 million. 2 99 The Guatemalan government obtained loans from the
Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB") and the World Bank for $105
million and $72 million, respectively. 30 0 The government obtained no
consent or input from the approximately 1,500 Maya Achi who lived in the
Rio Negro valley; in fact, initial feasibility studies of the area stated that the
valley was uninhabited. 30 1
289. Moye, supra note 285, at 45. According to PIERO GLEIJESES, SHATTERED HOPE: THE
GUATEMALAN REVOLUTION AND THE UNITED STATES, 1944-1954 149-62 (1992), the princi-
pal beneficiaries of Abbenz's agrarian reform were indigenous peoples.
290. Moye, supra note 285, at 45.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Guatemala Profile, supra note 279.
294. Moye, supra note 285, at 48.
295. Guatemala Profile, supra note 279.
296. Id.
297. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 2. The name is variously written as Achi, Achi',
Achi, and Achi the text dispenses with accent and diacritical marks.
298. Id. at 1. The name "Rio Negro" applies both to the river on which the Chixoy
Dam was built and to a cluster of valley villages near that river in the department of Baja
Verapaz.
299. Id. at 2.
300. Id.
301. 2 BARBARA ROSE JOHNSTON, CTR. POL. ECOLOGY, CHIXOY DAM LEGACY ISSUES STUDY,
CHIXOY DAM LEGACY ISSUES DOCUMENT REvIEw: CHRONOLOGY OF RELEVANT EVENTS AND
ACTIONS 8 (2005) [hereinafter JOHNSTON, CHIXOY DAm LEGACIES]. Johnston reports that
plans for the other three dams were dropped. Id. at 63. The name "Achi" applies both to
the people and to the language they speak. The word "Achi" in that language means
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Maya Achi are an indigenous people in their own right rather than a
mere subgroup of Maya people generally.30 2 Only in 1976, when a World
Bank-funded earthquake reconstruction survey identified the local popula-
tion, did Guatemala's creditors compel the government to create a resettle-
ment and compensation plan for the individuals who would be displaced
by the dam and reservoir. 30 3 Maya Achi themselves found out about the
dam when government officials, who flew over to the people living in the
Rio Negro valley, announced by loudspeaker that a dam would soon flood
the Maya Achi ancestral homelands. 30 4 Still, the government had to come
up with a resettlement and compensation plan, and it promised Maya Achi
homes, farmlands, trucks, boats, and tractors in return for giving up their
lands. 30 5
At this point, everything descended into chaos and violence. Maya
Achi met and created a "book" that catalogued their land titles in the Rio
Negro valley and riverbanks, recorded the government's promises, rejected
those promises as inadequate, and named two of their members to meet
with government officials in Guatemala City.30 6 On their way to the capi-
tal, the two representatives were kidnapped and disappeared along with the
"book," containing the land titles and record of promised resettlement and
compensation. 30 7 Maya Achi reiterated that they did not want to leave, and
"man." SERGIO NAVARRETE PELLICER, MAYA AcHI MARIMBA MUSIC IN GUATEMALA 229
n.229 (2005) [hereinafter NAVARRETTE PELLICER].
302. Some scholars classify the Achi language as part of a larger group of K'iche'
languages. See, e.g., BRrGITImNE M. FRENCH, MAYA EHTHNOLINGUISTIC IDENTITY: VIOLENCE,
CULTURAL RIGHTS, AND MODERNITY IN HIGHLAND GUATEMALA 66-74 n.300 (2010) [herein-
after FRENCH]. Historical, academic, and political relationships have maintained ethnol-
inguistic distinctions that make Achi people in many ways separate from K'iche' people
even though their languages are often considered practically the same. Id. at 1-5,
21-39, 58-76.
303. Barbara Rose Johnston, Chixoy Dam Legacies: The Struggle to Secure Reparations
and the Right to Remedy in Guatemala, 3 WATER ALTERNATIVES 341, 349 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter Johnston, Reparations in Guatemala].
304. See Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 2.
305. See Interview by Monti Aguirre with Crist6bal Osorio Sanchez (Apr. 26, 2004),
https://www.carnegiecouncil. org/publications/archive/dialogue/2_ 1 i/online-exclu-
sive/4454 [https://perma.cc/4UFL-Z7XQI [hereinafter Aguirre].
306. Id. See also JOHNSTON, CHIXOY DAM LEGACIES, supra note 301, at 40. The Maya
Achi leaders who were kidnapped and disappeared were Everisto Osorio and Valeriano
Osorio Chen. Id. at 3. 1 do not know whether they were related to Crist6bal Osorio
Sanchez (mentioned in note 298 supra). Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 67, states with-
out naming these leaders that "the mutilated bodies of the two were later discovered."
307. See Aguirre, supra note 305; Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 67 (calling the "book"
or "document" a Libro de Acta); Johnston, Reparations in Guatemala, supra note 303, at
349-50. Unclarity exists on the nature of these land titles. First, it is unclear whether
the land titles in the "book" were copies or originals. Second, Colajacomo, supra note
10, at 67, seems to indicate that the tides were communal rather than individual titles.
In contrast, Johnston, Reparations in Guatemala, supra note 303, at 349, writes that:
"[AIll the lands affected by the Chixoy dam had, at the time of development, properly
registered titles. The dates for the first inscriptions vary between 1883 and 1910. In
2004, of the 26 lots involved, only one lot was in the name of the developer (INDE),
while the rest were in the names of private owners, communal title or representatives of
the indigenous communities of the area. In other words, submerged lands, a portion of
the dam and the hydrologic works were built on lands still legally tided to their original
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violence erupted. 30 8 Across five massacres, paramilitary squads killed over
400 Maya Achi.3 ° 9 In one particular massacre, 107 children were killed,
and seventy-three women were raped and tortured before being mur-
dered.3 10 Later in 1983 during the filling of the reservoir, additional Maya
Achi were killed while attempting to flee or to resist forcible
resettlement. 3
1 1
The building of the Chixoy Dam on the Rio Negro in 1977-1983 occu-
pied a special place in Guatemalan history. It occurred during a civil war
between rightwing politicians, the army, and paramilitary forces on one
side, and leftist rebels, ethnic Maya, and Ladino farmers on the other.3 12
The war was coterminous with a period known as la Violencia, which was
marked by rebel atrocities and especially by the indiscriminate killing and
terror the Guatemalan government and its death squads inflicted upon the
rural poor.3 13 The local population consisted predominantly of Maya
Achi. 3 14 The government and its allies removed some villagers by force,
tortured others, and killed many.3 15 The treatment of Maya individuals
during la Violencia amounted to genocide and crimes against humanity. 3 16
The government offered only feeble resettlement efforts and even into the
new millennium refused to pay anything more than token compensation or
reparations to Maya Achi.3 17 Maya people generally make up nearly forty
percent of Guatemala's inhabitants. 3 18
owners. The failure [of INDE] to secure land title legally is a direct violation of loan
agreements and bank lending policies. In one instance of communal title, to retain rights
to cultivate upslope, the [communal] owners are still paying taxes on sub-merged lands."
Because Johnston hired a land title researcher (id.), her position seems more compelling
than Colajacomo's. INDE did not have tide to the land in question, except for one lot.
Id.
308. Aguirre, supra note 305.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 5.
312. STEPHEN CONNELY BENZ, GUATEMALANJOURNEY (1996); RACHEL MCCLEARY, DICTAT-
ING VIOLENCE (1999).
313. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: A GOVERNMENT PROGRAM OF POLITICAL MUR-
DER (1981).
314. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 3.
315. Johnston, Reparations in Guatemala, supra note 303, at 349.
316. Colajacomo, supra note 10. Former dictator Jos6 Efrain Rios Montt was con-
victed of genocide, though his conviction was later overturned by the Guatemala Consti-
tutional Court on the ground that he was cognitively unfit to stand trial. Id. at 355.
New legal proceedings began in 2017, and they continued until Rios Montt died on
April 1, 2018, at the age of 91. Efrain Rios Montt, in ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://
www.britannica.com/biography/Jose-Efrain-Rios-Montt [https://perma.cc/M9YD-
4CSX] (last visited Feb. 28, 2019).
317. 1 JOHNSTON, CHIXOY DAM LEGACIES, supra note 301, at 18-21. JOHNSTON's five-
volume report, the first four of which are in English and the last in Spanish, was submit-
ted to the Government of Guatemala Presidential Commission Human Rights, the World
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank, see Chixoy Dam Legacy Issues Study,
CTR. POL. ECOLOGY, www.centerforpoliticalecology.org/chixoy.html (last visited July 13,
2018).
318. As of January 23, 2019, the total population of Guatemala was about
17,467,853. Guatemala Population 2018, WORLD POPULATION REVIEw, http://worldpopu-
lationreview.com/countries/guatemala-population/ [https://perma.cc/QX5H-JXSE]
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One can trace the effects of the dam construction and operation on
Rio Negro Maya Achi and their descendants by (1) outlining the situation
of the inhabitants of Rabinal, where many Maya Achi still remain; (2)
examining the experiences of indigenous peoples living in Guatemala City,
where many Maya Achi moved in search of work; and (3) describing two
common work options for Maya Achi-the maquiladoras (factories that
make goods for export) and the palm oil plantations.
B. Maya Achi Then and Now
I begin with the entire municipality of Rabinal. Information on this
part of Guatemala is not limited to those affected by the Chixoy Dam, but it
helps to understand the average lives of those Maya Achi still living in their
place of origin. Next, I concentrate on the resettlement community of
Pacux, where most survivors of the Rio Negro massacres eventually went.
Finally, I deal with the resettlement of villages in and around Rio Negro.
1. Rabinal and Its Surroundings
The municipality of Rabinal, located in the department of Baja Ver-
apaz, had a population of 39,409 in the year 2000. The municipality
included the village of Rio Negro, Pacux, various other villages, and the
town of Rabinal.3 19 Over eighty percent of the population identified itself
as Maya Achi.320 Only twenty percent of the Maya Achi inhabitants of the
municipality lived in the town of Rabinal.321 The rest lived in smaller vil-
lages in the surrounding areas. 322 The economy of Rabinal depended
mostly on agriculture, especially the subsistence farming of corn and
beans.32 3 Roughly forty percent of the population was illiterate in the
early twenty-first century.32 4 Over the last few decades, the inhabitants of
Rabinal have seen a drop in the quality of life, owing to soil degradation
and inadequate land.32 5 Some eighty-seven percent of Rabileios, as the
denizens of Rabinal are known, lived in poverty and "nearly half of the
population periodically migrate[d] in search of seasonal agricultural jobs
(last visited Mar. 1, 2019). According to the 2010 census, Mestizos (Ladinos) made up
about forty-one percent of the population, and Maya groups (thirty-nine percent) and
whites of European descent (18.5%) added most of the rest. Id. Persons of African or
Asian descent constituted the remaining 1.5%. Id. It is not clear whether the figure for
total population included some 110,000 Salvadorans living in Guatemala. Id.
319. DoRA RUTH DEL VALLE COBAR, VIOLENCIA POLIrICA Y PODER COMUNTARO EN
RABINAL, BAJA VERAPAZ [Political Violence and Community Power in Rabinal, Baja Ver-
apaz] 46-47 (2004) [hereinafter DEL VALE COBAR].
320. Id. at 48.
321. Maeve Hautecoeur et al., Las Barreras de Acceso a los Servicios de Salud en la
Poblaci6n Indigena de Rabinal en Guatemala [The Barriers to Accessing Health Services
in the Indigenous Population of Rabinal in Guatemala], 49 SAUD POBLICA DE MP.XIco 86,
87 (2007) [hereinafter Hautecoeur et al.].
322. Id.
323. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 51.
324. Id. at 51.
325. See Julie Stewart, When Local Troubles Become Transnational: The Transformation
of a Guatemalan Indigenous Rights Movement, 9 MOBILIZATION: AN INT'L J. 259, 265
(2004) [hereinafter Stewart].
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or work in the capital."326 Most migrants were younger people, who often
opted for a job in the maquilodoras327 found in different parts of the coun-
try.3 2 8 Some young women migrated for jobs as domestic helpers. 329
Over the past few decades, some inhabitants have also gone to the United
States in search of work.330
Despite frequent migration, at the turn of the millennium "there
exist[ed] relative stability in the speaking of indigenous languages" in
Rabinal.331 Rabileiios were more likely to speak the language of their
grandparents than were many indigenous peoples living in other areas of
Guatemala. 332 For example, in the municipality of San Martin Jilotepeque,
in the department of Chimaltenango, 68.7% of inhabitants aged fifty or
older spoke an indigenous language, while only 20.4% of inhabitants aged
three to six spoke an indigenous language. 333 Because younger speakers of
indigenous languages were failing to replace older ones, the evidence from
San Martin Jilotepeque suggested that some, perhaps many, indigenous
languages might eventually disappear. By contrast, in Rabinal, seventy per-
cent of those aged fifty or older spoke Achi, and nearly sixty percent of
those aged three to six spoke Achi.334 Although those who stayed in
Rabinal tended to retain their families' language, many migrants living
outside of the department of Baja Verapaz may have had lower language
retention rates. Nonetheless, across Guatemala there was some support for
the use of indigenous languages, and this phenomenon may be linked to a
wider "heightened social and cultural awareness" among Maya groups. 3 35
Some of this support may have come from pan-Maya cultural
movements.3 3
6
Even with improvements in social awareness, the residents of Rabinal
lack necessary resources. For example, Rabileiios face financial, geo-
326. Id.
327. Often called maquilas, such factories also exist in Mexico and other parts of
Central America. See John Sargent & Linda Matthews, China Versus Mexico in the Global
EPZ Industry: Maquiladoras, FDI Quality, and Plant Mortality, 37 WORLD DEV. 1069,
1069 (2009).
328. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 50.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 152.
331. MICHAEL RIcHas, ATLAS LINGOISTICO DE GUATEMALA [Linguistic Map of Guate-
mala] 95 (2003) ("en . . . Rabinal existe una relativa estabilidad en al habla del idioma
indigena.") [in ... Rabinal there exists a relative stability in the speech of the indigenous
language.] [hereinafter RICHARDs].
332. Id.
333. Id. at 96.
334. Id. at 93.
335. Id. at 94 ("elevada conciencia social y cultural").
336. See EDWARD F. FISCHER, CULTURAL LOGICS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES: MAYA IDENTITY
IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE 4-6 (2001). Navarrete Pellicer, writing in 2005, suggests that
in Guatemala most Maya women spoke only their native Maya language while most
Maya men spoke both their native Maya language and Spanish. NAVARRETrE PELLICER,
supra note 301, at 232 n.40. Whenever Maya men and women moved to urban areas,
there may have been a trend toward Spanish monolingualism after a generation.
FRENCH, supra note 302, at 117-24.
Cornell International Law Journal
graphic, cultural, and linguistic barriers in accessing medical care.
3 3 7
There are few doctors in the municipality.338 Ambulances are usually una-
ble to get to the villages, so rural Rabilemios must often walk for hours to get
medical attention, even in emergency situations.339 Many Maya Achi claim
that health professionals intentionally discriminate against indigenous per-
sons. 34° Feelings of discrimination, coupled with a general fear and mis-
trust of authorities in the wake of la Violencia,341 have led many Maya Achi
to avoid health centers whenever possible.342 Women face additional bar-
riers to health care. Maya Achi women often feel uncomfortable being
examined by a male doctor, and a woman would not normally see a male
doctor unless her husband was present.343 Women are also less likely than
men to speak Spanish, and thus could have difficulty understanding the
instructions of a monolingual Spanish-speaking doctor.
344
The high cost and small supply of medical services in Rabinal contrib-
uted to the substantial use of traditional medicines. 345 For example, some
people seek medical help from "spiritual guides, medicine men, [and]
Maya priests. ' '346 Many women strongly prefer local midwives over other
health professionals when they give birth or seek pregnancy-related medi-
cal attention. 347 In one study, seventy percent of those interviewed stated
that at least some young people in the community used some forms of
traditional Maya medicine. 348
Many Rabileios mentioned a "collective pain"349 or "great sickness"
350
caused by La Violencia and the building of the Chixoy Dam. Effects of the
great sickness included "sadness, a feeling of injustice, fear, terror, horror,
337. Hautecoeur et al., supra note 321, at 86.
338. Id. at 88. In Rabinal, there was one doctor for every 10,000 people. Id.
339. Id. at 89-90.
340. Id. at 91.
341. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights characterized La Violencia as fol-
lows: "Between 1962 and 1996 an internal armed conflict took place in Guatemala that
resulted in enormous human, material, institutional and moral costs. The Historical
Clarification Commission (hereinafter 'CEH') estimated that 'more than 200,000 per-
sons died or disappeared during the internal armed conflict,' and that the State's armed
forces together with paramilitary groups were responsible for 93% of the human rights
violations committed, including 92% of the forced disappearances." Rio Negro Mas-
sacres v. Guatemala, Official Summary Issued by the Inter-American Court, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. 11 56 (Sept. 4, 2012), available at http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/
seriec-250_ing.pdf [https://perma.cc/DA3A-S55L].
342. Hautecoeur et al., supra note 321, at 92.
343. Id. at 90-91. The absence of a husband may be a common problem, given the
high incidence of periodic male migration for work.
344. Id. at 91.
345. Id. at 92.
346. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 182 ("los guias espirituales, los curanderos,
los sacerdotes mayas").
347. Hautecoeur et al., supra note 321, at 92.
348. OTTo RicARDo RvERA ALVAREZ, ORGANIZACION SocIAL MAYA ACHI': UNA APROXIMA-
CION A SAN Jost RABINAL EN LOS ALBORES DEL SIGLO XXI [Social Organization of the Maya
Achi: A Look at San Jose Rabinal at the Dawn of the 21st Century] 16 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter RivERA ALVAREZ].
349. Hautecoeur et al., supra note 321, at 91 ("un dolor colectivo").
350. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 183 ("la gran enfermedad").
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dreaming of those who were massacred, psychological torture, anguish, suf-
fering, pain, impotence, anger, frustrated and unresolved mourning, psy-
chosomatic problems, loneliness, traumatic memories, nightmares,
extreme distrust, rash behavior, panic attacks, nervousness, anxiety,
depression, lack of concentration, lack of personal autonomy, among
others."35 1
One can grasp changes in local power structures since the 1970s by
examining the cofradfas. A cofradia-a word translatable as "brotherhood"
or "association" -was once a group of important, financially powerful men
known as mayordomos.3 52 The cofradias, along with the Roman Catholic
Church, were one of the main pillars of Rabinal society. 35 3 These brother-
hoods were a link between the Catholic Church and indigenous communi-
ties and facilitated the adaptation of pre-Columbian traditions into
Catholic practices. 3 54 The cofradfas seemed to gain their respect and sta-
tus by organizing and funding religious rituals and community
festivities. 35 5
A non-Guatemalan interviewee familiar with community develop-
ments in Rabinal summed up nicely the political and social power the
cofradfas had before La Violencia and the construction of the dam: "the
kajawxeles here had spiritual power before; they organized the entire ritual
life, marriages, the memory of ancestors, the dead . .. they had political
power too because the mayordomos of the cofradfa would choose the indige-
nous mayor, who was a counterpart to the municipal mayor. '3 56 The
indigenous mayor, who was also the general administrator of all the local
cofradias, had significant judicial power. 357 The same foreign interviewee
stated that "the indigenous mayor was the judge, he was the one who
administered justice [by the principles of traditional law]. And if the indig-
enous mayor did not reach a just outcome or resolve the dispute, then he
would get together with the municipal mayor [who had the official title of
Justice of the Peace]."'3 58 Moreover, the members of the cofradias usually
consulted the municipal mayor about decisions to be taken by the
351. Id. ("tristeza, sensaci6n de injusticia, miedo, terror, horror, sofiar a los
masacrados, tortura psicol6gica, tormento, sufrimiento, dolor, impotencia, c6lera, duelo
alterado, problemas psicosomdticos, soledad, recuerdos traumticos, pesadillas, descon-
fianza extrema, desorganizaci6n de la conducta, ataques de pinico, nerviosismo,
ansiedad, depresi6n, falta de concentraci6n, falta de autonomia personal").
352. Id. at 142. Mayordomos are also known as kajawxeles in the Achi language. Id.
at 143.
353. Id. at 142.
354. Id. at 141-42.
355. Id. at 142.
356. Id. at 143 ("Aqui antes los kajawxeles tenian un poder espiritual, organizaban
toda la vida ritual, los matrimonios, el recuerdo de los antepasados, los muertos ...
tenian un poder politico tambien porque los mayordomos de las cofradias nombraban al
alcalde indigena, que era una estructura paralela a la del alcalde municipal.").
357. Id. at 87.
358. Id. ("el alcalde indigena era el juez, era el que practicaba la justicia [a trav&s del
los principios de derecho consuetudinario]. Y si el alcalde indigena no lograba la jus-
ticia o resolver el conflicto, se iba con el alcalde municipal [que tenia el nombramiento
oficial como Juez de Paz]").
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municipality. 3 59
Yet, by the early twenty-first century, the cofradias lost much of their
power and relevance. In one study, thirty percent of those interviewed said
that they feared the cofradlas were likely to disappear entirely.360 A major
cause of the cofradias' decline was the general poverty that afflicted
Rabinal: in tough economic times, nobody wanted to be a mayordomo and
expend scarce resources organizing and funding celebrations. 361 In Pacux,
for instance, the former residents of Rio Negro reorganized their cofradia,
but, because of the scarcity of basic foods like corn and beans, nobody had
enough food to organize a gathering.36 2 As one social activist and victim
of the civil war put it, "the cofradia is nothing but a symbol."363 Still others
in the community blamed the growing presence of Protestant groups for
the decreasing importance of the cofradias in Rabinal society. 3 6 4 Lastly,
the cofradia lost some support in the community because some Rabilmos
believed that many of the members of the cofradias had aligned themselves
with the military during the massacres. 365
Regardless of the causes, the decline of the cofradlas meant that local
political power was now more solidly in the hands of regional and national
politicians, rather than in those of indigenous community leaders. 366 The
mayordomos no longer played an important role as advisors to the munici-
pal mayor, and the mayor lost his function as a judicial official.367 The
waning of the cofradfas also presaged a loss of cultural knowledge. Before a
man could become a mayordomo, he would spend seven years studying the
rituals and cultural events Rabinal's cofradfas organized. 368 If the cofradias
were once the "center of community life"369 in Rabinal, it was not difficult
to see that at least some of Rabinal's traditions had disappeared during the
decline of the organization.
As time passed, some elements of the material culture in Rabinal dwin-
dled. Of those women interviewed who wove clothing and home decora-
tions, seventy percent said they learned how to weave from their mothers
and ten percent from their mothers-in-law. 370 Only sixty percent of those
interviewed said they have children who knew how to weave. 371 Though
the decrease was modest, it suggested a loss of cultural knowledge over
359. Id.
360. RIvERA ALvARsz, supra note 348, at 13.
361. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 146.
362. Id. at 145.
363. Id. ("la cofradia es como un simbolo nada mhs").
364. RIvENR ALvARELz, supra note 348, at 13. There was a sense among some in the
community that evangelical Christianity in Rabinal had divided the Rabileios and that
evangelical Christianity's stress on the individual undermined the traditional Maya
focus on the community. See DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 136-37.
365. DEL VALLE COBAR, supra note 319, at 144-45.
366. Id. at 81.
367. Id. at 85.
368. Id. at 143.
369. Id. at 143 ("el centro de la vida de las comunidades").
370. RIVERA ALvAREZ, supra note 348, at 22.
371. Id. at 23.
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time. Further, among those women who could weave, many had forgotten
the meaning of the symbols with which they adorned their clothes and
decorations. 37 2 Even more pronounced was a loss of knowledge in the
traditional ceramic arts. Of those interviewed who could create ceramic
art works (seventy-seven percent of whom had learned techniques from
one of their parents), ninety percent said that their children had not devel-
oped the necessary skill to make ceramic pieces and that the younger gen-
eration was simply not interested in producing ceramics. 3 7 3
At the same time, other traditional expressions of Maya culture seemed
to ascend. For instance, it became more common for members in the com-
munity to organize rituals with Maya priests. 3 74 This "resurgence," as one
scholar described it, was linked to the use of traditional medicines before
visiting a health clinic.3 75
Lastly, two groups relatively new to Rabinal started to have an effect
on the community: nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") and maras
(gangs). As to NGOs in Rabinal, some Rabileilos claimed that people
became accustomed to asking for goods and services, and that the some-
times paternalistic help offered by international NGOs led to less social
organization among the inhabitants of Rabinal. 376 Rabileiios also com-
plained that, owing to a decline in their earlier social values and to the
inaction of local military officials, Rabinal was suffering from crime and
terror at the hands of local gangs of teenagers. 37 7
2. Pacux: A Resettlement Village
After the survivors of the Rio Negro massacres spent two or three years
hiding from the military in the mountainous areas around Rio Negro, they
began to trickle into the resettlement village of Pacux, where many still
remain.3 78 As a report for the World Commission on Dams explained,
"[tihe resettlement village was one of the 'model villages' that the Guatema-
lan army had built to control guerrilla movements. A military base was
located at the entrance of the village and constantly controlled the popula-
tion."37 9 Former Rio Negro villagers met with even more violence when
arriving at Pacux: "for some days, all men arriving at the village were
seized, interrogated, mistreated and tortured by the army. Some of them
were left without water and food for 12 days, after the hard life in the
mountains, they did not survive the suffering and died."38 0 Some, who
refused to live in Pacux, left immediately for the coastal sugar cane planta-
372. Id.
373. Id. at 24-26.
374. DEL VALLE COBaR, supra note 319, at 173.
375. Id. at 174.
376. Id. at 177.
377. Id. at 184-85.
378. See generally Nathan Einbinder, Rio Negro Survivors Rebuild and Face the State, 47
NACLA REP. AMERIcAS 14 (2014) [hereinafter Einbinder]. For a detailed account of life
in Pacux, see 4 JOHNSTON, CHuxoY DAm LEGACIES, supra note 301, at 71-90.
379. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 7.
380. Id.
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tions or for work in Guatemala City.3 81
The move to Pacux transformed the life situation of the Rio Negro vil-
lagers. They went from each having 22.5 caballerias38 2 of land in Rio
Negro to just seven caballerias in Pacux. 38 3 Moreover, unlike the moist soil
near Rio Negro, the land around Pacux lacked irrigation water, which led
to a "loss of working hours for farming and difficulties in continuing tradi-
tional activities."'3 8 4 For example, residents lost access to the medicinal
plants that once grew along the river.3 8 5 The land around Pacux, wrote one
author, was "insufficient both in quantity and quality to feed the resettled
population. '38 6 The poorly constructed homes in Pacux, which were in an
"advanced state of decay," made no room for livestock or open-air commu-
nity areas. 38 7 And there were only 150 homes for 170 families.
3 88
Because of the lack of both agricultural lands and local work in Pacux,
many residents searched for work in the capital, the coast, or even the
United States. 38 9 Many younger people worked in the maquiladoras found
in other parts of the country. 390 Another option for younger people was
"three-year army service, where they [got] clothes, housing, food, and
[were] paid $60 a month."3 9 1 Women in Pacux often earned income from
working as domestic helpers in the town of Rabinal or by selling artisanal
goods.39 2 Though both men and women migrated for work, women were
more likely than men to return to Pacux and take care of children.
3 93
Most families became one-parent units headed by the mother.3 94 The
changed family structure resulted in part from males seeking work else-
where. But because paramilitary groups murdered more men than women
381. Einbinder, supra note 378, at 17.
382. A caballerfa is a unit of land measuring approximately 3,863 square meters.
Caballerfa, REAL ACADEMIA EsP.f-oLA, http://dle.rae.es/?id=6OAc9vw&o=h (last visited
Nov. 13, 2018).
383. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 10.
384. Id.
385. Id. at 11.
386. Stewart, supra note 325, at 265.
387. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 11.
388. Id. at 10.
389. See Horacio Martinez Paiz, La Metamorfosis de una Comunidad Achi: El Caso de
Rfo Negro-Pacux (The Metamorphosis of an Achi Community: The Case of Rio Negro-
Pacux) 291 (Museo Nacional de Arqueologia y Etnologia, Guatemala, J.P. Laporte et al.
eds., 2009) [hereinafter Martinez].
390. Id. at 291-92.
391. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 12. Colajacomo writes that "by a twist of fate, the
sons of those who died during the massacres of the early '80s are now becoming part of
the military system." Id.
392. Martinez, supra note 389, at 292.
393. Elisabeth Biesemans & Bert Janssens, Anexo A: Resumen de las Entrevistas de la
Investigaci6n Cualitativa [Attachment A: Summary of the Interviews from the Qualitative
Investigation], AsoCIACION PARA EL DESARROLLO INTEGRAL DE LAS VICTIMAS DE LA VIOLENCIA
EN LAS VERAPACES, MAYA ACHI (ADIVIMA) [AssociATION FOR THE FULL DEVELOPMENT OF
THE VICTIMS OF La Violencia in the Verapaces, Maya Achi] 45 (2004), available at http://
www.derechos.net/adivima/documentos/informes/chixoyvol3.2espan.pdf [https://
perma.cc/2UXT-AJGF].
394. Martinez, supra note 389, at 292; Biesemans & Janssens, supra note 395, at 45.
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during the civil war, widows and orphans became a visible portion of the
population in the generation following the war.3 95 The dearth of age-
appropriate males also led to men fathering children with more than one
woman: "many of these women who lost their husbands often found them-
selves obligated to maintain some type of relationship with the few men
who survived the massacres. This resulted in many of these men becoming
fathers or heads of household for multiple families."'396
Because so many older people were killed during La Violencia, survi-
vors struggled to remember and rebuild their traditions, such as marimba
music, traditional dances, or religious syncretism. 3 9 7 Moreover, the geo-
graphical change made certain traditions obsolete or impossible to con-
tinue. For example, one resident of Pacux recounted that it did not make
any sense to teach his children the old hunting techniques because the ani-
mals he hunted in Rio Negro could not be found around Pacux.398 The
same man said that he had not taught his children how to weave rugs
because the trees which provide necessary materials did not grow in
Pacux.399 One scholar described the move to Pacux as a disintegration of
the Rio Negro people's "complex and delicate system of internal regulation
(loss of traditional law, of the role of the chief and of access to places of
symbolic and religious importance). '40 0
As in the rest of Rabinal, the residents of Pacux suffered from the pres-
ence of maras. Interviewees told stories of robbery, violence, rape, and
intimidation at the hands of young gang members.4° 1 Many inhabitants
believed that the army refused to do anything to control violence and
crime. 40 2 And many of the older members of the community believed that
young people had lost the respect for communal life that was once com-
mon in Rio Negro. 40 3
3. The Village of Rio Negro
In the early 1990s, some families, driven mostly by economic and
social pressures, built homes on the steep slopes above what was once the
village of Rio Negro.404 Approximately 100 people came to live in the
395. Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 7.
396. Martinez, supra note 389, at 292 ("muchas de estas mujeres que perdieron a sus
esposos, se vieron frecuentemente obligadas a mantener algin relaci6n de pareja con los
pocos hombres que sobrevivieron a las massacres. Esto llev6 a que muchos de estos
hombres fueran padres o cabezas de hogar de varias familias.").
397. See Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 11; see Biesemans &Janssens, supra note 395,
at 47-48.
398. Biesemans & Janssens, supra note 393, at 47-48.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 42-43; Colajacomo, supra note 10, at 12.
401. Biesemans & Janssens, supra note 393, at 42-44.
402. Id. at 42.
403. Id. at 45.
404. See Felix A. Kupprat, Memorar la Cultura: Modos de Mantener y Formar las Iden-
tidades Mayas Modernas [Remembering Culture: Ways of Maintaining and Forming Mod-
ern Maya Identities], 38 ESTUDIOS DE CULTURA MAYA 145, 154 (2011).
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area. 4° 5 They dedicated themselves mostly to subsistence agriculture, and
supplemented their incomes with fishing and making artisanal goods like
textiles and metates (stones for grinding corn). 40 6 Because some tradi-
tional commercial routes were now under water, travel to and from Rio
Negro was more difficult than before the Chixoy Dam was built.40 7 Moreo-
ver, the most fertile land was now submerged in water; one resident of Rio
Negro commented that:
It's not like it used to be .... The best land was at the river's edge. We had
fruit trees-mango, peanut [sic], citrus, jocote, papaya, among others-and
we caught many species of fish. Now it's much harder, but it's still better
than life in Pacux. Here we have space for our milpas, and are free to
develop our community as we wish.
4 0 8
With money donated by a German development group, the villagers of
Rio Negro created a cultural center that served as a hotel and tourist desti-
nation for foreign travelers.40 9 The center provided food and accommoda-
tion for up to 30 people, and offered commemorative tours of the principal
massacre sites around Rio Negro. 4 10 The English-language advertisement
for the center read: "In Rio Negro, where the brightest and darkest aspects
of life come together, you can appreciate how the community of Rio Negro
has transformed suffering into new life."'4 1 1 Rio Negro eventually had a
school that offered bilingual education and classes that touched on themes
of violence in Rio Negro's history.
4 12
One scholar noted that the villagers of Rio Negro differed from other
Rabileios because of their shared experiences of massacres and displace-
ment: "[In this way there emerges a local ethnic identity based on rituals
and places of remembering that gain meaning within a very limited com-
munity."'4 13 Every year on March 13, the community began to gather to
commemorate the massacres. 4 14 The service involved a nighttime Maya
ceremony of prayers and offerings and a Catholic Mass on the following
day.4 1 5 Visitors came to the ceremony from Pacux and other communi-
ties.4 16 Remembering the massacres was a way for the community to
unify, but Rio Negro villagers judged the building of the dam and the ensu-
405. See Einbinder, supra note 378, at 18.
406. See Kupprat, supra note 404, at 154.
407. See id.
408. Einbinder, supra note 378, at 18. Milpas are small fields for growing crops, espe-
cially corn.
409. See id.
410. El Centro Hist6rico y Educativo "Rii Ib'ooy," CENTRo HisTORIco Y EDUCATIVO Rio
NEGRO, http://rio-negro.info/che/centro.html [https://perma.cc/E6DP-XBL7] (last vis-
ited Nov. 13, 2018).
411. Id.
412. See Kupprat, supra note 404, at 161.
413. See id. at 159. "Asi surge una identidad fmica local basada en rituales y sitios de
memoria que obtienen un significado dentro de una comunidad muy restringida." Id.
414. Id. at 156.
415. Id.
416. Id.
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ing massacres to be the cause of their current economic plight.4 17
C. Migration Patterns
1. Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala City
Displacement weighed heavily on Maya Achi, and the need for work
added to the burden. Disappointed by the low wages from agricultural and
plantation labor, many indigenous people tried their luck in the capital.
Two notable spaces in Guatemala City where indigenous migrants sought
work to provide for their families are La Terminal and La Brigada. For the
most part, the available sources do not distinguish Maya Achi from other
indigenous populations.
a. La Terminal
La Terminal is a large urban market in which indigenous migrants
often made their first entry into urban life in the capital.4 18 The migrants
lived mostly in substandard housing around the market or in the very mar-
ket stalls from which they sold their food and wares.4 19 These housing
options offered little space and no running water, and the necessary reli-
ance on public restrooms exposed the residents to even more of the crime
that surrounded the market.4 20 The average residence housed 6.3 persons,
with 4.2 persons per residence doing some type of remunerative work.4 2 1
High levels of illiteracy existed among residents. 4 22 Most indigenous
migrants at La Terminal were K'iche', but there were also other indigenous
groups.4 23 Indigenous migrants spoke their mother tongues, and most
women wore traditional Maya clothes, though both of these characteristics
were less common among younger family members.4 24 The families living
in La Terminal frequently visited their places of origin, and the men who
had not brought their families to the capital often had a "doble residencia"
and made frequent visits to see their families in their hometown. 42 5 For
many migrants, the move to La Terminal had a temporary or partial quality,
as migrants often worked there with an eye towards funding their lives back
home.
As one would expect, migrants who frequently visited their place of
origin maintained stronger links with their community and were less likely
to lose observable aspects of culture such as clothing and language. 4 26
417. See id.
418. MANUELA CAMUS, SER INDIGENA EN CIUDAD DE GUATEMALA [BEING INDIGENOUS IN
GUATEMALA CITY] 94 (2002) [hereinafter CAMUs].
419. Id. at 104.
420. Id. at 105.
421. Id. at 109.
422. Id.
423. Id. The K'iche'-speaking community was mostly from the departments ofQuiche , Quetzaltenango, Totonicapain, SololA, Retalhuleu, and the northern region of
Suchitep~quez. RicHARis, supra note 331, at 62.
424. CAmus, supra note 418, at 109.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 147.
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They were also more likely to limit their life in the capital to the area sur-
rounding La Terminal.4 2 7 In contrast, among those migrants who viewed
the capital as their home (especially young indigenous persons), there was
less use of indigenous languages, less wearing of traditional Maya clothing,
and a broader life in other areas of the capital.
428
b. La Brigada
La Brigada is an area on the outskirts of the capital with a high con-
centration of indigenous people from different areas of the country.4 29
Many of the recent arrivals came from Las Verapaces (Baja Verapaz and
Alta Verapaz). 430 About half of all male heads of household worked in
construction-an activity that employed up to twenty-five percent of all
workers in La Brigada.4 3 1 Women tended to make money by selling inex-
pensive goods or making tortillas. 4 3 2 Younger workers often labored in
nearby maquiladoras.4 33 La Brigada had a reputation for danger and suf-
fered from murders, rapes, muggings, and drug trafficking.4 34 To avoid the
maras, residents made sure to be home early. 43 5 Yet even within the family-
home problems existed, including alcoholism and domestic violence.
4 36
Family predominated in La Brigada.4 37 The average dwelling was a
room with five inhabitants, and two-thirds of La Brigada's residents lived
with their siblings, aunts and uncles, or parents.4 38 As in La Terminal, the
children in La Brigada had alarmingly low levels of education. 43 9 Most did
not complete primary school, and a quarter of the children over five years
old were not in school. 440 Still, unlike in La Terminal, it appeared that
many young dependents in La Brigada did not join the work force. 44 1
Many younger indigenous persons living in La Brigada linked being
indigenous to being poor and subordinated. 4 4 2 They tried to avoid the
labor of their parents, such as construction and domestic work, in hopes of
finding so-called "clean" jobs.4 4 3 The prospect of "clean" jobs perhaps
explained the attraction of maquiladora work among younger people.
A good example of these patterns can be found in NicolAs Sic, a resi-
dent of La Brigada originally from a Maya Achi village in Rabinal, who was
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 153.
430. Id. at 163.
431. Id. at 166-67.
432. Id. at 166.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 161.
435. Id. at 162.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 165 ("absoluta predominancia de la familia nuclear").
438. Id. at 164-65.
439. Id. at 168.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 196.
443. Id. ("empleos limpios").
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about twenty years old in 2002. 4 4 4 He came to La Brigada with his family
at the age of seven to do better financially and to escape La Violencia.44 5
His father worked in construction, and his mother, along with her oldest
daughter, her sister, and her niece, had a tortillerfa44 6 that supplied torti-
llas for food stalls at a maquiladora.4 4 7 NicolAs left his studies before fin-
ishing primary school and eventually worked as a salaried painter for a
company.4 48 NicolAs's oldest sister and his mother still wore traditional
Maya clothing, and they, along with NicolAs's father, still spoke Achi. 4 4 9
But NicolAs and his other siblings were unable to speak Achi, and none of
them wore traditional clothing. 450 Moreover, "NicolAs' new wife [was]
from the capital, and Nicolas [did] not assign to her any ethnicity."'4 5 1
NicolAs expressed having no strong ties to Rabinal and, though his family
had land there which his father still farmed, NicolAs had no desire to go
back.4 52 When asked about the possible ethnicity of his future children,
NicolAs said that they will be not indigenous, but "mixed. 4 53 According to
Camus, Nicolas sought "to avoid references to his life prior to his arrival in
the capital."4 54
La Brigada offered its undereducated youth few options, including the
consumption and trafficking of drugs.45 5 Many young workers tried work
in construction, commerce, and various trades; others sought their fortune
in the United States.4 56
2. Maquiladora Workers throughout Guatemala
Maquiladoras are an important source of jobs for poor Guatemalans.
One scholar, Liliana R. Goldin, defines the maquiladoras of Guatemala as
"export-processing, labor intensive plants that produce goods for interna-
tional capital."4 57 The workers surveyed in her research worked in the
industries of textile and apparel production, which in 2011 employed
around 75,000 people in some 195 factories throughout Guatemala. 45 8
Approximately seventy percent of maquiladora workers were young women,
444. Id. at 197.
445. Id.
446. Camus says that the tortillerfas are "key areas of employment" for female indige-
nous migrants. Id. at 322 ("espacio laboral clave").
447. Id.
448. Id.
449. Id. at 197.
450. Id.
451. Id. ("La mujer de Nicolds es capitalina, l la libera de una adscripci6n etnica.").
452. Id. at 198-99, 203.
453. Id. at 203 ("mezclados").
454. Id. ("trata de evadir las referencias a su vida anterior a su Hegada a la capital").
455. Id. at 348.
456. Id.
457. Liliana R. Goldin, Labor Turnover Among Maquiladora Workers of Highland Gua-
temala: Resistance and Semiproletarianization in Global Capitalism, 46 LATIN AM. RES.
REV. 133, 134 (2011) [hereinafter Goldin, Labor Turnover].
458. Id. at 135.
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who were preferred for supposedly being "docile" and "flexible."45 9 Work-
ers older than twenty-five were usually male and indigenous Maya.
460
They saw working in a maquiladora as better than working on the coastal
plantations, which was, according to Goldin, "characterized by semi-slave
debt peonage work environments and minimal salaries."
46 1
Maquiladora work was frequently part of a larger family diversification
strategy. Large numbers of Guatemalans sent young sons and daughters to
work in the factories while at the same time maintaining some type of agri-
cultural production with the aid of younger family members or hired
labor.46 2 Ninety percent of maquiladora households surveyed in Goldin's
study were also involved in agricultural production.463 On average,
"maquila workers [kept] approximately twenty percent of their wages and
pool[ed] eighty percent for household use."'464 Goldin notes that this
"access to cash mean[t] access to decision making [within the family
unit]."465 The wages earned in maquiladoras also enabled families to buy
consumer goods, including televisions, cell phones, and some kinds of
clothes.466
And yet, workers reported ambivalence about their jobs. 46 7 As nega-
tive aspects of the job, workers listed long hours, mandatory overtime, bad
treatment (such as verbal and physical abuse, a lack of bathroom breaks,
and intimidation), and working without food for many hours. 468 As posi-
tive aspects of working in the factories, workers listed friendships and
romantic relationships, new activities (like going out after work), avoiding
agricultural labor, and access to consumer goods.469 Goldin believes that,
for the maquiladora workers, "modernity represent[ed] a movement away
from agriculture, as it provide[d] access to the consumption of goods and
lifestyles available in urban centers and portrayed through the media."
470
Young workers viewed the "factory as a free zone where there [was] an
instituted lingua franca, Spanish, and where workers share[d] a common
experience that allow[ed] them to talk and legitimize their relation-
ships. '471 Class relations thus formed and sometimes superseded ethnic
boundaries; "poor Indians and poor Ladinos [were] defined as factory
workers and receive[d] the same wages."472 Moreover, because workers
459. Liliana R. Goldin, Maquila Age Maya: Changing Households and Communities of
the Central Highlands of Guatemala, 6 J. LATIN AM. ANTHROPOLOGY 30, 33 (2001) [herein-
after Goldin, Maquila].
460. Goldin, Labor Turnover, supra note 457, at 135.
461. Goldin, Maquila, supra note 459, at 36.
462. Id. at 38.
463. Id. at 39.
464. Goldin, Labor Turnover, supra note 457, at 135-36.
465. Id. at 137.
466. Id.
467. Id.
468. Id. at 137, 146.
469. Id. at 137.
470. Id.
471. Goldin, Maquila, supra note 459, at 38.
472. Id.
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came from different parts of Guatemala, many young adults found wives
and husbands in the factory who were not from their ethnic group.473
"Factory-based marriages often require[d] accepting a woman from
another town or permitting a daughter to leave town, as it [was] customary
for women to move into their husband's parents' home until they estab-
lish[ed] their own."'474
Young adults' decisions to work in the maquiladoras had profound
effects on traditional agriculture in rural Guatemala. The shift to the
maquiladoras meant that "these young men and women [were] not learning
the skills required to work in the fields."475 Some farmers said that
because of the lack of help from their children, they were unable to grow
the same amount of crops as they once could. 4 76 Many young maquiladora
workers viewed agricultural work as "our parents' jobs" and regarded it as
"too hard or tedious. ' 4 77 The fact that "land [was] too scarce and the
returns of existing lots [were] diminishing"478 further contributed to a lack
of interest in agriculture.
Perhaps because of the widespread ambivalence about the work, cou-
pled with the semi-independent status of many young workers, the maqui-
ladora industry reported high labor turnover. 4 79 Turnover was "volitional
in nature," as most workers quit for "voluntary reasons related to the con-
ditions of employment." 480 When young people were asked why they quit,
thirty percent blamed inadequate pay, thirteen percent said they had got-
ten married or had a child, and another thirteen percent were tired of the
hard work and forced overtime; eighteen percent said they had been fired
or fallen ill.48 1 Because of high turnover, and family economic diversifica-
tion, Goldin sees the workers "in transition, not fully proletarianized, but
keeping a foot in agricultural practices. '482
Along with the maquiladoras came the maras. Young men (often co-
workers at the maquiladoras) formed bands that were associated with petty
crime and disruption of the peace. 483 This sort of crime was sometimes
"perceived as a direct consequence of migration due to the presence of the
factories."48 4 Nevertheless, at other times, Guatemalans said that maras
were related generally to urban life and not specifically to the
maquiladoras.485
473. Goldin, Labor Turnover, supra note 457, at 136.
474. Id.
475. Goldin, Maquila, supra note 459, at 46.
476. Id.
477. Id.
478. Id.
479. Goldin, Labor Turnover, supra note 457, at 139.
480. Id. at 139, 146.
481. Id. at 144-45.
482. Id. at 151.
483. See Goldin, Maquila, supra note 459, at 37.
484. Id.
485. See id.
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3. Palm Oil Plantations in Sayaxche
Laura Hurtado Paz y Paz and Geiselle V. Sdnchez Monge discuss the
palm oil plantations in Sayaxche, Pet~n, Guatemala.48 6 At the end of the
first decade of this century, fifty percent of those living in Sayaxche were
from other municipalities and departments of Guatemala, including Baja
Verapaz. 4 8 7 The palm oil plantations of Sayaxch& employed approximately
214,000 migrant workers annually, with many of these workers coming
from Rabinal.48s Though a precise number of Maya Achi working on plan-
tations was unavailable, over half of Rabinal's inhabitants, periodically
migrated to work in the capital or as temporary agricultural workers.
4 89
There were both permanent and temporary migrant laborers in the munici-
pality, with the latter usually working one-month stints on the planta-
tions.4 9 0 The plantation companies, in order to avoid any liability or
responsibility, did not hire the laborers themselves, but instead paid third-
party contractors (contratistas) to find and hire the needed workers.
49 1
Contratistas often knew the laborers' community of origin well; being famil-
iar with the language and agricultural cycles, they served as a contact
between the plantation owners and rural indigenous laborers in other parts
of the country.4 92 It was often a full-time job held by older family mem-
bers; a contratista, in addition to finding laborers for the palm oil industry,
might work as an onsite manager for plantations that grew bananas, sugar
cane, and watermelon. 49 3
Through this arrangement, plantations avoided responsibility for the
laborers because all responsibility was transferred to the contratistas.
4 94
The contratistas hired the workers, transported the workers from their
place of origin to the plantation, and had to solve any problems that arose
during the trip or during work hours, such as accidents, illnesses, and
complaints by the laborers. 49 5 For example, in 2009, when thirty-four
workers were buried under debris after a mine caved in, contratistas had to
486. See Laura Hurtado Paz y Paz & Geiselle Vanessa Sanchez Monge, Precarizaci6n
del Trabajo Agricola en Plantaciones de Palma Africana en Sayaxcht, Peten, Guatemala
[Insecurity of Agricultural Work in African Palm Plantations in Sayaxche, Peten, Guate-
mala], in LA SUBCONTRATACION EN AMIRICA LATINA: MIRADAS MULT1DIMENSIONALES [SUB-
CONTRACTING IN LATIN AMERICA: MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEWS] 189, 191 (Juan Carlos Cells
Ospina ed., 2012).
487. See id. at 192.
488. See id. at 206. The authors describe Rabinal as one of "the great reservoirs of
labor for banana, African palm and sugar cane plantations." See generally id. ("los
grandes reservorios de mano de obra para plantaciones de banana, palrna africana, y
cafia de aziucar"). Most English-language sources speak of "palm oil plantations"
whereas most Spanish-language sources speak of "plantaciones de palma africana."
Even if the species of palm grown in Sayaxche was once native to Africa, it would invite
confusion to title this section "African Palm Plantations in Sayaxche."
489. Id. at 190.
490. Id. at 194.
491. Id. at 197.
492. Id. at 198-99.
493. Id. at 200.
494. Id. at 203.
495. Id.
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pay for funerals and pay damages to the family members of the
deceased.49 6 In part due to this arrangement, companies had scant reason
to better the working conditions of migrant laborers. Most companies in
the palm oil industry failed to pay even the minimum wage as established
by Guatemalan law.49 7 Workers who attempted to lodge complaints about
working conditions faced being blacklisted. 4 98
D. Congress, the Executive Branch, and the World Bank
It is impossible to give context to what has befallen Maya Achi without
seeing the building of the Chixoy Dam in terms of international economic
development and accordingly the role of the World Bank and the legislative
and executive branches of the United States government. The U.S. Con-
gress lacks direct authority over the World Bank.4 99 But, it tries to shape
World Bank policy indirectly through legislated instructions to the U. S.
Treasury Department. 50 0 Some instructions offer protections for indige-
nous peoples in Guatemala, but it is unclear whether the law on the books
will ultimately result in the protection of indigenous peoples in Guatemala.
This section gives an overview of the World Bank, describes statutes that
may protect indigenous peoples in Guatemala, and examines how these
legislated instructions may be enforced on the ground.
1. How the World Bank Works
The World Bank Group consists of five legally distinct international
institutions. 50 1 Two of these institutions form the World Bank: the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development ("IBRD") and the Interna-
tional Development Association ("IDA"). 50 2 The IBRD extends loans to
"middle-income and credit-worthy poor countries" for development pur-
poses.50 3 It is self-sufficient and raises most of its funds in the world's
financial markets.50 4 In contrast, the IDA provides grants and loans to
poor countries that are highly concessional in nature, which is why mem-
ber states replenish the funds of the IDA on a regular basis. 50 5 Guatemala
496. Id. at 204.
497. Id. at 205.
498. Id. at 225.
499. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 517. Malena Wilson's research assis-
tance on the World Bank helped me greatly.
500. Id. at 520.
501. About the World Bank, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about
[https://perma.cc/YZ5L-VHE9] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). [hereinafter About the World
Bank]
502. Id. "Together, IBRD and IDA make up the World Bank." Id.
503. What is IDA?, THE WORLD BANK, http://ida.worldbank.org/about/what-is-ida
[https://perma.cc/N8N8-QJAV (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting that IDA loans have a
zero or very low interest rate).
504. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank, http://
www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do/brief/ibrd [https://perma.cc/WGH6-JCF9]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
505. What is IDA?, supra note 505; Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 524.
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has received loans under the IDA.50 6
The IBRD and IDA are financially and legally distinct entities, but they
share the same president, executive directors, governors, and office
space.50 7 The World Bank consists of 189 shareholder member coun-
tries.5 0 8 Each member country is represented by one governor, who is usu-
ally the country's minister of finance or in a similar position. The United
States governor is the Secretary of the Treasury.5 0 9 The governors consti-
tute the Board of Governors and serve as the "ultimate policymakers at the
World Bank" and convene once a year.5 10 Each member's voting power is
based on that member's capital contribution.5 1 1 The United States has the
greatest overall voting power in the World Bank: it casts over fifteen percent
of the total votes in the IBRD 51 2 and over ten percent of the total votes in
the IDA. 5
13
The World Bank has twenty-five executive directors, who make up the
Board of Directors. 5 14 The five largest shareholders each appoint one exec-
utive director.5 1 5 The United States executive director is nominated by the
President and confirmed by the Senate.5 1 6 The other member countries
elect the remaining twenty executive directors.5 1 7 The executive directors
"meet at least twice a week to oversee the Bank's business, including
approval of loans and guarantees, new policies, the administrative budget,
country assistance strategies and borrowing and financial decisions."
5 18
The executive directors also select the president of the World Bank.
5 19 The
governors can delegate almost all their duties to the executive directors,
506. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 524.
507. Id.
508. Organization, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/leader-
ship (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). [hereinafter Organization].
509. Governors and Alternates, THE WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/BankGovernors.pdf [https://perma.cc/
S56F-HBV5] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
510. Organization, supra note 508.
511. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 523. This voting structure differs from
most other international organizations, where members cast their votes on a one-state,
one-vote basis. Id.
512. International Bank For Reconstruction And Development Subscriptions And Voting
Power Of Member Countries, THE WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
BODINT/Resources/278027-1215524804501/IBRDCountryVotingTable.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8MDT-773P] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting that the United States casts
15.75% of the total votes.).
513. International Development Association Voting Power Of Member Countries, THE
WORLD BANK, http://siteresources.worldbankorg/BODINT/Resources/2
78 02 7-12155 2 4
804501/IDACountryVotingTable.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PRT-8XBH] (last visited Mar.
1, 2019) (noting that the United States casts 10.36% of the total votes.).
514. Organization, supra note 508.
515. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 523.
516. Id. at 523. Matthew T. McGuire served as Executive Director until 2017. Erik
Bethel has served as the Alternate Executive Director since April 2018. Erik Bethel, THE
WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/people/e/erik-bethel [https://
perma.cc/5ZJW-6SQJ] (last visited Feb. 20, 2019).
517. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 523.
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519. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 523.
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and in practice the executive directors run the bank. 520
2. The Law-on-the-Books
It is highly unusual for Congress to be actively involved in policymak-
ing at the World Bank.521 In the last forty years, Congress nevertheless
passed many statutes to influence the policy of international financial insti-
tutions, including the World Bank.52 2 This legislation instructs U.S. repre-
sentatives at the financial institutions on how to vote and what policies to
promote or oppose. 523 Relevant provisions that could provide protections
for indigenous peoples in Guatemala exist in the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961 ("FAA"), as amended, and the International Financial Institutions Act
of 1977 ("IFIA"), as amended. 524
To illustrate, Section 262p-4o of the IFIA addresses the protection of
indigenous rights.525 It requires the Secretary of the Treasury to direct the
United States executive director of the World Bank "to use the voice and
vote of the United States to bring about the creation and full implementa-
tion of policies designed to promote respect for and full protection of the
territorial rights, traditional economies, cultural integrity, traditional
knowledge and human rights of indigenous peoples. '526
Other provisions exert pressure on foreign governments that commit
human rights violations by withdrawing financial assistance. Section
2151n(a) of the FAA prohibits assisting any government that
engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recog-
nized human fights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges, causing the
disappearance of persons by the abduction and clandestine detention of
those persons, or other flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the
security of person, unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy
people in such country.52 7
Section 262d(e) of the IFIA contains similar language, but provides an
instruction specifically to the executive. 528 Under this section, the United
States executive director is to oppose any loan or financial assistance to
countries "whose governments engage in a pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights, such as torture or cruel, inhu-
mane, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without
520. Id. at 523 n.35.
521. Id. at 555.
522. Id. at 519. ("Congress can and does protect its institutional prerogatives, and its
active involvement in this especially important international organization has been
ongoing-the rule rather than the exception.").
523. Id.
524. Both the FAA and the IFIA are codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. Key
provisions include 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 262d, 262m, 262m-2, 262o-4, 262p-4o, 262r-2,
2151(a)(1), 2151n, 2169, 2271(b).
525. 22 U.S.C.A. § 262p-4o.
526. Id.
527. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2151n(a). Query whether U.S. administrations have always
observed this section.
528. 22 U.S.C.A. § 262d(e).
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charges, or other flagrant denial to life, liberty, and the security of per-
son."52 9 This instruction does not apply to assistance that "is directed spe-
cifically to programs which serve the basic human needs of the citizens of
such country." 530 The adoption of section 262d followed Congress's dis-
covery that, though the United States reduced or eliminated financial aid to
specific governments that committed human rights violations, other inter-
national financial institutions increased funding to those governments.
53 1
The section sought to prevent the executive branch from circumventing
Congress's policy preferences concerning the distribution of foreign
aid.53 2
3. The Law-on-the-Ground
Congress often tries to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
5 33
Whether Congress is successful depends on the circumstances. First, Con-
gress must try to motivate the executive branch to implement its legislated
instructions as U.S. policy. Second, the executive branch must try to imple-
ment U.S. policy at the World Bank.
a. Congress and the Executive Branch
The constitutionality of Congress's legislated instructions to the execu-
tive branch is unclear. Beginning in 1988, U.S. presidents have repeatedly
issued signing statements that claim exclusive authority over the U.S.
share-of-control over the World Bank and that reserve the right to decline to
follow Congress's instructions. 5 34 But despite the constitutional objections
of presidents, the Treasury Department continues to implement congres-
sional instructions. 5 3 5 The threat of Congress to cut funding can be an
effective tool to achieve its policy goals for the World Bank.5 36 Because the
United States contributes a disproportionate share of resources to the
Bank, a threat to withhold these resources can sometimes move the U.S.
executive director and the World Bank to implement Congress's policy pref-
erences. 5 3 7 Congressional threats to cut funding, however, are generally
ineffective. If the executive branch already plans to reduce financial aid to
foreign countries, Congress typically has little leverage to restore it.
5 3 8
Moreover, Congress is unlikely to wield its power of the purse in every
instance. 53 9
529. Id. Query whether U.S. executive directors have always opposed loans to such
countries.
530. Id.
531. Daugridas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 530.
532. Id.
533. Id. at 517-19.
534. Id. at 542-49.
535. Id. at 547.
536. Id. at 533 ("Commentators have long acknowledged that Congress's ability to
cut off funding may well be its most important tool in shaping foreign policy-although
it is hardly an all-powerful one and can be tricky to deploy effectively.").
537. Id. at 534.
538. Id. at 540.
539. Id. at 533-34.
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Aside from the movement of Latin Americans toward the southern bor-
der of the United States, the situation of indigenous peoples in Guatemala
is not a visible issue in American politics. The relevant statutes that protect
indigenous peoples in foreign countries are buried in the FAA and IFIA.
The adoption of those provisions may have gone largely unnoticed, even by
other legislators, because most congressional instructions to the executive
branch are not the result of an open deliberative process, but are adopted
as riders to appropriations bills.540 Which riders make it into an appropri-
ations bill are often decided by a few members of Congress in leadership
positions, not by a majority of both houses of Congress. 54 1
Nonetheless, the political will to protect indigenous rights in Guate-
mala is not entirely absent in Congress. An appropriations bill of 2014
addressed the parlous situation of indigenous communities affected by
building the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala. 542 Specifically, Congress was con-
cerned with Guatemala's implementation of a reparations plan that was
finalized in 2010 and provided for the compensation of indigenous com-
munities affected by the construction of the Chixoy Dam.54 3 After Con-
gress finalized the reparations plan, Guatemala failed to honor its promise
to compensate Maya Achi. 5 4 4 In passing the annual budget of 2014, Con-
gress included provisions in the appropriations bill that conditioned
United States financial assistance to Guatemala on making meaningful pro-
gress towards the implementation of the reparations plan. 54 5 It appears
that Congress's measure contributed to the Guatemalan government's sub-
sequent decision to act. In October 2014, in response to increasing inter-
national pressures, Guatemala's president made a legally binding
commitment to implement the reparations plan.5 46
It is unclear to what extent Congress can motivate the U.S. World Bank
executive director to further particular policies. If Congress and the execu-
tive branch share policy interests, the U.S. executive director is more likely
to follow the letter and spirit of Congress's instructions. But if the execu-
tive branch does not share Congress's foreign policy preferences, Congress
has limited means to ensure that the executive director actually implements
540. Id. at 521, 534.
541. Id. at 534.
542. See Barbara Rose Johnston, Inside the Chixoy Dam Reparations Deal, CouNTER-
PUNCH (Nov. 14, 2014), http://www.counterpunch.org/2014/11/14/inside-the-chixoy-
dam-reparations-deal [https://perma.cc/LV39-63RF] [hereinafter Johnston, Reparations
Deal].
543. Id.
544. Id.
545. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-76, 128 Stat. 5
(2014). Under § 7045(c)(1)(A), any financial assistance for the Guatemalan army
requires the Secretary of State to certify "that the Government of Guatemala is taking
credible steps to implement the [Reparations Plan]." Id. at 543. Under § 7029(f), Con-
gress instructs the Secretary of Treasury to "direct the United States executive directors
of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to report to the Commit-
tees on Appropriations not later than 30 days after enactment of this Act and every 90
days thereafter until September 30, 2014, on the steps being taken by such institutions
to support implementation of the [Reparations Plan]." Id. at 508.
546. Johnston, Reparations Deal, supra note 542.
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Congress's instructions. 5 4 7 Although the World Bank has become more
transparent over the years, Congress has limited access to information
regarding the inner workings of the World Bank.54 8 In determining the
integrity of the United States executive director, Congress relies mainly on
public information, and the testimony and reports furnished by the Trea-
sury, which can be self-serving.5 4 9 Even if Congress is certain that an
executive director is implementing its instructions only on paper, Congress
lacks access to measures which can enforce more genuine efforts.
Congress appears to be in a better position to control the vote of the
U.S. executive director. There is generally less room for evasion in voting
instructions, although sometimes the executive branch may interpret the
voting instructions narrowly to circumvent congressional preferences.
550
It is also easier to monitor the compliance with voting instructions. Under
Section 262o-3 of the IFIA, the executive must make available online all
negative votes and abstentions of its United States executive director.
5 51
b. The Executive Branch and the World Bank
Any attempt by the executive branch to implement a policy of protect-
ing indigenous rights in Guatemala faces institutional hurdles. Officially,
the Board of Governors possesses all powers of the World Bank. In prac-
tice, the Board delegates most of its powers to the executive directors,
except for a specific list of broader powers. 552 The United States executive
director has no veto powers over day-to-day decisions of the World Bank
and shares the decision-making authority with other member countries.
553
Therefore, opposition to a loan for building a dam by the U.S. executive
director will not prevent the bank from approving the loan if a majority of
executive directors of other member countries cast their votes in favor.
5 54
To illustrate, shortly after Congress adopted Section 262d of the IFIA, the
U.S. executive director opposed, or abstained on, 112 loan proposals based
on human rights grounds.5 5 5 In spite of the resistance of the United
States, the relevant international financial institution approved every single
loan.556
547. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 553.
548. Id. at 551-52.
549. Id.
550. Id. at 541.
551. 22 U.S.C.A. § 262o-3.
552. Boards of Governors, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/
leadership/governors [https://perma.cc/6NZ8-US53] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). The
Board of Governors retained the powers concerning whether to "[aidmit and suspend
members; [increase or decrease the authorized capital stock; [dietermine the distribu-
tion of the net income of the [World Bank]; [diecide appeals from interpretations of the
Articles of Agreement by the Executive Directors; [m]ake formal comprehensive arrange-
ments to cooperate with other international organizations; [s]uspend permanently the
operations of the Bank; [i]ncrease the number of elected Executive Directors; and
[a]pprove amendments to the Articles of Agreement." Id.
553. Daugirdas, World Bank, supra note 18, at 532.
554. Id. at 526.
555. Id. at 531.
556. Id.
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Perhaps Congress and the executive can shape World Bank policy
more readily based on the prominent position the U.S. holds in the World
Bank. After all, the U.S. was the leading force in the World Bank's creation
in 1944. 55 7 All twelve of the World Bank presidents have been American
citizens. 558 The Bank is based in Washington D.C.5 5 9 And the United
States is the largest shareholder, and as such, the only member that retains
veto power over changes in the World Bank's structure. 560 So in light of the
special status of the United States, actors at the World Bank might cater to
U.S. foreign policy goals. But there is no guarantee that they will do so.
Especially in cases where the executive director has no genuine interest in
implementing Congress's policy, other member countries are unlikely to
defer to congressional foreign policy.
Even if the United States could be a force for good at the World Bank,
skeptics may doubt that it will actually be such a force in a way that helps
indigenous peoples in Guatemala. The historical context out of which the
Chixoy Dam emerged includes U.S. efforts during the Eisenhower adminis-
tration to destabilize the Guatemalan government in 1953, unseat Presi-
dent Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, and install the military leader Castillo Armas
as president that same year.5 6 1 President Castillo Armas halted agrarian
reform and broke up peasant unions, which adversely affected indigenous
Maya.5 62 There followed a series of military governments and a civil
war.
5 63
The development record so far is mixed. The Guatemala overview sup-
plied by the World Bank in April 2018 said:
Thanks to prudent macroeconomic management, Guatemala has been one of
the strongest economic performers in Latin America in recent years, with at
GDP growth rate of 3.0% since 2012 and 4.1% in 2015. In 2017, the coun-
try's economy grew by 2.8%, according to the latest estimates, and is
expected to grow by 2.6% in 2018.564
Even so, grinding poverty remains a huge problem. Guatemala "has
one of the highest inequality rates in Latin America," said the World Bank,
"with some of the worst poverty, malnutrition and maternal-child mortality
rates in the region, especially in rural and indigenous areas."5 65 Poor per-
557. The World Bank in the United States, Overview, THE WORLD BANK, http://
www.worldbank.org/en/country/unitedstates/overview#3 [https://perma.cc/H4WZ-
4MWS] (last visited Mar. 1, 2019). [hereinafter United States, Overview]
558. Id.
559. About the World Bank, supra note 501.
560. United States, Overview, supra note 557.
561. See supra text accompanying notes 281-90.
562. See supra text accompanying note 290.
563. See supra note text accompanying note 290. See also Moye, supra note 285 (dis-
cussing U.S. intervention in Guatemala).
564. The World Bank in Guatemala: Overview, THE WORLD BANK, https://www.world
bank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview [https://perma.cc/U666-252] (last updated
Oct. 4, 2018).
565. Id. This dismal record dates back to at least 2009. See generally THE WORLD
BANK, GUATEMALA POVERTY ASSESSMENT: GOOD PERFORMANCE AT Low LEVELS (Mar. 18,
2009).
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formance in these areas raises a question of whether GDP growth comes at
the expense of the least well off in Guatemalan society. If the Guatemalan
government decides that the World Bank and the IADB are not adequately
serving the needs of its people, it can approach the Development Bank of
Latin America ("CAF") and the Central American Bank for Economic Inte-
gration ("CABEI"). 5 66
c. Human Rights, Politics, and Corruption in Guatemala
Congressional instruction to the executive branch or the World Bank
to protect the rights of indigenous peoples would be beneficial. One ray of
hope lies in changes in Guatemalan politics. In 2015, President Otto Prez
Molina resigned because of a corruption scandal that was followed by a
wave of protests.5 6 7 The Guatemalan people rejected candidates from the
old power establishment and voted into office the political outsider and
former television comedian Jimmy Morales. 568 Whether President Morales
would make significant changes, in particular with respect to indigenous
rights, was uncertain in 2015.569
However, sources soon linked President Morales to retired military
officers, who were part of a military dictatorship that existed during the
civil war, and are themselves linked to human rights violations.5 70 The
military was partly responsible for the violence inflicted on indigenous
peoples during the civil war.5 7 1 Early in 2016, the police arrested eighteen
retired military officials who were allegedly involved in war-time mas-
sacres. 5 72 According to Amnesty International, "Human rights defenders,
in particular those working on land, territorial and environmental issues,
were at great risk."' 5 73 Criminal proceedings against military officials,
including those charged with crimes during the period 1960-1996, contin-
566. Guatemala is a member of the CABEI but not the CAF. In 2017, the CABEI
loaned Guatemala USD 137 million to support infrastructure and other projects. Repub-
lic of Guatemala, CENT. AM. BANK ECON. INTEGRATION, https://bcie.org/en/member-coun-
tries/founders/guatemala/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2019).
567. Elisabeth Malkin, Guatemalans Ousted the President. Now What?, N.Y. TiMEs
(Sept. 6, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/06/world/americas/guatemalans-
ousted-the-president-now-what.html [https://perma.cc/R8GN-JSZA].
568. Anna-Cat Brigida & Deborah Bonello, Former TV Comedian Elected in Guate-
mala, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2015, at A3.
569. Anita Isaacs, Op-Ed, A Wrong Turn for Guatemalan Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/06/opinion/a-wrong-turn-for-guatema-
lan-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/7JXQ-74RF] (noting that corrupt power struc-
tures appear to be deeply engrained in the system and that Morales lacks the support of
Congress necessary to achieve significant political changes).
570. Id.
571. See Johnston, Reparations Deal, supra note 542.
572. Elisabeth Malkin, Guatemala Arrests Former Military Officers in Connection With
Massacres, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/world/
americas/guatemala-arrests-former-military-officers-in-connection-with-massacres.htmI
[https://perma.cc/G78E-5KWU].
573. Guatemala 2017/2018, AMNESTY INT'L, https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/
americas/guatemala/report-guatemala/ [https://perma.cc/XYR6-C9YP] (last visited
Mar. 1, 2019).
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ued at a snail's pace and occasionally stalled. 57 4 Judges and prosecutors
had to work in the face of intimidation.5 75 "In January [2017], Sebastian
Alonso Juan was killed during a peaceful protest against the construction
of hydroelectric projects in the Ixquisis region of San Mateo Ixtat~n. ' '5 76
Recall Abouharb and Cingranelli's claim that honoring human rights
increases economic development. 57 7 Although there seem to have been
some gains in GDP in the period 2015-2018,578 perhaps there would have
been higher gains in GDP had human rights been respected. It is doubtful
that Guatemala has learned much from the Chixoy Dam massacres, 5 79 and
whether the World Bank has put enough pressure on the country.
Under President Morales, corruption in Guatemalan politics has con-
tinued. On August 25, 2017, Guatemala attorney general Thelma Aldano
and the head of an anti-corruption commission, Ivan Velfsquez, 58 0 asked
Guatemala's "Supreme Court to remove the president's immunity from
prosecution for alleged electoral crimes."58 1 Morales responded on August
27th by expelling VelAsquez and "declaring him 'persona non grata.'"582
Guatemala's Constitutional Court then temporarily blocked Morales's
expulsion order. 58 3
Some worry whether "an innovative hybrid international-national
experiment will be able to continue to serve as a model for combating cor-
ruption and impunity," not only in Guatemala, but "in other countries. '58 4
In Guatemala as well as other Latin American countries, the executive
branch of government dominates the legislature and the courts,5 8 5 which
makes it harder to pass anti-corruption laws that have any bite. Evidence
exists that the poor bear a heavier burden than others under corrupt prac-
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id.
577. See supra text accompanying note 42 and accompanying text.
578. See supra text accompanying note 558 and accompanying text,
579. See supra notes 86-89, 559 and accompanying text.
580. Under a 1996 peace pact following civil war violence, the United Nations created
the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala ("CICIG"). See Dudley
Althaus, Commission Has Powers, Popularity, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2017, at A7. The
CICIG appointed Mr. Velasquez, a Colombian prosecutor, to head the Commission in
Guatemala. Dudley Althaus, Guatemala Faces Political Crisis Over U.N. Probe, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 28, 2017, at A7 [hereinafter Althaus, Guatemala Crisis].
581. Althaus, Guatemala Crisis, supra note 580, at A7.
582. Id.
583. Elisabeth Malkin, Guatemala's Top Court Blocks President's Expulsion of Anticor-
ruption Chief, N.Y. TimEs, Aug. 29, 2017, at A8.
584. Charles T. Call, What Guatemala's Political Crisis Means for Anti-Corruption
Efforts Everywhere, BROOKINGS (Sept. 7, 2017), http://brook.gs/2vP66fz [https://
perma.cc/MF7J-ZLXX]. The international-national experiment is the CICIG mentioned
in supra note 582. See also Witte, Guatemala, supra note 99 (pushing against corruption
in Guatemala).
585. See RosE-AcKERmA, supra note 97, at 151-59 (discussing the difficulty in Latin
America of creating a judiciary that refuses bribes and a legislature that passes sound,
enforceable laws).
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tices.5 86 And yet, journalist Brook Larmer sees hope.58 7 Larmer writes
that "[a] central driver of the anti-corruption movement [in Latin America]
is a young generation of judges and prosecutors armed with greater inde-
pendence and, in some cases, tough new transparency laws."'588
E. Ethics of Development
The tale of the Chixoy Dam is a story of human rights abuse and ram-
pant corruption. It is insightful, then, to tie development ethics and the
ethics of dam development to the Chixoy Dam in Guatemala. Sired by U.S.
involvement in Guatemala since at least the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury,589 the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank loaned
Guatemala $177 million to build the dam.5 90 The Guatemalan government
obtained no consent from Maya Achi and to some extent withheld informa-
tion that the Rio Negro valley, where they lived, was even inhabited.
5 91
Only under strong insistence from Guatemala's lenders did the country
generate a compensation and resettlement plan. 59 2 Guatemala paid little
heed to the plan, reneged on its promises to Maya Achi, and was complicit
in the moral atrocities of kidnapping, rape, and murder of Maya Achi car-
ried out by paramilitary groups. 59 3 Even if sometimes, in a circumstance
of moral evil, good arises occasionally from the ashes, often it does not.
The literature on resilience indicates that post-traumatic growth can grow
out of horrific conditions, 59 4 and that has sometimes occurred in Latin
America. 59 5
Many harms from dam-induced development are foreseeable. Their
foreseeability suggests that those who set such dam-building in motion
have to reckon with these harms, unless development of some kind is nec-
essary or highly desirable, and unless all other alternatives have even
greater foreseeable harms. It makes sense for development lending institu-
tions, such as the World Bank and the IADB, to evaluate the risks inherent
586. See, e.g., Brian J. Fried, Corruption and Inequality at the Crossroad: A Multimethod
Study of Bribery and Discrimination in Latin America, 45 LATIN Am. RES. REv. 76 (2010)
(finding that in traffic stops police "officers are more likely to target lower class individ-
uals and let more affluent drivers off with a warning"). As the saying goes,
"Dependiendo del sapo,/ Asi es la pedrada," or "The stone you throw depends on the
size of the toad." Id.
587. Brook Larmer, Corruption Scandals Are Taking Down Leaders around the World-
and It's a Hopeful Sign for the Future of Developing Economies, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 6,
2018, at 24, 26 ("Corruption is being exposed, denounced and prosecuted more vigor-
ously, and at higher levels, than ever. And in Latin America, at least, these ... seem to
be the rumblings of a historic shift.")
588. Id. at 27.
589. See supra text accompanying notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
590. See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
591. See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
592. See supra text 305 and accompanying text.
593. See supra text 308-13 and accompanying text.
594. See supra text 272-75 and accompanying text.
595. See, e.g., Berger & Weiss, supra note 272, at 55.
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to displacement-risks that are well-summarized by Michael Cernea.596
Officials in a country that seeks to build a dam would do well to appraise
the risks to their inhabitants-indigenous and nonindigenous. These offi-
cials would likewise do well to appraise the transition costs borne by those
who will be displaced, and to take steps to reduce corruption that some-
times occurs whenever large sums of money from institutional lenders
come into banks in the recipient country.
Conclusion
The idea of indigeneity merits careful attention and revision. Under
traditional definitions of indigenous peoples, Maya Achi in Guatemala
clearly qualify as indigenous. They are a distinctive trans-temporal cultural
group who consider themselves different from other sectors of society and
who are historically connected to a pre-invasion and pre-colonial soci-
ety. 59 7 The 55 recognized ethnic minorities in China do not qualify. They
have no historical narrative of colonialism, and self-identification is irrele-
vant under Chinese government policy.598
Nevertheless, under the concept of indigeneity elucidated in Part I,
ethnic minorities in China are indisputably indigenous because they have
lived on what is now Chinese territory for hundreds if not thousands of
years. Also, they suffer from oppression, discrimination, and political and
cultural marginalization at the hands of the Han Chinese super-major-
ity.5 9 9 In the Chinese context, the absence of a historical narrative of out-
sider conquest and colonization does not matter. Insider Han domination
suffices. Ethnic minorities in China should be treated in basically the
same way as indigenous peoples in other parts of the world should be
treated.
The adverse effects of dam construction and operation can be limited
by rooting out corruption, compensating promptly those affected, and con-
tinuing to pay the costs of resettlement until displaced persons are securely
lodged in their new locations. Moreover, entities such as the World Bank
that loan money to foreign governments for power dams should demand
that sufficient funds be carved out for compensation and resettlement.
They should also demand that an audit verify that carve-out money actu-
ally goes to compensation and resettlement.
596. See supra text accompanying note 263 (citing Cernea, Economic Analysis, supra
note 271, at 17-18).
597. This sentence draws on a mix of the Martinez Cobo Study, supra note 2, and
Munzer & Raustiala, supra note 1.
598. See supra text accompanying notes 58-63, 78 and accompanying text.
599. See supra text accompanying notes 48-85 and accompanying text.
